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ABSTRACT
The defense establishment o f the United States underwent many changes after its
magnificent victory in World War II. Budget cuts and a rapid demobilization that
President Truman described as "disintegration" shrunk the Armed Forces to less than a
quarter o f their wartime strength in less than two years, just as the world's geopolitical
landscape was hardening into the bi-polar relationship of the Cold War. Adding to the
resulting confusion was Truman's successful effort to unify the three services in an
overarching National Military Establishment which eventually became the Department of
Defense.
The resulting pressures on the three military services led to a prolonged,
acrimonious inter-service squabble over position, mission, and funding which often
appeared to be merely selfish survivalism. Actually, the arguments which surfaced in the
late 1940s over the various proposals for employing nuclear and conventional forces arose
out of sincere and rational concerns for the best interests of the Nation.
Admiral Louis Denfeld served as the Chief of Naval Operations, the uniformed
head o f the Navy, from December 1947 through October 1949. He attempted to support
the policies of President Truman in public statements, during congressional testimony, and
in talks to his subordinates but was unable to satisfy all three groups. 1949 brought a
new, economy-minded Secretary o f Defense, Louis Johnson, to the Pentagon. Admiral
Denfeld soon came into conflict with Johnson over the new Secretary's preference for the
Air Force and strategic bombing over the Navy's aircraft carriers and tactical air
operations. Johnson chose Francis P. Matthews, an Omaha lawyer, as Secretary o f the
Navy, making Denfeld's position even more difficult. Denfeld attempted to compromise
and temporize his way through the resulting conflicts, but only succeeded in alienating
both his superiors and his subordinates.

The deep-seated bitterness in the Navy over budgetary cuts and seemingly
arbitrary restrictions boiled over in the summer of 1949, leading to Congressional hearings
on military unification and national strategy. This bitter episode has become known as the
"Revolt of the Admirals." Denfeld did not lead the "revolt." He tried to maintain a sense
of discipline, albeit ineffectively. Eventually, he sided with the rebels in his testimony, and
was promptly removed by Matthews, Johnson, and the President.
Congress, the media, and the public were divided on the removal of the Chief of
Naval Operations. The House Armed Services Committee concluded that his firing had
been a reprisal for his candid testimony before Congress and reacted angrily because this
firing might discourage future military witnesses from providing honest and open
testimony. The Senate Armed Services Committee also examined the firing o f Admiral
Denfeld but concluded that his testimony had not been the cause o f his removal. This
Committee agreed with Matthews' contention that many small matters over the course of
several months had rendered the Admiral unsuitable for continued service as the Navy's
senior officer. To date, no historical works about this incident have reconciled this
difference o f opinion.
This thesis attempts to show that Admiral Denfeld's Congressional testimony was
only a symptom of the real cause of his firing. His inability to communicate effectively
with his civilian bosses and to unify his subordinates in support of the administration led to
an intolerable situation in the Navy. Matthews never publicly explained his rationale for
removing his subordinate, but the Admiral's testimony was not the only cause of the
Secretary of the Navy's decision. Both Matthews and Denfeld have been neglected by
historians, generally being dismissed as the Navy's leaders in an embarrassing "family
feud." Nevertheless, they were both patriotic Americans and deserve a better legacy.
Their principal shortcoming was their inability to work effectively together.
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INTRODUCTION

"Admiral Denfeld was ousted because of'an accumulation o f many small conflicts on
policy making,' and not as the result of any one incident." (1950 news report o f a
statement by Senator Millard Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee)1
"The removal of Admiral Denfeld was a reprisal against him for giving testimony to
the House Armed Services Committee." (1950 House Report)2

This stark contrast in Congressional opinions on the cause of the October 1949
firing of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, is one example o f many
passionate disagreements between all parties involved in the "Revolt o f the Admirals."
This "revolt" marked the low point in the struggle for position and influence between the
armed services following their 1947 unification in the predecessor to today's Defense
Department. Many senior officers o f all services sincerely defended their often conflicting
concepts of what the United States needed for national defense. Drastic cuts in military
budgets and a growing Soviet threat at the start of the Cold War gave an even greater
sense o f urgency to this debate. Admiral Denfeld, traditionally a conciliator, decided on
27 October 1949 to take his stand at the head of the "revolting admirals" during a public
Congressional inquiry into military unification and strategy. Two weeks later, President
Truman, at the Secretary of the Navy's request, removed Denfeld from his position as the
uniformed head of the Navy and as a member of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff for a lack of
"loyalty to superiors and respect for authority."3

1"Denfeld Firing Probe Closes," Omaha World Herald. 31 January 1950, p. 1.
2U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Unification and Strategy. H. Doc. 600, 81st
Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 56.
3Letter from Francis P. Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
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Admiral Denfeld's removal punctuated the "revolt" and served as a catharsis for the
Armed Forces. President Truman had selected him to be Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) for a two-year term starting 15 December 1947. Admiral Denfeld had thereafter
led the Navy through the tumultuous battles o f military unification and oversaw the
dramatic draw down from its 1945 heyday. He set the Navy on a course to meet its Cold
War responsibilities in the atomic age. Despite these and many other tangible
achievements, most historical accounts have neglected, and the Navy has largely
forgotten, Denfeld's unselfish performance o f duty because o f his enduring association
with the embarrassing "Revolt of the Admirals." This attempt by naval officers to save
their service from relegation to the second echelon in national defense backfired badly.
Their allegations that the Air Force's weapons programs and strategic bombing doctrines
were inflexible, ineffective, and immoral resulted in an emotional Congressional
investigation. This investigation did not produce any immediate, tangible gains for the
Navy and caused great concern and frustration among the leaders of the U. S. defense
establishment. To them and to Congress and the public, the Armed Forces appeared to
have sunk to a new low in petty bickering and undisciplined, inter-service rivalry.
President Truman's dismissal of the Chief of Naval Operations, although resolving none of
the issues in contention, marked the end of this painful period in the evolution of the
United States Armed Forces.
The findings of the two Congressional committees which dealt with the "Admirals'
Revolt" continue to frame the debate concerning the CNO's removal. The House
concluded that Denfeld's dismissal was clearly a reprisal for testimony not welcomed by
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy. The Senate accepted the latter's
view that there was no reprisal, only an accumulation of many minor incidents which led
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to an impossible working relationship in the Navy's headquarters. None of the existing
historical works have settled this conflict.
Many historians have examined the "revolt" and commented on its consequences,
yet none have focused on the culminating episode in the struggle, the firing of Admiral
Denfeld. Moreover, scholars have not yet tried to settle the ongoing controversy about
what motivated this firing. This thesis will attempt to address these unanswered questions
and demonstrate that the Secretary of the Navy had, for various reasons, contemplated
removing the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) before Denfeld delivered his testimony to
the House Armed Services Committee. Although this testimony was not the only cause of
Denfeld's removal, it persuaded Secretary Matthews to decide to accelerate the
implementation of the plan he had already been developing to replace the CNO.
The opinions expressed in this thesis are based primarily on evidence obtained
from the archives of the U. S. Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the
Strategic Air Command and from the papers of President Truman, Secretaries of the Navy
Sullivan and Matthews, Secretary of the Air Force Symington, and Admiral Denfeld. The
resultant clarification of Secretary Matthews' motivations, while not a final and definitive
answer, should go far to settle the controversy surrounding the firing o f Admiral Denfeld.
Historians have written many analyses of the conflicts accompanying the Truman
administration's efforts to consolidate the armed services under one Department of
Defense. In doing so, they have consistently denigrated Admiral Denfeld and described
him as having been everything from "the consummate bureaucrat" to an "oleaginous
timeserver. "4 Some of his naval colleagues have attempted to defend the CNO but have

4Thomas D. Boettcher, First Call: The Making of the Modem U. S. Military. 1945 - 1953. (Boston:
Little Brown and Company), p. 139, and Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure America's Armed Forces. (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 96.
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had little success in reversing this historical judgment.5 The only depiction of Admiral
Denfeld in the Truman Library's museum is a blown up political cartoon that unflatteringly
casts Denfeld as a reluctant bride for Air Force General Spaatz in a military version o f a
shotgun wedding. Historians have caricatured Admiral Louis Denfeld predominantly as
"Uncle Louie," and trivialized him as an insignificant figure in an era of giants.
Discussions of the "Revolt of the Admirals" as early as 1950 concluded that
Denfeld was to blame for the lack of discipline and control in the Navy. These studies
denounced him as a "weak leader" and "a commander who was incapable o f controlling
his subordinates."6 Much scholarship in subsequent decades totally neglected him, and
where he is mentioned, his role is frequently misrepresented. Norman Polmar's biography
o f Admiral Rickover incorrectly describes Denfeld as "a naval aviator and former carrier
commander."7 Mark Perry's study of four star officers and Lawrence Korb's analysis o f
the Secretary of Defense's relationship with the JCS both attribute Denfeld's removal to
some sort of internal mutiny where the Navy's aviation community somehow forced the
CNO from his position.8 Navy Secretary Francis P. Matthews has suffered the same sort
o f historical neglect. His only claim to fame is his role as a "rowboat Secretary" who

5Admiral Arleigh Burke wrote that he had "a great regard for Admiral Denfeld" and that "a lot of other
people would have been worse." (Interview with Arleigh A. Burke, Admiral, USN (Ret.), "A Study of OP23 and its Role in the Unification Debates of 1949," Volumes III and IV, by John T. Mason, 1980 - 81,
U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, Transcript, 1983, U. S. Naval Academy Library, Special
Collections, p. 533). Admiral Radford stated that "only the fact that with Admiral Denfeld as its military
head, the Navy was united made it possible to keep going." (Stephen Jurika, Jr., ed., From Pearl Harbor to
Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press,
1980), p. 109).
6Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Truman MERRY-GO-ROUND. (New York: The
Vanguard Press, Inc., 1950), p. 455.
7Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 251.
8Mark. Perry, Four Stars. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p. 19, and Lawrence J. Korb,
"The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Conflict in the Budgetary Process, 1947 - 1971,"
Naval War College Review. December 1971, p. 26.
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briefly took on the Navy's brass in the revolt. Both men's characters and imprint on
history have been overlooked.
The best scholarly treatments of the period, Paul Hammond's "Super Carriers and
B-36 Bombers," and Jeffrey Barlow's The Revolt of the Admirals, portray the CNO as a
well-meaning but ineffective leader who found himself in an impossible position.
Hammond describes Denfeld's firing as "a true administrative tragedy, for the seeds o f his
destruction were inherent in the office which he held."9 Barlow concludes that the CNO's
testimony "sealed his fate," but shares Hammond's appreciation o f the difficulty o f his
position.10 Professor Isenberg's 1993 history of the modern U. S. Navy describes Denfeld
as being a "man of high moral principles" who "lacked something as an inspiring leader."11
Isenberg goes on to claim that Fleet Admirals King and Nimitz "were, by any measure,
head and shoulders over Louis Denfeld."12 Only Barlow has extensively studied Denfeld's
papers, but his monograph does not concentrate on the CNO. There has been no scholarly
effort to understand or assess Admiral Denfeld as a naval officer or evaluate the causes
and consequences of his removal. Secretary Matthews is similarly overdue for a thorough
reexamination.
In order to understand the causes of Denfeld's firing, one must first understand the
circumstances surrounding the "Revolt of the Admirals" and the personalities involved
therein. After laying this groundwork, this thesis will describe and analyze the events
leading up to the President's and the Secretary of the Navy's decision to remove Admiral
Denfeld, a decision taken during a painful period of military consolidation and
9Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy, and Politics," in
American Civil-Militarv Decisions, pp. 465-576, edited by Harold Stein, (Birmingham, Alabama:
University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 246.
10Jefffey G. Barlow, The Revolt of the Admirals. (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1994), p. 269.
1M ichael T. Isenberg, Shield of the Republic: The United States N aw in an Era of Cold War and
Violent Peace, Vol. I. 1945 - 1962. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 145.
12Ibid„ p. 165.
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reorientation. This thesis will conclude by seeking to demonstrate that the "revolt" and
Denfeld's firing offer many lessons on civil-military relations, naval leadership, defense
unification, and interactions between the Congress and the Executive Branch. These
lessons should be particularly relevant to today's national policy-makers and military
professionals who are engaged in a very similar process of military "downsizing" and
strategic reevaluation accompanied by its own embarrassments and confrontations.
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DEFENSE UNIFICATION TO 1947

"Proof that a divine Providence watches over the United States is furnished by the fact
that we have managed to escape disaster even though our scrambled professional
military setup has been an open invitation for catastrophe." (1944 magazine article by
then-Senator Harry S. Truman)13
"All the services, but the Navy and Air Force in particular, descended rapidly - far
too rapidly - into a gutter world characterized by spying, character assassination, and
half truths. In the process the true goal of unification, the strengthening o f national
defense, got lost." (1993 historical perspective)14

From 1798 to 1947, the responsibility for the defense of the United States had
been divided between the Departments of War (Army) and the Navy. The differences in
their missions, clearly based on the geographical division between land and sea, had
enabled the Army and Navy to prosecute the Country's wars successfully as independent
fighting forces. Rarely did their operations overlap until the growing mobility and
complexity of twentieth century warfare forced them into close contact and eventual
confrontation.15 The introduction of the airplane into military operations opened an new
arena for combat, one which overlapped both the land and sea and led to an acrimonious
inter-service struggle for control of military aircraft. The Billy Mitchell affair of the 1920s

13Senator Harry S. Truman, "Our Armed Forces MUST Be Unified," Collier's. 26 August 1944, p. 16.
14Isenberg, p. 115.
15Many historians have discovered the genesis of a formal, joint military system in the Spanish-American
War. Inter-service disagreements during this war convinced the services to create the Joint Army and
Navy Board in 1903. (U.S., Congress, Senate, Defense Organization: The Need for Change. Staff Report
to the Committee on Armed Services, S. Rept. 99-86, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, p. 276.) A recent
Defense Department publication, "Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces," also known as "Joint Pub 1,"
(Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991) attempts to show that joint operations have been
crucial to American military efforts since the Revolutionary War. Its uses the 1781 Battle of Yorktown
and the Mississippi River campaign of the Civil War as historical examples of joint operations. These
examples were actually the exception rather than the rule. The normal character of warfare prior to
World War II was service-pure rather than joint.
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is the most well-known episode in this conflict. Both services eventually regarded aviation
as necessary to the success of operations on land and at sea, yet neither service trusted the
other to provide the necessary air support. The expanding importance of amphibious
operations and of the logistics involved in supporting complex military and naval forces
also contributed to a blurring o f what had been a clear division o f responsibilities between
the Army and the Navy. By the outbreak of World War II it had become obvious to even
the most stubborn military traditionalists that the services needed to work together, but
this cooperation proved exceptionally difficult to achieve in practice.
Before World War Two, the United States Congress also perceived the trend
toward service unification and studied both the influence of aviation on military
organization and the prospect for unifying the two services under one Department of
Defense. Representative Carl Vinson, who would play a key role in the 1949 "revolt," had
served on the Morrow Board in 1925 which examined these issues in the wake of General
Mitchell's court martial.16 Although this Board had rejected arguments for a separate Air
Force and a unified Defense Department, the proponents o f these ideas did not give up.
The "economy bill" of 1932 originally contained a provision to unify the American
military, but this section was deleted on the floor of the House.17 In the 1930s, advocates
of unifying the small defense establishment primarily touted unification as an economy
measure. Although Congress did not then pass any reorganization bills, it demonstrated
its willingness to consider new ideas on defense organization.
World War II forced the services into close cooperation in all theaters of that
global conflict. Naval forces served under General Eisenhower's command during the
Normandy landings, and Army troops followed the orders of Marine generals in the island16Captain John F. Tarpey, USN, "Uncle Carl," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. January 1982, p. 38.
17Lawrence J. Korb, "Service Unification: Arena of Fears, Hopes, and Ironies," U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, May 1978, p. 172.
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hopping campaigns of the Pacific. The Pacific region was divided up into two regional
joint commands under Admiral Nimitz and General Mac Arthur to facilitate each exercising
unified command over multi-service operations in their respective regions. President
Roosevelt created the Joint Chiefs of Staff to parallel a British structure and gave this
body the responsibility to coordinate the operations o f the services throughout the globe.18
Despite these organizational shifts, competition and rivalry between the services
continued. Veterans of World War II saw a clear need for improving cooperation
between the services after 1945. Public pressure encouraging closer inter-service
coordination and even unification was such that in 1950, Rear Admiral Gallery observed
"through some magic process since the end of World War II, this word 'unification' has
become a fetish; anything with that label attached to it is assured to be sacred. Nobody
knows exactly what it means, but everybody is for it."19
Harry Truman, who as President became the chief standard bearer for this concept,
had served during the war as the head of Congress' "Truman Committee" charged with
inspecting and evaluating the homefront defense production, procurement, and distribution
systems. In the course of this two-year review, Truman found so many examples of
counterproductive rivalry between the services that he became "a staunch unifications!"20
In late 1944, after being chosen as President Roosevelt's running mate on the strength of
his work in the Senate, Truman published an article in Collier's entitled "Our Armed

18The Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has produced an excellent overview of the
development of joint operations and joint organizational structures titled "History of the Unified
Command Plan, 1946 - 1977." Although it is unpublished, it can be obtained from the Joint Staffs
History Office in the Pentagon. Other good studies of this topic include Paul Y. Hammond's Organizing
for Defense. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), Paolo E. Coletta's The United
States N aw and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. (Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press,
1981), and the introduction to the 1985 Senate Report 99-86, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed
Services, Defense Organization: The Need for Change. 99th Cong., 1st sess.
19Daniel V. Gallery, Rear Admiral, USN, "If This Be Treason
Collier's. 21 January 1950, p. 15.
20Tarpey, p. 40.
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Forces MUST be Unified." He believed current relations between the services to be
marked by "prejudices and jealous rivalries that masquerade as esprit de corps," and noted
the "stiff-necked contentiousness" of the uniformed leaders. He complained o f "the
operational gulf which yawns between the services" and advocated the disestablishment of
Annapolis and West Point as "competitive institutions." His overall solution was "the
integration of America's defense in one department under one authoritative, responsible
head."21 As one might expect given Truman's experience as an Army Captain during
World War I, most of his examples of poor inter-service cooperation faulted the Navy
rather than the Army.
When Truman became President upon Roosevelt's death in April 1945, he
continued to advocate service unification. Shortly after he took over, an observer in the
Oval Office noted that "Roosevelt's naval scenes had been replaced with a series o f prints
o f early airplanes."22 Although Truman's subordinates were hardly unanimous in viewing
him as an Air Force partisan, the new President was clearly less sympathetic to the sea
services than had been his predecessor who had served as Assistant Secretary o f the Navy
and retained a great fondness for nautical things. Secretary of the Navy Sullivan went as
far as to state that "it wasn't the United States Navy, it was Roosevelt's Navy, and he
protected them all through the years . . . [causing] the natural instincts o f self-preservation
in the Navy to atrophy. "23
Naval personnel, knowing of Truman's Army service and his 1938 Senate
advocacy for an air force "second to none," agreed with Admiral Radford, who saw
Truman as "a hard-line Army man."24 The Navy's civilian leaders were more charitable.
21Truman, pp. 16 and 63-64.
22David G. McCullough, Truman. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 402.
23Interview with John L. Sullivan by Jerry N. Ness, 27 March 1972 and 13 April 1972, Washington, D.C.,
Transcript, 1973, Harry S. Truman Library, p. 31.
24Ibid., p. 234, and Jurika, p. 83.
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Secretary Forrestal, who led the Navy from 1944 to 1947 before becoming the first
Secretary of Defense, recorded in his diary in mid-1946 that "the President is not taking
sides either for or against the Army or the Navy" and later noted that Truman "said he was
not prejudiced in favor of one service or the other - what he wanted was a balanced
system o f national defense."23 Forrestal's successor as Navy Secretary, John L. Sullivan,
agreed with this assessment. When asked in an interview if he believed Truman's Army
service caused him to be partial to the Army, Sullivan stated, "No, I think he was very
fair."26 Regardless of his prejudices, Harry S. Truman was now Commander in Chief of
all the services, and the Navy was forced to redevelop its capacity for self-preservation in
the ensuing debates over the implementation of President Truman's unification plans.
The military requirements and strategic landscape of 1946 differed markedly from
those o f the pre-war period. Whereas a typical 1930s combined Army and Navy budget
amounted to less than $1 billion, post-war funding for the defense establishment never
dropped below SI 1 billion.27 Nuclear weapons and long-range aircraft had seemingly
rendered much of military doctrine and weaponry obsolete and had made the Nation
vulnerable to a devastating enemy attack. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans no longer
served as shields to keep aggressors at arm's length. Professors Allan Millett and Peter
Maslowski have noted that "amid the casualties of World War II lay the corpse of
traditional American defense policy."28 Vast budgetary growth, changes in the nature of
warfare, and lessons learned from that war prompted renewed calls in the press and in
Congress for unification o f the armed services to improve efficiency and economy in
national defense. Only the Navy seemed to oppose these proposed changes.
25Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries. (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 152, 160.
26Sullivan interview, p. 32.
27Korb, "Service Unification," p. 172.
28Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United
States of America. (New York: The Free Press, 1984), p. 471.
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The Navy, under the leadership of its wartime CNO, Fleet Admiral Ernest King,
began, in 1945, to develop plans for its post-war forces. Its first plan called for a
peacetime force based around 14 battleships and 14 carriers, and reflected more the Navy's
traditional view of what it was rather than what it should be in light of lessons learned in
World War II regarding its probable future obligations. Admiral Radford was one o f the
few naval leaders who vigorously opposed this unrealistic plan.29 In November 1945, he
stated that "things were really in a mess. The Department as a whole and, worse, the
Navy at large had no guidance. "30 The only thing most naval leaders could agree on was
their opposition to unification, recognizing that their Army and Air Force counterparts
were generally unfamiliar with naval warfare and would be able to outvote them on issues
critical to the future o f the naval services.
At the same time, the Army Air Corps, under the leadership of Generals Arnold
and Spaatz, was aggressively endorsing the creation of a separate Air Force and had a
good plan and strategy to back up their ideas. They contended that their capability to
drop atomic weapons from long-range bombers would effectively deter any potential
enemy from attacking the United States, and, if this deterrent was ignored, the bombers
could quickly devastate an enemy's homeland just as they had done to Germany and Japan
in 1945. As commanders of this primary American striking force, the air generals felt
justified in cutting all organizational ties to the ground army. The concept o f a long-range
"atomic blitz" and an independent Air Force was not new. In the early 1920s the Italian
aviation prophet Guilio Douhet asserted in his Command of the Air the omnipotence of
strategic bombing. General Billy Mitchell and other U. S. Army Air Service officers had
quickly adopted Douhet's ideas and adapted them to American strategies. Finally, in 1945,

29Jurika, pp. 78-79.
30Ibid.,p. 81.
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atomic weaponry gave them the means to wield the strategic force Douhet had envisioned.
The only obstacle to attaining their objectives was the need to convince either Congress or
the Army and the Navy that the creation of an independent Air Force dedicated to
strategic bombing was in the nation's best interests. For obvious reasons, they believed
Congress and the public to be most susceptible to persuasion, and began a vigorous
campaign for military reform.
The Air Corps generals did not miss any opportunities to try to influence their
sister services as well. In November 1945, General Spaatz offered Admiral Radford, one
o f the Navy's ranking aviators, the chance to succeed Spaatz as the head of a combined
Air Force if Radford would support giving it command over Navy as well as Army
aircraft. Radford respectfully declined to accept this offer even though he considered it to
be "an alluring prospect" and "felt highly complimented."31 The armed services could
reach no agreement on any overall military strategy. And with President Truman's tight
limits on the military budget, all three services were cut to the bone. The inter-service
competition to develop an effective and politically acceptable strategic concept and
protect each service's place in the national defense establishment rapidly degenerated into
a public relations war which Carl Borklund characterized as "one o f the shoddiest spitting
contests in U. S. military history."32
President Truman introduced his first defense reorganization proposal in late 1945,
but opposition from military leaders and their Congressional supporters prevented
approval o f any bill until 1947. The President's initial proposal followed the lines of his
1944 Collier's article by placing the services under a strong Secretary and a single military
Chief o f Staff. This structure resembled the German General Staff, a pattern that

3Aurika, p. 82.
32Carl W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 45.
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Truman's opponents frequently charged was incompatible with a democratic form of
government. The Army fully supported this strongly centralized organization, but the
Navy vehemently opposed any efforts to establish a single commander o f the Armed
Forces other than the President. The admirals and their Secretary, James Forrestal, feared
that they would be subordinate to the ground and air services and publicly raised the
specter of a military "man on horseback" usurping the President's constitutional powers
and imposing military controls over the Nation.33 Secretary Forrestal also repeatedly
pointed out that no man would be able to control the vast defense establishment and retain
his sanity - an opinion he would tragically and ironically validate several years later.
Forrestal expended great effort studying the various unification proposals and even
commissioned an independent effort under Ferdinand Eberstadt to develop a defense
organization that would protect the Navy's interests while providing the economy and
coordination the President and the public sought. This 250-page report, completed in
September 1945, eventually served as the basis for the National Security Act of 1947.34
The Army and its air component opposed Eberstadt's weaker structure, and the inter
service arguments concerning the structure of a unified defense establishment continued
for two years. The leading naval officers in this debate, representing the new CNO, Fleet
Admiral Nimitz, were Vice Admiral Arthur Radford, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(DCNO) for Air, and Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, DCNO for Operations. Both were
naval aviators and played distinct roles, Radford taking the hard line and Sherman acting
as the contemplative intellectual. Both men acted in similar fashion in the 1949 "revolt."
As Forrestal's views began to gain the upper hand in the protracted negotiations, the

33Navy Secretary Forrestal was even urged by Vice Admiral Radford to resign in protest due to Truman's
adoption of the Army's plan. Forrestal chose to stay and fight, eventually successfully, in order not to "let
the Navy down." See Jurika, p. 93.
34Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries. (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 64.
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President's exasperation with his military leaders was obvious. In 1946, he stated that
"naval officers were engaged in propagandizing and lobbying" and that "the Air Force had
no discipline."35
The publicity machines of the two camps continued to present their cases to the
public. Neither camp favored restraint. A 1946 speech by Army Air Corps General Frank
Armstrong, Jr. at a "goodwill dinner" arranged by businessmen in Norfolk, Virginia, the
home port of the Atlantic Fleet, is a good example of the emotion and arrogance displayed
by both sides:
You gentlemen had better understand that the Army Air Force is tired of
being a subordinate outfit. It was the predominant force during the war, and
it is going to be a predominant force during the peace . . . and we do not care
whether you like it or not. The Army Air Force is going to run the show.
You, the Navy, are not going to have anything but a couple of carriers which
are ineffective anyway, and they will probably be sunk in the first battle.
Now, as for the Marines, you know what the Marines are, a small bitched-up
army talking Navy lingo. We are going to put those Marines in the Regular
Army and make efficient soldiers out of them.36
Given this type of ammunition, it is no wonder the military leadership seemed to explode
at the mere mention o f unification.
Despite o f - or maybe because of - his frustration with this squabbling, President
Truman remained convinced that greater central direction of the services was required and
forwarded a compromise unification bill to Congress.37 He signed the resulting National
Security Act of 1947 into law on 22 July. Richard Haynes has speculated that the

35Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief. (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), p. 100, and Millis, p. 149.
36General Armstrong's speech is quoted in Demitrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 151. In a later article, General Spaatz even asked "Why
Should We Have a Navy at All?" See Caraley, p. 100.
37McCullough, p. 476.
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President may have "deliberately allowed the services to pick at each other in public . . . to
strengthen [his] case for unification. "38
Whatever the cause, the true losers in this struggle were the Nation and the armed
services in general and James Forrestal in particular. The Armed Forces spent two years
wrangling over organizational structures and thereby drifted and fragmented, costing the
Nation dearly. A 1 May 1946 telephone conversation between Navy Under Secretary
Sullivan and Under Secretary of War for Air Stuart Symington clearly demonstrates that
this cost was obvious even to the partisans on each side:
Symington: I think that if we're going to continue to argue as to who did
this and who did that we're going to get ourselves in a hell of a mess,
instead of cleaning it up. I think the only people who are really suffering by
this argument is the country, the people, not the services.
Sullivan: That's rig h t. . ,39
So uncontrollable did the services appear to be that Admiral Radford concluded that
"ranking unification high in the list of problems that our leaders had to study and attempt
to solve in those immediate post-war days was one of the gravest mistakes ever made by a
president."40 But, taking a longer view in retrospect, the President's memoirs contend that
military unification was one o f the "outstanding achievements" of the Truman
administration.41
The National Military Establishment (NME) set up by the new legislation has been
described as "a loosely knit grouping of executive departments" and a "confederation

38Haynes, p. 97.
39Transcript of telephone conversation between John L. Sullivan and W. Stuart Symington, 1 May 1946,
Sullivan Papers, Box 7, File "Air Force," Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
40Jurika, p. 85.
41Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Vol. II. Years of Trial and Hope. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1956), p. 53. The best analysis of President Truman's role as a military reformer can be found
in Haynes, pp. 93-115.
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rather than a unified or even a federal structure. "42 This essay will not attempt to describe
its organization in detail, but suffice it to say that unification had not found its final form
under this legislation.43 An organizational chart of the NME is attached at Appendix I.
Secretary Forrestal was given the responsibility of coordinating all services' budgets,
strategies, and operations but was given little authority to enforce his decisions. Michael
Isenberg has written that
no one in Forrestal's modest suite of offices facing the Mall (he had only sixty
people at first) dared use the resulting acronym - NME - although ENEMY
was as good as any other single word to describe the bitterness and hostility
generated by unification.44
Precious little was accomplished under this structure other than intensifying inter-service
arguments.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were officially chartered under this act but received
no direction on how they were to resolve disputes between the services. In fact, rather
than becoming a unifying authority to settle issues, this body continued to serve as a forum
for inter-service wrangling. The chiefs who filled the JCS positions when the National
Security Act was approved were General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Army Chief o f Staff,
Admiral Nimitz as CNO, and General Carl Spaatz, as Air Force Chief o f Staff, all
distinguished World War II field commanders. These leaders were relieved by Army
General Omar N. Bradley, Air Force General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and Admiral Denfeld
between December 1947 and April 1948.45 The new group was obliged to hit the ground

42William Frye, "The National Military Establishment," The American Political Science Review. June
1949, p. 545, and Korb, "Service Unification," p. 175.
43Pages 543-555 of Frye's article provides an excellent discussion of the new organization's structure.
44Isenberg, p. 114.
45Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Key Officials. 1947 - 1992.
unpublished compilation, 1992. A good summary of JCS organization and procedures can be found in
Arthur A. Ageton, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret ), "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," Shipmate. July 1951, p. 3ff.
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running because budget struggles and disagreements about unification's ultimate form had
not gone away.
Economy had always been touted as one chief benefit o f unification. Defense
Secretary Forrestal struggled to achieve consolidation of the military budgets and
elimination of duplication, but was unable to persuade his uniformed leaders to place
national interests above their parochial service concerns. Instead, this consolidation of
budgets actually served as "an exhilarating stimulant o f inter-service rivalries."46 Outside
the privacy of their own meetings, Truman restricted the Chiefs to mere advocacy of the
administration's "party line" regarding defense budgets and strategy. Richard Betts
concluded that the Truman administration "positively politicized" the Chiefs, making them
administration spokesmen rather than military advisors. This policy contradicted the intent
of unification to make them "non-partisan professionals."47 Inside the Pentagon, these
professionals continued to expend much energy fighting one another. Into this lion's den
in late 1947 went Admiral Louis E. Denfeld as the new CNO and successor to the retired
Fleet Admiral Nimitz.

46Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions. (Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama
Press, 1963), p. 7.
47Richard K. Betts, Soldiers. Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1977), p. 53.
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ADMIRAL DENFELD TAKES THE HELM

"He is liked by everyone." (1912 - Midshipman Denfeld's Naval Academy
graduation yearbook entry)48
President Truman "asked me who I wanted for the Navy as CNO and I told
him the choices remained the same: Ramsey, Blandy, and Denfeld; that I was
somewhat concerned about Denfeld's political activity. . . . However, it is
obvious that the President would find Denfeld the easiest of the lot to work
with." (1947 - diary entry by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal)49
Louis Emil Denfeld was born on 13 April 1891, in Westboro, Massachusetts. His
parents, Professor Robert E. Denfeld and Etta May Denfeld, were the first generation of
each of their families to be born in the United States. Robert's father had emigrated from
Germany in 1848.50 The Denfeld family had already produced one U. S. naval officer by
the time of Louis' birth. George William Denfeld, Louis' uncle, had graduated from the
Naval Academy in the class o f 1877 and risen to the rank of Captain before retiring in
1905.51 Current Biography. 1947 claimed that Louis was inspired by his uncle to seek an
appointment to the Naval Academy.52 After Louis' graduation from the Academy in 1912,
his cousins, Fred and Richard, both followed in his footsteps, graduating in the classes of
1922 and 1952 respectively.53 Fred reached the rank of Commander, but Richard broke
48Luckv Bag. U. S. Naval Academy Class of 1912. (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Academy,
1912), p. 102. The Lucky Bag is the Naval Academy's yearbook. Each member of the graduating class is
allocated one page which contains his picture and a semi-biographical note, usually written by one of his
classmates.
49Millis, p. 325.
50Letter from Admiral Louis Denfeld to Karl Denfeld of Kassel, Germany, 23 September 1949, Denfeld
Papers, Box 3, File "Denfeld," Naval Historical Center Archives, Washington, D. C., and Naval Office of
Information, Biographical Sketch, Admiral Louis Emil Denfeld, U.S. Navy, Retired, 20 December 1967.
5U nited States Naval Academy Alumni Association, Register of Alumni. (Annapolis, Maryland: U. S.
Naval Academy Alumni Association, Inc., 1987), p. 143.
52Anna Rothe, ed., Current Biography. 1947. (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1948), p. 160.
53U. S. Naval Academy, Register of Alumni, pp. 184 and 295, Letter from Admiral Louis Denfeld to
Congressman Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, 10 November 1948, Denfeld Papers, Box 3, File "Denfeld,"

20

with the family's Navy tradition by transferring to the Air Force upon graduation and rising
to the rank of Colonel before retirement.54
Louis was a remarkable midshipman only in his lack o f noteworthy achievement.
He stood 88th in a class o f 156, and his graduation entry in the Lucky Bag notes his
pleasant disposition but makes no mention of his having attained any leadership positions
in the Midshipman regiment or in any team sports.55 His roommate, Ralph Parr, held a
"three-striper" leadership position while lettering in basketball and distinguishing himself
as a rifleman. Other classmates who later achieved public recognition included Richard E.
Byrd, the famous polar explorer, and DeWitt Clinton Ramsey, one o f Denfeld's
competitors for the CNO position in 1947. The Lucky Bag described Louis Denfeld as "a
rough-house kid with a happy-go-lucky disposition, . . . [and] often one of the boys."56
To accompany his personal entry and picture, Louis chose an intriguing quotation, given
his future fame as the half-hearted leader of rebellious admirals: "Where ignorance is bliss,
'tis folly to be wise."57 As CNO, Admiral Denfeld was often criticized for ignoring or
delegating difficult problems rather than taking them on himself.
After graduation, Denfeld was commissioned an Ensign and served in succession
on battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. In 1915, he married Rachel Metcalf and returned
to sea duty, eventually rising to command the destroyer U.S.S. McCall at the end of
World War I. In 1922, he completed submarine training and served during 1923 and 1924
in the submarine force where he earned the submariners' gold dolphins and commanded
the submarine S-24. Afterward, Denfeld began to serve in staff billets, beginning with two
Naval Historical Center Archives, Washington, D. C., Telegram from Admiral Louis Denfeld to Admiral
Roper, 23 April 1948, Denfeld Papers, Box 3, File "Denfeld," Naval Historical Center Archives,
Washington, D. C., and interview with Richard Denfeld, telephone, 14 February 1995.
54U. S. Naval Academy, Register of Alumni, p. 295.
55Ibid., p. 163, and Lucky Bag, p. 102.
56Luckv Bag, p. 102.
57Ibid.
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years in the Office of the CNO followed by a brief destroyer command. Thereafter,
Admiral Richard Leigh, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet's Battleship Division, selected
Commander Denfeld to be his aide, a position he retained as Admiral Leigh rose to
command the United States Fleet in 1933. Following additional sea and shore
assignments, in June 1937, Denfeld was chosen to be the aide of the CNO who became his
chief patron, Admiral William Leahy.58
During World War II, Captain Denfeld served as the Chief of Staff for the
Commander of the Navy's Atlantic Support Force, coordinating the escorts for North
Atlantic convoys bound for Great Britain. He then moved to the Navy's Bureau of
Personnel as Assistant Chief and supervised the manning o f the wartime Navy from early
1942 through March 1945. Admiral King finally awarded Rear Admiral Denfeld a sea
command toward the end o f the Pacific war, assigning him to lead Battleship Division
Nine under Admiral Halsey in support of the Okinawa landings and naval operations
against the Japanese home islands. Immediately after the Japanese surrender Denfeld was
ordered to Washington to head the Bureau of Personnel and coordinate the Navy's
demobilization. Denfeld ably managed the Navy's manpower pool from August 1945
through February 1947 under the new CNO, Admiral Nimitz. Through his routine
opportunities to testify before Congress on personnel issues, he made important contacts
which would facilitate his later becoming an effective advocate of the Navy's interests as
CNO.59 Admiral Nimitz rewarded Denfeld in February 1947 by awarding him a fourth

58Naval Office of Information, Biographical Sketch, Admiral Louis Emil Denfeld, U.S. Navy, Retired, 20
December 1967 and Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations. (Annapolis, Maryland:
Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 193.
59See Sullivan Papers, Box 7, File "Denfeld," and Secretary of the Navy appointment calendar, Truman
Library, Independence, Missouri for examples of contacts with Congressional and Executive Branch
leaders.
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star and making him Commander in Chief of the Navy's Pacific Fleet and o f the joint
Pacific Command, Admiral Nimitz's wartime position.60
Although Admiral Denfeld had now escaped from the tense Washington
atmosphere and could enjoy the warm Hawaii sun, his name remained on the lips of the
NME's leaders. Secretary Forrestal wrote him a friendly, conversational letter in May
1947 giving his ex-personnel chief an update on the current budget negotiations.61
Speculation had also already begun regarding Admiral Nimitz's successor as CNO, since
his 2-year term was due to expire in December. Nimitz provided his recommendations to
his civilian superiors at the end of the summer. He favored Admirals W. H. P. Blandy,
DeWitt C. Ramsey, Richard L. Connoly, Charles M. Cooke, and Louis E. Denfeld as
suitable candidates to fill his position.62 Blandy, Connoly, and Cooke were surface ship
officers in the standard naval tradition, and all had impressive combat service records.
Ramsey, an academy classmate of Denfeld's, had made his mark in the Navy as an aviator
and had commanded an aircraft carrier with great success against the Japanese. Admiral
Denfeld was the only candidate with extensive Washington experience, and his patron,
Admiral Leahy, still exercised great influence in the Nation's capital.
As Secretary Forrestal narrowed his choices, he received recommendations for
Cooke from retired Fleet Admiral King and for Denfeld from Leahy. Nimitz gave no
preference. By early October, the Secretary had narrowed his choices to Denfeld,
Ramsey, or Blandy and discussed his difficult decision with the President. Professor
Isenberg has concluded that Leahy's recommendation helped determine the President's
choice of a new CNO because Leahy had served as Truman's Chief of Staff and was

60Ibid., andRothe, Current Biography. 1947. pp. 161-62.
61Millis, p. 275.
62Love, The Chiefs of Naval Operations, p. 193.
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"practically the only naval officer the President trusted."63 Forrestal suggested that
Denfeld would be "the easiest of the lot to work with," and this seemed to Truman to be
the deciding argument.64 Given the fact that no candidate appeared markedly superior to
the others, the President was hesitant to give his new CNO a full four-year term, the
maximum authorized under the regulations. Nimitz had served for only two years, a fact
that the Admiral "regretted and rather resented,"65 and the President saw no reason to
grant a longer commission to his successor. It has been asserted that Denfeld's two year
term in some way reflected of the President's lack of confidence in him, but this can not be
demonstrated with any credibility.66 The President made his choice on 12 November
1947, and the very next day, Admiral Denfeld began work in Washington by meeting with
Secretary Forrestal and senior naval aviators on "Project A," the Navy's code name for the
newly designed flush-deck aircraft carrier, later popularized as the "supercarrier" and
destined to play an important part in the unfolding saga of unification.67 On 15 December
1947, Admiral Denfeld officially relieved Nimitz.
The new CNO was very familiar with the Navy's organization, having spent five of
the last eight years in Washington. His official primary duty was "to command the
operating forces and be responsible to the Secretary o f the Navy for their use." He was
also to serve as the "principal naval advisor to the President and to the Secretary o f the
Navy on the conduct of war, . . . [and to be] the Navy member of the Joint Chiefs of

63Isenberg, p. 145, and Henry H. Adams, Witness to Power: The Life of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.
(Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute Press, 1985), p. 328.
64Millis, p. 325.
65Potter, Nimitz. p. 428.
66Isenberg, p. 145.
67Sullivan Papers, Box 8, Secretary of the Navy appointment calendar, Truman Library, Independence,
Missouri.
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Staff."68 Because the Navy Department also included the Marine Corps, Denfeld became
the advocate for the Marines in the JCS. The Commandant of the Marine Corps did not
become a full-fledged JCS member until the Eisenhower administration.
Denfeld was authorized to assign a Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) and
no more than six Deputy Chiefs o f Naval Operations (DCNOs) to assist him in meeting his
responsibilities. The structure Denfeld inherited included five DCNOs: "OPOl" took
charge o f personnel matters, "OP02" dealt with administration, "OP03" was responsible
for operations, "OP04" oversaw the Navy's logistics, and "OP05" ran the Navy's aviation
programs.69 A Navy Department organizational chart is attached in Appendix I. Shortly
after assuming his new duties, Denfeld brought in Vice Admiral Radford as his VCNO and
right hand man, and would rely heavily on Radford's extensive background in naval
aviation and unification issues.
As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Denfeld took on several
additional responsibilities. The Chiefs served as "the principal military advisors to the
President and the Secretary of Defense," and carried out the following specific duties:
- to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction o f the
military forces;
- to prepare joint logistic plans . .
- to establish unified [joint] commands in strategic areas . . .;
- to formulate policies for the joint training of the military forces;
- to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members o f the
military forces;
- to review major military material and personnel requirements . . . in
accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

68U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Management Engineer, The United States Navy: A
Description of its Functional Organization, unpublished manual, 1948, p. 57, contained in the Papers of
Francis P. Matthews, File "Navy," Truman Library, Independence Missouri.
69Ibid., p. 22, and Robert G. Albion and Robert H. Connery, Forrestal and the N aw . (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 239.
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- to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee o f
the United Nations . . 70
The service chiefs were individually assigned to supervise appropriate joint theater
commands, and, given the Navy's interests, Admiral Denfeld assumed the responsibility for
the Pacific Command (his previous assignment) and the Atlantic Command, then under
Admiral Blandy's leadership. Later, Denfeld, as the Navy's senior officer, also became
responsible for the naval support command for Europe, designated as the Northeastern
Atlantic and Mediterranean Command under Admiral Connoly.
Denfeld took these responsibilities seriously and sought to help the Joint Chiefs
provide the best possible national defense, but he was certainly aware of the on-going
inter-service struggles. Shortly after taking over the Pacific Command, he had observed
that "the Army and the Air Force seek to shackle, restrict, or otherwise prevent the Navy
from exploiting its intrinsic capabilities."71 He later reflected that "the task [of the JCS]
would be, I thought, to fit the best tools each service could provide to the joint problem of
winning any war by swift, efficiently co-ordinated teamwork."72 But, as he was soon to
find out, service politics and struggles for budgetary allocations often overrode these
larger concerns. The Hoover Commission studied the functioning of the JCS in mid-1948
and concluded that the Chiefs were influenced too much by considerations of "service
particularism and aggrandizement" and failed to devote adequate "time and thought" to
their broader duties.73 Despite Admiral Denfeld's original intentions, he soon discovered
70U.S. Department of the Navy, The United States Naw. p. 50. These duties are reprinted from the text of
the National Security Act of 1947.
71Admiral Denfeld's March 1947 statement, quoted in Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Volume I: The Formative Years. 1947-1950. (Washington: Historical Office,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984), p. 395.
72Louis E. Denfeld, Admiral, USN (Ret.), ''The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force ever SANK," Collier's.
25 March 1950, p. 33.
73Chairman, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, The National
Security Organization. (The Hoover Commission Report) H. Doc. No. 86, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949,
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, pp. 66-67.
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that if he failed to look out for the Navy’s interests, the other Chiefs would run roughshod
over his service. He came to understand that he must fight for every dollar in the Navy's
budget.
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DENFELD BATTLES FOR THE NAVY (DECEMBER 1947 TO MARCH 1949)

"Denfeld was a very nice person. . . . He was a very decent person, but this
[the JCS] wasn't his league." (1949 - Wilfred J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of
Defense)74
"The admirals frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim
religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his only prophet, and the
United States Navy the only true Church." (1947 - McGeorge Bundy,
Presidential Adviser)75
1947 and 1948 were two of the most turbulent peacetime years experienced by
Americans in recent memory. At home the American people sought to return to a normal
routine following the trauma of the Second World War, yet this led to inflation, strikes,
and other problems. Finding productive work for returning servicemen was increasingly
difficult as the wartime economy contracted, leading to serious unemployment problems
and a dramatic rise in the Nation's homeless population. Pent up labor frustrations
paralyzed many industries, eventually causing the President to break one strike with
federal troops. Truman's concern for the health o f the economy caused him to place very
tight limits on all allocations, especially those for defense projects, in an attempt to
minimize budget deficits.
The United States was unable to return to its traditional isolationist posture
following the war. Its commitment to the new United Nations and its status as the only
nuclear power required extensive international obligations. The Marshall Plan, the
Truman Doctrine, and aid to the Chinese Nationalists demanded that vast sums be

74Interview with Wilfred J. McNeil by Jerry N. Ness, 1972, Washington, D C., Transcript, 1979, Truman
Library, p. 113.
75Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1947), p. 506.
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appropriated from the national treasury to promote political stability abroad and to protect
democracy from the growing communist menace. Soon, the Berlin crisis, the creation o f
NATO, the victory of Mao's Chinese communists, and Soviet nuclear tests would harden
the battle lines o f the Cold War. National interest and the support o f allies obliged the
United States to remain engaged in this global struggle.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were responsible for formulating military contingency
plans to meet all crises effecting the United States' interests throughout the world.
Despite growing international dangers, domestic economic and social pressures severely
constrained available military options. Postwar demobilization had left the United States
with only the sixth largest Army in the world by mid-1947.76 The American Armed
Forces had dropped from their 1945 peak strength of 12 million to just over 1.5 million in
1947. Even President Truman characterized this process as "efficient disintegration."77
The limited capabilities of the Nation's forces were, for obvious reasons, not well
publicized; but at the time of the Czechoslovak communist coup in 1948, the Army could
have only deployed one combat-ready division if the Soviets had threatened Western
Europe. The Navy and the Air Force were in much the same sorry state. In early 1948,
Secretary Forrestal reported to the President that an "acute personnel shortage . . .
requires the immobilization of 107 ships."78
Admiral Denfeld recognized the difficult demands his new position would impose,
but believed that in concert with the able and experienced Secretary of the Navy, John L.
Sullivan, he could adequately defend the naval services' interests in the inter-service power
struggles and promote an effective strategy for national defense. He encouraged his
subordinates to broaden their experience to include "skills in business organization and
76Haynes, p. 119.
77Ibid.
78Millis, p. 375.
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administration" because he realized that in peacetime, the greatest threat to the Navy was
in the Nation's capital rather than on the high seas.79 To keep in close contact with the
other services and the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Denfeld led the January 1948 effort
to move the Navy's headquarters to the Pentagon from its home in the Main Navy
Building on Constitution Avenue. Initially, the public feedback he received on his
performance was very positive. The Cleveland Plain Dealer described the Navy's
leadership in June 1948 as "a fighting, winning team . . . [who] have been able to infuse
Congress with some of their Navy enthusiasm."80 But soon his management and
leadership skills began to be questioned inside and outside the Navy.
The CNO's extensive background in personnel and budgetary matters enabled him
to feel very comfortable testifying before Congress and arguing with the other service
chiefs on these issues, but on other matters he routinely delegated the leadership role to
one of his deputies. Vice Admiral Libby recalled that "Admiral Denfeld never had much
to say when he was down at Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings. . . . He was very much
interested in being Chief of Naval Operations, but he didn't enjoy being a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. That was his great weakness."81 Vice Admiral Carney, Denfeld's
DCNO for Logistics and later a CNO himself, echoed this view:
We [Radford, Sherman, and Carney] were doing all the work on the JCS. . . .
Questions would come up on technical issues, where Raddy and I had lived
through it and knew what the hell we were talking a b o u t. . . and Louie, he
wouldn't know his ass from third base about it.82

79Admiral Denfeld's preface to Department of the Navy, The United States Naw. p. v.
80Walker S. Buel, "It's a Great Week for the Navy," Cleveland Plain Dealer. 4 June 1948, in the Denfeld
Papers, Naval Historical Center Archives, Box 6, File "Clippings."
8interview with Ruthven E. Libby, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) by Commander Etta-Belle Kitchen, USN,
1984, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, Transcript, 1984, U. S. Naval Academy Library,
Special Collections, p. 168.
82Vice Admiral Carney quoted in Isenberg, p. 145.
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Denfeld's habit of routinely delegating many of his duties also frustrated the leaders
o f the other services. Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington recalled that even though
Admiral Denfeld was CNO, "the real boss" appeared to be Radford.83 General
Eisenhower privately commented on the JCS' operations at that time:
The situation grows intolerable. Denfeld apparently wants to do right, but he
practically retires from every discussion in favor of [Vice Admiral Arthur D ]
Struble [DCNO for Operations], who infuriates everyone with his high,
strident voice and apparent inability to see any viewpoint except his own.84
Although Denfeld could be an eloquent speaker and was committed to defend the Navy's
interests, he seemed to lack enthusiasm for fighting in the joint arena. His practice of
obtaining the advice and aid of experts on technical questions was appropriate for a CNO,
but he delegated so many tasks to his subordinates that he did not establish himself as the
primary spokesman for the Navy. Professor Isenberg has concluded that Denfeld held
"the leading reins very loosely - if he had quite grasped them at all."85 Later, when
circumstances and conscience pushed Admiral Denfeld into taking a public stand as the
Navy's primary spokesman, he vacillated and procrastinated until his leadership had little
influence on his subordinates and Congress. His inability to maintain control over his
service and serve as its public leader eventually cost him his job.
Denfeld proved to be a successful CNO in other arenas. His Congressional
contacts were well developed by the time he assumed this office. As one of the few
Republicans in the Truman administration, he cultivated good relations with G. O. P.
leaders. At the same time, he understood that every high-ranking military officer was
obliged to avoid publicly making partisan political statements. He made "a very favorable
83Interview with W. Stuart Symington by James R. Fuchs, 1981, Washington, D.C., Transcript, 1983,
Truman Library, p. 78.
84Eisenhower statement of 19 March 1949, quoted in Rearden, p. 366.
85Isenberg, p. 146.
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impression" on Senator Robert Taft of Ohio in December 1947. In discussions with
Republican Party officials, he even explored whether or not to reserve a room for him at
the 1948 Republican National Convention, but eventually declined to do so: "As you
know, I would be delighted to be there . . . but I think I might be criticized in my position
if I were."86 During the summer o f 1948, while President Truman campaigned for
reelection in a contest few expected him to win, Denfeld admitted privately to having been
approached "by a number of Republican leaders asking me who I wanted as Secretary of
Defense and Secretary of the Navy."87 No wonder Forrestal had been concerned about
the Admiral's "political activity" when recommending his selection as CNO.88
President Truman never indicated that his support for Admiral Denfeld was ever
adversely affected by the CNO's political activities. Both men appeared to maintain good
relations throughout 1948 and 1949 until the last days o f the "Revolt o f the Admirals."
On 12 April 1948, Denfeld sent the President a hearty congratulatory note on the third
anniversary of his inauguration. "It has been both an honor and a pleasure to serve you as
Chief of Naval Operations. I am confident that I speak for all the officers and men of the
Naval Establishment in assuring you of our continued support in these most trying
times."89 After Truman upset Governor Dewey in November to win a second term,
Denfeld extended his "sincere and hearty congratulations," and asserted that "the country
is fortunate in having your firm guidance during the difficult years ahead." He also offered
Truman use of the CNO's quarters at the Naval Observatory during the upcoming White

86Letter from Senator Robert Taft to Dudley White, publisher of the Sandusky, Ohio Register-Star-News.
31 December 1947, and letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, 20 February 1948, in Denfeld
Papers, Naval Historical Center Archives, Box 6, File "W."
87Ibid., Letter from Admiral Denfeld to John P, Marquand of Newburyport, Massachusetts, 12 August
1948, in Denfeld Papers, Naval Historical Center Archives, Box 4, File "M."
88Millis, p. 325.
89Letter from Admiral Denfeld to President Truman, 12 April 1948, in the Harry S. Truman Papers,
White House Central Files, Presidential Personal Correspondence Files, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
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House renovations.90 The President gratefully acknowledged this "generous expression of
confidence in my leadership," and stated how "characteristically thoughtful" was Denfeld's
offer o f his "own quarters."91 Despite continuing inter-service battles and acknowledged
political differences, the President and his CNO remained on good terms.
Secretary Forrestal also seemed to maintain a friendly and respectful relationship
with the Admiral despite the Secretary's intense frustration with the interminable inter
service squabbling. In March 1948, Forrestal described his service chiefs (Bradley,
Spaatz, and Denfeld) as "broad-minded and patriotic men."92 Admiral Denfeld always
valued his relationship with Forrestal and, after his removal as CNO in 1949, proudly
referred Congressional investigators to letters in which the late Secretary had attested to
Denfeld's support for unification.93 Despite this cordiality, Forrestal seems privately to
have had reservations about the admiral. In early 1949, General Eisenhower recorded that
the Secretary expressed trust in many Army officers, but of those in the Navy, thought "of
only Sherman and Blandy among the higher ones, [and] possibly Connoly also."94
Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, in their Forrestal biography, observed that the
Navy's refusal to compromise and "its stiff-necked resistance to any cuts distressed him"
to the extent that Forrestal "grew more disenchanted with the self-righteous arrogance of
senior naval officers and their rigid peddling of the party line. "95 Given Denfeld's generally
good relations with Forrestal, one wonders whether some effort on Denfeld's part to

90Ibid., Letter from Admiral Denfeld to President Truman, 10 November 1948.
91Ibid., Letter from President Truman to Admiral Denfeld, 13 November 1948.
92Letter from Secretary Forrestal to the Honorable E. V. Robertson, 30 March 1948, quoted in Millis, p.
404.
93Letter from Admiral Denfeid to Senator William F. Knowland, 9 February 1950, p. 5, in Matthews
Papers, Correspondence files, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
94Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure - America's Armed Forces, (New York:
Random House, 1971), p. 95, and Isenberg, p. 147.
95Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal. (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), pp. 412-13.
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mediate between the Secretary and the Navy's hard-liners might have eased the growing
tensions. But, if such an opportunity ever existed, it was lost.
The Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan was an intelligent and experienced
administrator and no relation to the former heavyweight champ. He had served in the
Executive Branch since 1939, holding positions in the Internal Revenue Service, the
Treasury Department and the Navy Department, and rising to Navy Secretary when
Forrestal assumed the leadership of the National Military Establishment in 1947. During
his treasury service, Sullivan had established excellent ties with Congress and built on this
strength by serving as the Navy's point man "on the hill" during his tenure in the Navy
Department. Professors Albion and Connery observed that "he made brilliant appearances
before Congressional committees," and he was respected throughout the administration
for his experience and intelligence.96
According to Sullivan's papers in the Truman Library, Admiral Denfeld maintained
a good but stiff relationship with the Secretary. Their telephone conversations were
always respectful and professional, and with the exception o f occasional luncheon
meetings, they engaged in little social contact or other pleasantries.97 One indicator that
the Secretary did not have complete confidence in the Admiral was that during a crisis
involving the new flush-deck aircraft carrier, Sullivan called Radford back from California
rather than rely on the advice of his CNO.98
In this somewhat ambiguous position, Admiral Denfeld strove to develop plans
and policies to ensure national security and protect the Navy's interests. Even before his
selection as CNO, he had testified against proposed cuts in the Navy's budget. In March

96Albion and Connery, pp. 211 and 301.
97Sullivan Papers, Secretary of the Navy appointment calendar and correspondence files, Truman Library.
98Ibid., 24 April 1949 transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary Sullivan and Vice Admiral
Radford.
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1946, he had claimed that proposed reductions would make it impossible for the Navy to
defend many of its Pacific bases against enemy attack. This charge elicited the following
note to President Truman from budget director Harold Smith: "This is an extraordinary
statement. Nimitz, in his testimony, at least says one cannot be dogmatic. Denfeld has no
hesitancy, apparently, about being dogmatic." " Regardless o f the political fallout,
Admiral Denfeld consistently reiterated this view throughout his tenure. His opposition to
budgetary reductions was certainly based on personal conviction rather than any parochial
Navy "party line."
Denfeld was strongly committed to maintaining a balanced defense structure and
consistently opposed excessively relying on any one weapons system or theory o f warfare.
He testified before Congress in April 1948 that "the three armed services must be kept in
balance . . . [and that] it is even more important than before that the United States have
the naval means to control the oceans between North America and Europe and North
America and Asia."100 In testimony on the following year's budget, Denfeld reiterated this
position more explicitly:
We [the Navy] believe that only by maintaining a balanced composition, under
the requirements of a sound strategic concept, can the National Military
Establishment possess the necessary flexibility to meet and counter not only the
most probable enemy action, but unexpected and unforeseen turns o f events. . .
The unpredictable fortunes o f war make it very unwise to be committed in
advance to any single plan of action.101

"Letter from Harold Smith to President Truman, 21 March 1946, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, White
House Central Files, Presidential Personal Correspondence Files, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
100U. S. Congress. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Hearings on
the Department of the N aw Appropriation Bill. 1949, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, p. 79.
101Louis E. Denfeld, Admiral, USN, Statement to the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, United States Senate, on the Navy Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, 18 June 1949, In the
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Denfeld's statement seems very clear and correct in retrospect, but in the charged
atmosphere o f 1948, with defense budgets being drastically cut and many Americans
believing in the omnipotence of the Air Force's strategic atomic bombing forces, few
wanted to listen to an admiral who tried to justify the maintenance o f a large fleet and
other costly forces.
The inter-service battles o f the late 1940s have often been interpreted as almost
exclusively concerned with the distribution of funds, yet there was a more fundamental
cause o f disagreement. The JCS has responsibility for preparing the Nation's strategic
defense plans and for recommending the military forces required to implement these plans.
This task was greatly complicated by the lack of any clear, authoritative statement of
objectives from the National Security Council, a body created by the 1947 National
Security Act for just this purpose. President Truman appeared to illogically give priority
to developing "a firm military policy" before attempting to formulate a national security
strategy. That is to say he seemed to allow the capabilities of the armed services to
determine the national security goals of the Nation. Although Secretaries Forrestal and
Sullivan seemed to accept this procedure, Admiral Denfeld and Air Force Secretary
Symington, in rare agreement, objected to this process as inverted.102 As the temperature
o f the Cold War gradually rose, the Joint Chiefs attempted to formulate strategic plans
which could protect the Country and its allies while remaining under President Truman's
very low budgetary ceilings. General Marshall accurately described the Joint Chiefs as

102Letter from Secretary Sullivan to Secretary Forrestal, 9 July 1946, in the Sullivan Papers, Box 7, File
"Unification," Truman Library, and W. Stuart Symington, "Our Air Force Policy," Vital Speeches of the
Day. 1 July 1949, p. 567.
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being obliged to craft grand strategic plans without adequate resources and contended that
we are "playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out."103
The Chief of Naval Operations offered some constructive original ideas on the best
strategies for national defense, yet was consistently outvoted by the advocates o f strategic
air power. There was consensus that the only potential enemy was the Soviet Union, but
how the U. S. might oppose the envisioned Red Army offensive across the North German
plain was the subject o f interminable debate. Secretary Forrestal succinctly captured this
argument over strategy in a December 1947 letter:
There are really four outstanding military facts in the world at this time. They
are: (1) The predominance of Russian land power in Europe and Asia. (2)
The predominance of American sea power. (3) Our exclusive possession of
the atomic bomb, and (4) American productive capability. As long as we
can outproduce the world, can control the sea and can strike inland with the
atomic bomb, we can assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable in an effort
to restore world trade, to restore the balance of power - military power - and
to eliminate some o f the conditions which breed war.104
Admiral Denfeld would have agreed with this summation with its emphasis on several
aspects of American national power.105
In JCS sessions as early as April 1948, Denfeld opposed the prevailing
Administration inclination to rely on an atomic retaliatory offensive by suggesting
alternative plans to defend America's European allies on the ground while striking at the
invading Soviet forces from their Mediterranean and Northern flanks.106 Another key
103Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Volume II, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and
National Policy. 1947-1949, (Washington: The Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1978), p. 18.
104Letter from Secretary Forrestal to Chan Gurney, 8 December 1947, quoted in Millis, pp. 350-51.
105Admiral Denfeld offered several similar statements before Congress during his term as CNO. See
Louis E. Denfeld, Admiral, USN, Statement to the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, United States Senate, on the Navy Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, 18 June 1949, Contained
in the White House Official Files, "Department of the Navy Correspondence - 1949," Truman Library for
one example.
106Ibid„ p. 278.
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issue on which Admiral Denfeld and the President disagreed was the Administration's
assumption that the budget only fund a military nucleus which could always be built up
when additional force was required. In early 1949, the CNO pointed out in Senate
testimony that although this strategy had worked in past crises, "it is unlikely that our
allies will ever again absorb the brunt o f an enemy's initial attack. "1UV Any shift from either
o f these Administration strategies would have required both the maintenance o f a strong
fleet o f aircraft carriers and much greater expenditures on the military in general, options
which few voters or legislators were willing to accept.
Regardless o f the opposition they encountered, the CNO and his fellow naval
officers continued to criticize the Air Force's proposed "atomic blitz" strategy and
recommend improvements in overall readiness. In a "spirited defense of the Navy's
position" on 4 October 1948, Admiral Denfeld broadly criticized the Air Force's plans.
The unpleasant fact remains that the Navy has honest and sincere misgivings as
to the ability of the Air Force successfully to deliver the [atomic] weapon by
means of unescorted missions flown by present-day bombers, deep into enemy
territory in the face of strong Soviet air defenses, and to drop it on targets
whose locations are not accurately known.108
This basic theme was to be reiterated in ever-increasing volume and frequency throughout
the remainder of Denfeld's term as CNO.
Secretary Forrestal kept the President informed o f the disagreements over strategic
concepts within the JCS. In October 1948, Truman and Forrestal discussed the inability o f
American forces to operate in the Mediterranean theater in wartime under the current
budget. The President authorized his Defense Secretary to prepare a "supplemental, back
up budget" that would fund operations in the Mediterranean, but Forrestal observed that he

107Denfeld statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 18 June 1949.
108Ibid., pp. 231-32, and Rearden, pp. 344-45.
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did not seem overly concerned.109 The only war plan the JCS could develop within existing
budgetary constraints was one which called for a quick atomic strike by long-range
bombers on the Soviet Union's centers o f industrial production from bases in Great Britain
and the United States while the American and allied armies gave ground in Western Europe
and waited for the anticipated crippling of the enemy's industrial base to slow down his
advance. Senior naval officers continued to oppose this atomic strike option, but the
Administration considered the expense o f preparing for other defensive measures to be
unacceptably high.110
In 1948, American military leaders brought up an additional significant misgiving
about the desirability of this atomic strategy. Given the decision to make the delivery of
nuclear weapons the principal deterrent to Soviet aggression, it would have seemed logical
to give the Defense Department control over those weapons to ensure their readiness for
prompt use in event of a crisis. The leaders o f the Defense Department discussed this
proposal with President Truman on 21 July 1948. He rejected Secretary Forrestal's
proposal on the grounds that the atomic bomb was not "a military weapon" and must be
treated "differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that."111 The Joint
Chiefs had thereby based their only affordable retaliatory strategy on the use o f a weapon
which they did not control and which might be denied to them in time o f national
emergency.
Because almost all of the JCS' strategic planning efforts were classified, public
debate over the competing doctrines of strategic bombing and control o f the seas found
their best forum in the inter-service discussion about assignment o f roles and missions to
each armed service. Debates concerning the creation of a separate Air Force had not
109Rearden, p. 345.
110Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 504.
11 McCullough, p. 650.
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clearly defined the division of responsibilities within the NME between the three services,
especially regarding aviation. When the President had signed the National Security Act of
1947, he had also approved Executive Order 9877 which specified the duties o f the three
services. The Air Force was assigned the primary responsibility o f conducting strategic
bombing operations, but the Navy also retained the responsibility to operate aircraft in
pursuit o f naval objectives, including the attack o f inland targets as required to support the
conduct o f naval campaigns. These two services could not agree on how to differentiate
between their missions and continued the public debates which had raged since the end of
the war. Although a full examination o f the nuances o f the roles and missions debate is
beyond the scope of this study, a brief survey of the major events and principal issues in
this evolving argument is essential to understanding the eventual removal o f Admiral
Denfeld.112
Secretary Forrestal had become so exasperated by the ongoing bickering between
his service chiefs that in early 1948 he decided that a four-day meeting of the Joint Chiefs
away from Washington might facilitate these officers detaching themselves from their
parochial service concerns and coming to some agreement on roles and missions. Forrestal
restricted the attendees at this 1 1 - 1 4 March 1948 JCS conference at Key West, Florida to
only two officers per service plus the Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General
Gruenther, and the President’s Chief o f Staff, Admiral Leahy. Representing the Navy were
Admirals Denfeld and Radford. Generals Bradley and Wedemeyer attended for the Army,
and Generals Spaatz and Norstadt were the Air Force's delegates.113 This dedicated,
private session helped to settle some of the details. The various missions were divided into
primary and secondary categories. The Air Force was given the primary mission of
112The best examinations of the struggles over roles and missions during this period are found in
Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," and Jeffrey Barlow’s The Revolt of the Admirals.
113Millis, p. 390.
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conducting strategic bombing campaigns while the Navy was placed in a secondary,
supporting position in this area. Denfeld gained the other services' acquiescence on the
construction of the Navy's flush-deck carrier, but this agreement was actually illusory,
because several of the delegates later claimed that their approval had either been
conditional or merely acknowledging the fact that the President had already approved the
carrier in the latest defense budget.114 These second thoughts were encouraged by the fact
that no notes were taken during any of the sessions. Forrestal saw this conference as "the
beginning of the effort to rebuild the Armed Forces of the United States," but few other
participants thought as highly of the event.115
The inadequacy of the Key West agreements was best revealed by Forrestal's
having again to sequester his Joint Chiefs in August 1948 at Newport, Rhode Island, to
insist that they clarify the meaning of their earlier agreement. At this session, a
stenographer was present to contribute some order and accountability to the
deliberations.116 The concepts of "primary" and "secondary" mission areas were clarified
and a special board, the Weapons System Evaluation Group, was created to independently
assess the performance and suitability of weapons systems being developed by the
services.117 Admiral Denfeld confidently issued a press release:
The words o f our understanding are clear and to my mind unequivocal. They
will serve if they are interpreted properly - in the spirit of "all for one and one
for all." Any agreement will work only if the personnel of each service work

114Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," pp. 474 - 76 provides a good summary of the Key
West Agreements and their impact on the Navy's carrier program. The theory that Denfeld traded the
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together with sympathy and understanding and really desire to make it
w ork.118
His assessment was overly optimistic. Either the other chiefs did not share his desire to
make the Newport agreement work or the inertia of continuing struggle and budgetary
pressures were too much for the two agreements to overcome. The squabbling and public
affairs wars continued unabated.
The struggles for defense dollars were hardly unnecessary during this period. In
the absence o f any agreed upon strategic concept, each service prudently sought to retain
as much "muscle" as possible to ensure it could meet its responsibilities. The funding
allocated for the entire defense establishment in Fiscal Year (FY) 1946 (1 October 1945
through 30 September 1946) was $45 billion, or over two thirds of the total government
budget.119 In FY 1947, the first true post-war budget, the military's allocation dropped to
$14.26 billion and fell to its post-war low of $11.9 billion the following year.120 After
having led their services to victory in a war during which projects were usually funded
with little discussion, the admirals and generals adjusted with difficulty to the lean years of
peace. President Truman believed that "Army and Navy professionals seldom had any
idea of the value of money. They did not seem to care what the cost was."121
Secretary Forrestal disagreed with the Chief Executive by giving the admirals a
back-handed compliment, "even naval officers were not economic fools . . . [and]
recognized . . . that by forfeiting a sound economy at home we could stumble into state
socialism just as successfully as if we had marked our course for that harbor."122 Even
118Admiral Denfeld's statement following the conference was included in an Office of the Secretary of
Defense press release and is quoted in Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 487.
119Millis, p. 352.
120Roger R. Trask, The Secretaries of Defense: A Brief History. 1947 - 1985. (Washington: Historical
Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1985), p. 63.
121Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Vol. I, Year of Decisions. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1955), p. 88.
122Millis, p. 250.
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with this understanding, the Joint Chiefs agreed in 1948 that the ceilings imposed by the
President were too low "to implement national policy in any probable war situation that
can be seen."123 Nevertheless, the ceilings remained and Forrestal's protests to the
President contributed to Truman's growing dissatisfaction with his Defense Secretary.
The President continued to view the military leaders' claims as "excessive,11and
considered Denfeld and the Navy to be the "worst offenders."124 Truman assessed what
might be required for military sufficiency in light of all civil and military needs, and gave a
priority to balancing the budget over funding the latest weapons upgrades. Essentially
what occurred was Truman funded all other programs and gave the military the remainder
as its budget ceiling. He firmly believed that war was not imminent and that short-term
defense cuts to improve the economy would be a good investment.125 In 1948, when
Congress overwhelmingly approved a supplement of $822 million for additional Air Force
groups above the President's request, Truman impounded the funds and would not allow
the Air Force to spend them.126 Although Congress did support this particular Air Force
request, both political parties sought to reduce defense spending. Republican Senator
Robert Taft, a committed isolationist, advocated cutting an additional $6 billion from the
existing $11.9 billion FY 1948 military budget. Even without Senator Taft's cuts, the
federal government concluded FY 1948 with a cash surplus of $8.4 billion.127 Denfeld
strongly opposed the general policy of seeking ever deeper reductions. In his testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee on 19 May 1948, he stated: "It is axiomatic
123JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, 8 November 1948, quoted in Condit, p. 241.
124Truman, Memoirs. Vol. II, p. 34.
125President Truman was quoted in 4 May 1950's New York Times as asserting "repeatedly that he saw
no possibility that the 'cold war' would develop into a shooting war and [he] even promised to reduce the
defense budget next year [FY 1951]." The North Koreans attacked their Southern neighbors less than two
months later, destroying his reduction plans.
126Haynes, p. 124. The Congressional votes were House: 343-3, Senate: 74-2.
127James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1972), p. 373.
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that military strength insufficient to support national policy is dangerous to national
security and ineffective as a means of preserving the peace."128 One weakness in Admiral
Denfeld's argument was that the only existing "national policy" was that supporting fiscal
restraint.
These dramatic fiscal restrictions and the ongoing roles and missions debate
provided more than enough fuel to keep the inter-service arguments flaming during
Admiral Denfeld's term as CNO. Despite clear and repeated direction from the President
and the Secretary of Defense, military officers and their civilian supporters continued to
take their cases to the public in one sensational series of accusations after another. While
Vice Admiral Carney urged naval officers to "subordinate your Navy partisanship to the
laws, rules, and regulations of unification in furtherance o f the goal o f an American
military team," other officers like Rear Admiral Gallery and General Spaatz used the media
to vent their frustrations and tout their points of view.129 Although this behavior was not
limited to naval officers, the sea service took the lion's share o f the blame for these
activities, apparently only because their publicity efforts were uncoordinated and clumsy
when compared to the Air Force's polished campaign.
The Navy's public relations office reported to the Secretary o f the Navy rather than
to the CNO, and it received little support or emphasis during this period. In his 1947
report to the Secretary of Defense and the President, Secretary Sullivan devoted less than
one page to public affairs in his 83-page submission. In the following year's report

128U. S. Congress. House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of the N aw
Appropriation Bill. 1949. 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, (Washington: United States Government Printing
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Sullivan did not even mention the activities of his public relations office.130 In his Revolt
o f the Admirals. Jeffrey Barlow concludes that:
the Navy seemed to view public relations as something of a necessary evil.
The service's senior leadership had little understanding of the importance o f
getting their message across to the public until it was far too late to do much
about it.131
Not until late in 1949 was the Navy's Office of Public Relations shifted to Admiral
Denfeld's control in the Office of the CNO.
The Air Force consistently and effectively used its Congressional supporters and
the press first to gain its independence from the Army, and then to promote its 70-group
Air Force program. The Finletter and Brewster Boards, two studies of the Nation's
military aviation policy commissioned in 1947 by Congress and the Executive Branch,
generally supported the Air Force's positions. The Finletter Board's report showed
especial partiality to the Air Force in advocating a large build up of that service and a
deemphasis o f Army and Navy responsibilities.132 The aggressive public relations
campaign of the Air Force in 1947 masked what was actually a paper tiger. The longest
range bombers in its strategic retaliatory force could not reach the Soviet Union from the
United States, and other serious shortcomings plagued the "junior service." Kenneth Moll
has argued that in 1947, the Air Force's "intelligence was poor [and] its readiness
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marginal. Its long-range capabilities were nonexistent, and [the low level of] the A-bomb
stockpile was shocking."133 But by listening to the claims o f Air Force officers and their
supporters, an uninformed observer might have concluded that the Air Force was all that
the United States needed to ensure its national security.
The extended public brawling over roles, missions and funds angered the civilian
heads o f the NME and the Government. Secretary Forrestal and President Truman
attempted to restrict the public statements by military leaders but were unable to muzzle
them effectively. The most difficult type of statement to restrict was the officers'
testimony to Congress. Because as witnesses, they were under oath and were routinely
asked for their personal opinions, there was no way the Chief Executive could order them
to advocate policies they did not agree with. As early as 1945, President Truman's
position was explained by Clark Clifford as follows.
The President felt that civil and naval personnel o f the Navy Department
should no longer publicly attack unification, since it was administration policy.
However, if called to testify before Congress, these individuals should feel
free to express their opinions, after first explaining to the Committee that they
were expressing personal views under leave to do so granted by the
commander in chief.134
In mid-1946, Truman modified this seemingly fair policy as propagandists continued to
embarrass the Administration with their inability to "toe the party line." He directed that
the services support the new unification measure once it was officially submitted to
Congress, because it would by that time have "become administration doctrine and he

133Kenneth L. Moll, "Nuclear Strategy, 1945 - 1949: America's First Four Years," Master's thesis,
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would expect complete support for it in Congress."135 These presidential views on what
was and was not permissible in Congressional testimony would become especially
pertinent during the debates over the late 1949 removal of Admiral Denfeld. Many
contended that his removal was a reprisal for his frank testimony, which he had identified
as his personal opinion in accordance with this administration policy.
Between 1946 and 1949, the civilian leaders o f the NME were forced repeatedly to
clarify their policies on the expression of dissent and the promotion of individual service
virtues. Assistant Secretary o f Defense William Frye was probably stating the obvious
when he declared that "discipline and authority . . . are the inescapable methods of control.
Without them, a military organization is useless in war and a menace in peace."136
Nevertheless, a firm hand was often lacking in the Defense Department during the
Forrestal years. Dr. Hammond noted that while the Secretary personally preferred to
settle contentious issues through private discussion, he "seemed to uphold as a matter of
principle the right of his own subordinates to dissent in public."137 Truman tried to
reiterate his ground rules in May 1948 by directing the service Secretaries and Chiefs to
"subordinate their private and service biases to the established national policies."138 But
Air Force Secretary Symington continued to make so many inflammatory and partisan
public statements that Forrestal finally began to consider removing him in July 1948.139
General Bradley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, acknowledged that his Air Force
step-children were "in open defiance o f Truman" and that their actions were "vastly
complicating the JCS'job of producing unified war plans and budgets," yet he was unable

135President Truman in September 1946, quoted in Haynes, p. 103.
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138Memorandum from President Truman to the Air Force Chief of Staff, et al., 13 May 1948, quoted in
Haynes, p. 124.
139Millis, pp. 463 - 64, and Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 480.
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to exert any influence to put an end to the campaigns. Bradley observed that General
Eisenhower shared his dismay, characterizing the activities o f the leaders o f the Navy and
Air Force as "near insubordination."140 Returning to the Congressional testimony
problem, Secretary Forrestal issued guidance to his service leaders in November 1948,
encouraging them to defend their services' capabilities to the best o f their abilities but
stated that he thought inappropriate and certainly not "conducive to the spirit of
unification," any attack or criticism o f the competence o f another service.141 Despite these
warnings, the "mud slinging" continued. A self-proclaimed aviation expert, William
Bradford Huie, launched the next salvo by publishing a series o f articles in the popular
Readers' Digest "wholly critical of naval aviation. Many Navy leaders believed that he had
been paid by the Air Force."142 Secretary Forrestal discussed this problem with the
President in January 1949 and forwarded a draft speech to him to use to direct the service
Secretaries and military chiefs to "keep their differences within military circles or resign,"
but this shot was never fired.143
Probably the most effective weapon in the Air Force's publicity arsenal was its
ability to take its weapons platforms almost anywhere in the country and display their
glamorous and awesome power. On the first Air Force Day, 18 September 1948, the Air
Force staged "massive flights of B-29s over some of the major American cities [and]
flights of five B-36s over 103 separate cities in the United States."144 Record breaking
feats and air shows converted many citizens to the Air Force's way of thinking. In March
1949 an Air Force B-50 bomber, using new aerial refueling techniques, completed a non
140Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army, U.S. Army, (Ret) and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An
Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p.
491.
141Millis, p. 516.
142Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 489.
143Millis, p. 545.
144Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 486.
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stop flight around the world, making front pages across the land. Shortly thereafter the
new B-36 bomber made a widely publicized 5,000 mile flight carrying a simulated atomic
bomb.145 To further amplify the importance of this feat, someone leaked to the press an
account of a secret Air Force briefing to the JCS that highlighted 70 strategic Russian
targets now within the range of the B-36. This leak caused Congressman Carl Vinson, the
powerful Chairman of the House Armed Service Committee, to declare that further
indiscretions would lead to a full Congressional investigation.146 Several months later,
Secretary Forrestal's funeral was the scene of one of the most unusual of the inter-service
snubs. In a final act of partisan defiance, all service Secretaries except the Air Force's
Symington were chosen to serve as pall bearers.147 There was no way to prevent
bitterness of this depth from being revealed.
The essential question raised in all attempts to limit public statements by Service
Chiefs was: "What were the rights and status of military officials regarding freedom of
expression?" Political appointees clearly served at the pleasure of the President and could
be expected to support his policies until they found themselves in a situation where their
integrity might be in jeopardy, such as being asked for their personal views while testifying
under oath, or in purely individual matters like funerals. Military officers, on the other
hand, were appointed to positions of authority in order to provide unbiased advice and
guidance on military matters to the President and Congress. Although they received their
commissions from the President and served at his pleasure, they were expected to be less
politically-constrained, and consequently of value to Congress and the Executive Branch
as neutral technical advisers. A Joint Chiefs of Staff filled with "yes men" would not serve
the needs of the Nation. Conversely, Joint Chiefs who could not follow orders or accept
145Ibid., p. 491.
146Ibid.
147Boettcher, p. 171.
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direction from the President in matters which did not compromise their personal honor
also threatened the very fabric o f the government. Commitment to a common goal and
mutual respect was required to make this arrangement work. In the late 1940s, these
preconditions were often missing, as senior officers were politicized by the Administration.
Admiral Denfeld actively participated in these bitter exchanges and deserves at
least as much blame as any other member of the NME's leadership for this group's
unseemly behavior. As CNO he was charged with establishing and enforcing standards of
conduct for his subordinates. Even though most of Denfeld's public statements were
professional and responsible, as the uniformed leader o f the Navy, he was accountable to
the Commander in Chief for any rash or intemperate actions or statements by his
subordinates. The 1924 Guide to Naval Leadership, a standard text during Denfeld's early
career, offered 20 "points o f the naval profession" to guide naval leaders. Among those
were number 18 - "before you take any action . . . consider carefully its effect upon the
discipline of the organization," and number 20 - "avoid, as you would the plague, hostile
criticism of authority."148 Admiral Denfeld understood principle 20 and did restrain his
growing frustration with his superiors, but he failed to take into account the effect his
passive leadership had on the discipline o f the Navy. His lack o f assertiveness actually
encouraged other naval officers to speak out, thereby diminishing his authority within the
Navy and contributing to the growing public perception that he was losing control over his
immediate subordinates. The Navy appeared rebellious and out of control in contrast to
the single-minded Air Force, which despite occasional brash and insubordinate outbursts,
maintained a unified front before the public. There is no indication that the Secretary of
the Navy, the President, or anyone else drew this conclusion in time to counsel Denfeld

148Leo H. Thebaud, comp., Naval Leadership With Some Hints to Junior Officers and Others. (Annapolis,
Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1924), p. 154.
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about his leadership deficiencies, but it seems obvious that the inability o f the CNO to
keep his subordinates in line contributed to his eventual fall from favor.
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LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE
CANCELLATION OF THE 'SUPERCARRIER ("MARCH THROUGH MAY 19491

"Owing to the cancellation of the supercarrier, there was a vicious mutiny
afoot in the Navy. With his crazy bull-in-the-china-shop approach, Johnson
was in no way fitted to deal with it. Nor was his decent but weak and
inexperienced Navy Secretary, Frank Matthews. A Navy mutiny could
conceivably tear apart the Department of Defense, possibly tempting the
Kremlin to capitalize on our military disarray." (1949 - General Bradley)149
"The better I got to know Mr. Matthews the more certain I became that his
appointment as Secretary of the Navy verged on a national catastrophe."
(1949 - Admiral Radford)150

James Forrestal, the Nation's first Secretary of Defense, had served the Roosevelt
administration since June 1940. President Roosevelt had recruited him from the most
experienced leaders of the business community to help improve the organization and
efficiency o f the Executive Branch. His naval service in World War I led him to gravitate
to the military Departments, and he became Under Secretary of the Navy before Pearl
Harbor.151 Forrestal's natural tendency was to go slowly and study every issue fully before
coming to any decision. He believed that one risked damaging morale and the service's
cohesion through rapid and ill-conceived changes and therefore often delayed
implementing seemingly obvious improvements in the Department's organization to allow
the dust to settle from previous efforts. This slowness and apparent indecisiveness
eventually contributed to Truman's growing disenchantment with his Defense Secretary

149Bradley and Blair, p. 505.
150Jurika, p. 176.
15 forestall was actually a qualified naval aviator, earning his wings in 1917 as "Naval Aviator Number
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during 1948 and 1949.152 Additionally, the Secretary's firm stands in opposition to the
recognition of Israel, in favor of military control over the Country's atomic arsenal, and
especially, his insistent demands for more money frustrated the President. For his part,
Forrestal "found himself thinking less and less o f a President who seemed so willing to
cave in to cheap political expediency."153 Shortly after Truman began his second term, he
decided to replace Forrestal, who he believed "had worked himself to a state o f near
collapse."154 Soon after his being relieved by Louis Johnson on 28 March 1949, James
Forrestal experienced a mental breakdown. He was admitted to a hospital for observation,
but there was to be no recovery. Forrestal jumped to his death from an unguarded
window less than two months after leaving office, becoming the first casualty o f military
unification. More casualties were soon to follow.
In Louis Johnson, Truman found the solution to his frustrations with an indecisive
Defense Secretary who was not supportive o f his economy programs. Johnson, a wealthy
lawyer from West Virginia, had a reputation for getting quick results through aggressive
leadership. He was not afraid to make decisions and, right or wrong, he was rarely at a
loss for a course o f action. As early as February 1948, Admiral Denfeld anticipated that
Johnson would succeed Forrestal. The CNO wrote to a friend that he had met Johnson in
1948 and believed that this personal relationship "may enable us to do something to keep
the Navy where it should be."155 Still unclear is why Denfeld thought that this one brief
meeting had enabled him to convert Johnson from his strong commitment to air power and
firm allegiance to the Army. The CNO was in for a great disappointment. The worst of
the inter-service struggles were yet to come.
152McCullough, pp. 736 - 37.
153Ibid., p. 599.
154Ibid., p. 736.
155Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, an Ohio newspaper publisher, 28 February 1949, in
Denfeld Papers, Box 6, Correspondence File "W," Naval Historical Center Archives.
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Washington press correspondents remembered Johnson from his term as Assistant
Secretary o f War in the late 1930s and described him as "cold, self-seeking, and harddriving, . . . He is iron-willed, self-confident, and self-sufficient."156 Johnson was born in
Roanoke, Virginia, the son of a grocer.157 He worked his way through law school and
was elected to the West Virginia House of Delegates in 1917, serving as Speaker o f that
body during his first term. Johnson served in the Army during the First World War, rising
to the rank of Captain before returning home after the Armistice. Even at this early
juncture, Johnson did not hesitate to make waves when he thought something needed to
be done. On his return voyage from Europe, Johnson drafted a 67-page ietter to the
Secretary o f War, setting forth "cogent ideas he had thought up for improving the
Army."158 Following the War he became the leading partner in the law firm o f Steptoe
and Johnson and helped found the American Legion, serving as its national commander
from 1932 through 1933. This service, and his aggressive campaign support for President
Roosevelt, led to his 1937 selection as Assistant Secretary of War. In this position,
Johnson vocally supported universal military training, rearmament, and an expansion of
military aviation, but he was eased out when Secretary Stimson took over the Department
in 1940.159
Louis Johnson was an impressive individual who stood over six feet tall and
weighed over 250 pounds. His bald head and booming voice added to his powerful image.
He had been out of government for eight years when President Truman called on him for
help in managing the finances of his foundering reelection campaign in mid-1948.

156Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Truman MERRY-GO-ROUND, (New York: The
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159Trask, p. 12.
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Johnson's connections, forceful personality, and loyalty to his Party helped raise millions
for the President and helped him upset Governor Dewey in the November election. This
yeoman work certainly merited a reward, and Johnson and Truman decided that the
Defense Department would be the right place for Johnson to exercise his dynamic
qualities.160 Jack Alexander observed that unlike Forrestal, Johnson was "not much
concerned with diplomatic niceties."161 He charged into his new duties and rapidly
changed the entire atmosphere in the National Military Establishment. David McCullough
reported that "he hit the Pentagon like a cyclone."162
Truman felt confident his new Secretary o f Defense could force the Joint Chiefs to
agree on budgets within the Administration's ceilings and put a stop to the incessant
bickering within the Pentagon. Johnson was able to force through budgets even below the
President's goals, yet even he could not suppress disagreements between the professional
officers under his command. In fact, his hard-fisted methods actually exacerbated some of
the issues, adding fuel to the fire and sparking the "revolt of the admirals" in 1949.
Johnson's personal ambition of succeeding Truman as President in 1952 motivated him to
try to make a distinctive mark, and his lack of restraint made his mark much more a crater
than a footprint. General Bradley later remarked that Johnson "was probably the worst
appointment Truman had made." In light of Johnson's aggressive and seemingly irrational
behavior, Bradley further commented that Truman had in fact "replaced one mental case
with another." Eventually Johnson was found to have developed a brain tumor, but no
evidence indicates that this adversely affected his personality in the late 1940s.163 Louis
Johnson was by nature an aggressive man.
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The new Secretary of Defense relieved Forrestal on 28 March 1949, the same day
the North Atlantic Alliance was formed. At his first press conference, Johnson promised
the President his support and stated that "to the limit the present law allows, I promise you
there will be unification as rapidly as the efficiency of the service permits it."164 Johnson
was determined to centralize the Defense Department as much as possible and consolidate
his power over the services to avoid the frustrations experienced by Forrestal.165 He had
enormous confidence in his ability to get quick results on all problems facing the
Department. Admiral Radford observed that Johnson "had not the slightest doubt o f his
ability to fairly settle any question, military or otherwise."166 Johnson saw his position as
the President's point man in the Defense Department who would enforce the President's
will on this bureaucracy and its avaricious generals and admirals.167 Johnson had no
intention o f weighing complex variables or developing various options before making any
hard and fast decisions. He believed his imposition of firm budgetary limits would force
the military establishment to become more efficient in its use of personnel and resources.
With regard to the festering service rivalries, the new Secretary had a plan to
resolve them promptly. At his first press conference, Johnson asserted that anyone who
objected to his program to settle inter-service disputes "would have a chance to argue me
out of that conclusion in the next couple o f days." Thereafter anyone who still disagreed
would be forced out of the organization; "there will just not be room for them around the
Pentagon and I told the three Secretaries that."168 To make it clear who was in charge,
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Johnson ousted the Secretary o f the Army from the best office in the Pentagon, and settled
in himself. He also had General Pershing's impressive wooden desk moved into his new
office, thereby creating quite a stir in the five-sided building. Despite Admiral Denfeld's
earlier impression that Johnson would be objective, General Bradley quickly recognized
Johnson as "an unstinting airpower advocate."169 Secretary Johnson had served as a
director o f Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer o f the B-36
bomber, before returning to government service in 1949 and had come to believe in the
economic virtues o f airpower over the more costly sea and land forces. The inter-service
rivalry and especially its public manifestations had also instilled in Johnson a particular
dislike for the Navy .170
Robert Allen and William Shannon provided a humorous and perceptive anecdote
concerning the Navy and the new Secretary in their 1950 book, The Washington
MERRY-GO-ROUND that clearly illustrates the relationship between the Navy and the
new Defense Secretary:
A young [Navy] Lieutenant did not show up at his Pentagon desk one day,
and his colleagues became concerned. One recalled that the Lieutenant had
expressed the intention to stand outside the Russian Embassy and tell the
Soviet Ambassador to go to hell and take Joe Stalin with him. "If he really
did that, it could be serious," an officer said. A hurried check disclosed that,
sure enough, the young Lieutenant was in the hospital. His friends rushed
over to see him. They asked if he had gone through with his daring plan. "I
sure did," he replied. "I waited till the Ambassador came out and then I
yelled, "to hell with Stalin," and the Ambassador shouted, "to hell with Louis
Johnson." We were embracing each other in the middle of the street when a
taxi hit me."171
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Few in the Navy Department were surprised when Secretary Johnson quickly trained his
sights on the sea services.
In keeping with his reputation, Johnson instituted dramatic changes within the first
few weeks of taking over. In an effort to strengthen his hand over the service propaganda
machines, he ordered all public affairs matters centralized in his office and that all
proposed public statements by military officers and civilian employees first be routed
through his staff "for security review" before being released.172 This move did not single
out any service, yet Navy advocates quickly became frustrated as this centralization policy
was rescinded and then reimposed with no apparent rationale.
Admiral Denfeld found himself in opposition to the new Secretary almost
immediately. Secretary Forrestal, before his tragic breakdown, had submitted a proposal
to Congress to strengthen the Secretary o f Defense's control over his Department. In
Senatorial debate on an amendment to Forrestal's proposal which was supported by the
Administration and Secretary Johnson, the CNO spoke on behalf o f the JCS against the
amendment in testimony on 7 April 1949. The Administration's amendment aimed to
remove the specific statutory duties o f the JCS from the unification law and permit the
Defense Secretary more organizational flexibility. In this case Denfeld's logical argument
was persuasive and helped defeat the new Secretary's proposal.173 But this victory was
short-lived. On the same day, in another move to assert his control over the Department,
Johnson abolished the annual celebrations o f the three military departments and
consolidated the three service holidays into Armed Forces Day, to be celebrated on the
third Saturday in May starting in 1950.174
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The most spectacular action during Johnson's first month in office came on 23
April 1949 when the Secretary precipitously canceled the construction o f the Navy's new
flush-deck carrier in the interest of economy. This vessel's keel had been laid thirteen days
earlier, and millions o f dollars had already been spent in equipment procurement and
obligated contracts, dollars which had been painfully saved through the cancellation of
other Navy construction programs over the previous several years.175 The Navy had
mortgaged its future for this ship, intending it as a prototype to demonstrate the ability of
aircraft carriers to carry the latest military aircraft whose weight and size made them
unable to operate from the existing ships. This new carrier, to be named the U.S.S.
United States, would be unique in that it would not have a superstructure, or "island,"
protruding above its flight deck. An artist's drawing o f the proposed design in relation to
other classes of aircraft carriers is attached at Appendix II. Although the U.S. S. United
States was to be only 100 feet longer than the Navy's biggest existing carriers, its
capabilities and radical appearance, exaggerated in no little measure by the Air Force's
spectacular charges, became known publicly as a "supercarrier."176
By adding this new carrier to the fleet, the Navy expected to extend the range o f
offensive strikes and even operate aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons, an
option which incensed the Air Force's leaders. They strongly objected to the Navy's
development o f a costly, mobile, nuclear launching platform which could compete with
their bombers in carrying out one o f their primary missions, strategic bombing. Denfeld

175The best unbiased discussion of the events and positions leading to the construction of the U.S. S.
United States can be found in the House Armed Services Committee's report on the Navy's proposal to
cancel thirteen other ships already authorized and under construction to free up funds for the new carrier.
U. S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services, Stoppage of Work on Certain Combatant Vessels.
H. Rept. 2269, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., 1948, In Harry S. Truman, Official Files, File "Navy, 1948" Truman
Library.
176Louis E. Denfeld, Admiral, USN (Ret.), "The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK," Collier's.
25 March 1950, p. 33.
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and the other admirals claimed that the capabilities of this new ship were required to
ensure that the Navy maintained its ability to control the seas, its primary mission. The
Air Force leaders did not accept this argument and consistently objected to the proposed
vessel. In all JCS discussions since the Key West Conference where the carrier had been
mentioned, Generals Spaatz and Vandenberg voted against its construction on the grounds
that it was an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of the Air Force's capabilities.
The cancellation of this vital Navy project may be likened to a breeze which fanned
the smoldering Navy rebellion into flames. How and why this cancellation occurred is
examined in Paul Hammond's "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers" and Jeffrey Barlow's
The Revolt of the Admirals. They adequately analyze this decision, whose understanding
is necessary to comprehend the events o f late 1949 which cost Admiral Denfeld his
position. Consequently, this thesis provides only a brief overview of Admiral Denfeld's
involvement in the cancellation controversy in order to facilitate understanding the later
stages of the "revolt" and the CNO's removal.
The initial idea for a flush-deck carrier capable of carrying large jet aircraft has
been credited to Admiral Marc Mitscher, one o f the Navy's ablest World War II carrier
commanders. His 1946 proposal to Admiral Nimitz started the planning for such a ship.
Funding for its construction was allocated by Congress and approved by the President in
fiscal years 1947, 1948, and 1949. Mitscher had calculated that a flush-deck carrier would
be required in order to operate the larger, modem jet aircraft. Moreover, the 1946 atomic
tests against anchored ships in the Bikini Atoll also indicated another advantage to
reducing the ship's cross section by removing the superstructure. A flush-deck carrier
would be much less susceptible to damage than a conventional carrier from the powerful
shock waves produced by a nuclear explosion.177 To allow the continued allocation of
177Rearden, pp. 389 - 90.
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funds for the new carrier, in 1948 the Navy decided to stop the construction of thirteen
ships, including the battleships Kentucky and Hawaii which were to be converted into
prototype rocket-launching vessels. The United States was the only naval vessel above
destroyer-size under construction during 1948 and 1949.178
The Joint Chiefs o f Staff' were not asked to approve the new carrier in 1947,
because its construction had been authorized before the military unification law was
enacted. Only at Key West did Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Denfeld seek the Chiefs'
approval o f this project. Later, the Army and Air Force Chiefs claimed that the carrier
project was not presented to them for consideration but was described to them as a project
already approved by the Secretary of Defense and the President and funded by
Congress.179 Later JCS discussions of the flush-deck carrier project were similarly
ambiguous. Admiral Denfeld testified to Congress in early 1949 that the JCS had
"approved" the carrier project on three separate occasions in 1948, but Bradley and
Vandenberg never agreed to having voted on it except when it had been presented as a fa it
accompli,180 In preparing the fiscal year 1950 defense budget, Forrestal was eventually
able to get the Service Chiefs to agree on all issues except funding construction of the new
carrier. He wrote to Charles Wilson that this was a "question I had to resolve myself. "181
Despite the carrier's inclusion in the budget, Bradley noted in his memoirs that he sensed
Truman had lost enthusiasm for the project by December 1948 .182 In one of its few
publicity victories the Navy obtained the President's permission on 2 February 1949 to
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name the new carrier the United States, giving it added patriotic stature.183 Nonetheless,
the carrier's $189 million price tag in a defense budget o f $11 billion made it one o f the
most expensive new weapons systems and an attractive target for the budget cutters.
Admiral Denfeld was convinced that the flush-deck carrier was the most important
new project being developed by the Navy. Aircraft carrier operations had proved essential
to victory in the Pacific theater, and were expected to be equally essential in future efforts
by the U. S. Navy to control the sea lines of communication between North America and
any area o f military operations. Although the United States would be capable of operating
nuclear-capable bombers, the CNO asserted that strategic bombing was never considered
to be a primary responsibility o f the carrier. He said that it had more than enough naval
missions to carry out without adding any responsibilities assigned to the Air Force.184 On
15 April 1949, shortly after Johnson became Secretary o f Defense, the keel o f the new
carrier was laid in a Virginia drydock, but this ship was not to experience any smooth
sailing.
At a news conference on the twelfth o f April, Johnson replied to a querry about
the future o f the Navy's carrier project by stating that his opinion would be forthcoming.
On the fifteenth, he asked General Eisenhower to obtain the Joint Chiefs' current views on
the project.185 Navy Secretary Sullivan approached Johnson on the twenty-first and asked
to discuss the carrier. The Secretary of Defense was too busy to see him, but did promise
that he would confer with Sullivan before making any decision about the ship. The Joint
Chiefs' opinions were predictable. Admiral Denfeld strongly supported the construction of
the United States while both Generals Bradley and Vandenberg opposed its continuation.
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Admiral Denfeld, as the senior member o f the Joint Chiefs (the Joint Chiefs did not have a
Chairman yet), delivered the three written opinions to the Secretary o f Defense on
Saturday, 23 April 1949. Johnson, who had expected this verdict, called General
Eisenhower at Key West where he was recuperating from an illness. Eisenhower also
opposed the new ship's construction. To ensure Congressional support for cancellation o f
the project, Johnson received concurrence from the Chairmen o f the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees, Representative Vinson and Senator Tydings, and then
notified the President o f his decision. Secretary Sullivan was then in Texas delivering a
speech to the Reserve Officers' Association. Neither he nor Denfeld were given an
opportunity to discuss the decision. In fact Admiral Denfeld was still in the Secretary's
offices 45 minutes after delivering the JCS' memos when the already mimeographed press
release announcing the cancellation of the carrier was passed out.
The CNO was very upset, but Secretary Sullivan, who heard about Johnson's
action on the radio, was absolutely livid. Sullivan believed that Johnson had broken his
promise to wait until he had discussed the carrier with the Defense Secretary before taking
any action.186 He also objected to the method of the cancellation and Johnson's disregard
for his advice and opinion. Sullivan initially intended to protest to President Truman, but,
when he found out that Johnson had obtained the President's concurrence, scrapped his
plans for an appeal and instead drafted a fiery letter of resignation.187 He met with
Truman on Monday, 25 April and delivered his letter to Johnson on the next day.
Secretary Sullivan's anger at the cancellation was aimed at Johnson and not the
President. Sullivan felt that Johnson's economy program was the Defense Secretary's own
creation and that Johnson's "unannounced candidacy" for the Presidency in 1952 was the
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motivation for the dramatic action and newsworthy cutbacks.188 The President had been
placed in the position o f either supporting the Defense Secretary he had just installed, or
increasing the confusion in the Defense Department by countermanding the direction of
the Secretary. Although Sullivan felt that the President did not want to cancel the carrier,
Johnson had put him in a position where he could not reasonably object.189 Sullivan's
violent protest and resignation made him a hero with the Navy.
Admiral Denfeld had the same opportunity to go out in a blaze of glory over the
cancellation o f the carrier. He had been committed to the project and had opposed its
termination. In September 1949 he wrote that "I fought for the big carrier from the day I
took office until it was canceled and at no time did I give an inch in my fighting for it."190
Now, the Navy's future was in doubt. Both Denfeld's staff and the departing Secretary
recommended that the CNO support Sullivan's action by also resigning. But Denfeld
"thought he would help the Navy better by staying" and remained at his post. Sullivan
"always regretted that Denfeld didn't resign" and Vice Admiral Libby rightly concluded
that Denfeld "would have been better off had he done so."191 Nevertheless, Denfeld's
choice was difficult and courageous. He knew what he was fighting against and placed
the good o f his service ahead of his own personal concerns. Denfeld was not interested in
the easy way out. At this juncture, the CNO probably saw himself as a modem day John
Paul Jones, just beginning to fight while the masts tumbled down around his head. But
Johnson and Denfeld's Air Force and Army opponents likely saw the CNO as a captain
who had now chosen to go down with his sinking ship. The ongoing inter-service struggle
was now clearly Denfeld's battle to win or lose.
188Sullivan interview, p. 59.
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Cancellation o f the flush-deck carrier strained the relationship between Secretary
Johnson and the President. David McCullough wrote that Truman liked Sullivan and "did
not blame him for resigning." He also stated that "Johnson's manner troubled [Truman]
greatly."192 Robert Donovan confirmed this assessment in his review o f the Truman
Administration, citing a diary entry o f White House Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers
which described the President as "very displeased" with Johnson.193 Now that the
President had chosen an aggressive man with a firm hand as his Defense Secretary, he
seemed to miss Forrestal's thoughtful and deliberate manner.
The press responded vigorously to the cancellation o f the United States and
Sullivan's resignation. Two syndicated writers who were known for their support o f the
Navy's positions, the New York Times' Hanson W. Baldwin and U. S. News and World
Report's David Lawrence, recognized that Johnson's action set a dangerous precedent by
"allowing two services to pair off against the other" and believed that this would "lead to
explosive events in the National Military Establishment."194 The San Francisco Chronicle's
editor observed that "the morale of the Navy was better the day after Pearl Harbor than it
is today as a result o f . . . the scuttling o f the supercarrier."195 Not all o f the press reacted
so negatively to this event, but there was clearly a sense that this battle was not over.
More fireworks were yet to come.
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Denfeld's view of the events surrounding the death of the carrier were
understandably negative. He later questioned the right o f Secretary Johnson to cancel the
United States, but during his tenure as CNO, kept his charges within the Department and
worked to improve the situation.196 Admiral Radford, now serving as the Commander in
Chief o f the Pacific Fleet, wrote to Denfeld that the news from Washington was "certainly
disturbing." He reported that "the cancellation o f the CVX [flush-deck carrier] has had a
tremendous and very bad effect on the Navy as a whole," and went on to observe that
"our friend in the front office [Johnson] must be nuts. The only consoling thought I have
is that he is going so far so fast that he is going to trip himself up."197 This hopeful
assessment was eventually to prove correct, but not before many more painful episodes in
the unification war had to be endured.
Also with a view toward the future, the San Francisco Chronicle's editor wrote
about the important decision now before Secretary Johnson and the President - the
selection o f Sullivan's replacement:
The obligation now rests heavily upon President Truman and Defense
Secretary Johnson to produce a new Secretary o f the Navy with the zeal and
aggressiveness to give the Navy fair representation in the defense councils. . .
The situation calls for a prompt and intelligently selected replacement, and
beyond that it demands that his views be given a fair reception by his
superiors.198
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The choice was indeed important, yet if the Navy had fallen totally out o f the
Administration's favor there was no reason to select a strong replacement for Sullivan. A
figurehead Navy Secretary who would follow Johnson's lead could keep the Navy in a
subordinate role. This was exactly the situation the Navy saw itself in when Secretary
Johnson and President Truman selected Francis P. Matthews, a distinguished lawyer from
Omaha, Nebraska, with no experience in naval affairs or national service, to lead the Navy.
Matthews was nearly unknown in Washington when Johnson chose him to join the
Defense team in early May 1949. His most significant national-level service had been as
the Supreme Knight o f the Knights of Columbus from 1939 through 1945. He had ably
led this Catholic lay organization o f 425,000 members in support o f the war effort, even
making two trips to European battlefields as a representative o f the Catholic Bishops o f
America to assess the religious needs o f the American servicemen.199 Elis first trip was
made on a British bomber, flying 12 hours over the North Atlantic in a temperature o f 50
degrees below zero, demonstrating his firm commitment to do the job he was asked to
perform.200 On his second visit to the war zone he traveled to the front in Italy in late
1944, actually coming under enemy fire on several occasions. After leaving Italy, he
stopped in Greece and witnessed the beginnings of the Communist insurrection, being
forced from his hotel by a grenade attack.201 Matthews' courage and dedication were
traits few were counting on as he entered into the Washington unification struggles.
The new Secretary had deep roots in Nebraska soil. He was born in Albion,
Nebraska in 1887, the son o f a harness maker. When Francis was nine years old his father
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died, leaving his mother to raise eight children on her own. In an initiative characteristic
of the Matthews family, she used her husband's insurance money to purchase a farm and
settled the family down to a regimen of hard work, discipline and faith in their God.202
Eventually all eight children attended college and prospered. Francis scrubbed floors,
waited tables, sold men's furnishings, and tutored his classmates to work his way through
Omaha's Creighton University, earning his law degree in 1913. He excelled in school,
winning the University's law prize three years in a row and graduating high in his class.203
After being admitted to the Nebraska bar in 1913, Matthews married and raised
seven children o f his own. He formed his own law firm in 1929 and pursued a career of
community service typical o f a prominent mid-Western businessman. The future Navy
Secretary served on the local utilities board, rose to head the State's Knights o f Columbus
organization in 1924, became a member of Omaha's Chamber o f Commerce, and served
on the Board o f Directors o f Boy's Town.204 A devout Catholic, he was knighted by the
Pope in 1924 for his services in the Knights o f Columbus. Matthews did some
government work in the 1930s, serving as Omaha's attorney for the Reconstruction
Finance Commission. He also headed the Omaha Chamber o f Commerce's military affairs
committee in 1934, working with the local military bases o f Fort Omaha and Fort Crook
(later OffUtt Air Force Base, the home of the Strategic Air Command). His business and
legal ventures prospered, enabling him to become a millionaire in the early 1940s.
Matthews was an active Democrat in a predominantly Republican region. He
chaired his county's Democratic Central Committee from 1932 through 1936 and was
elected President o f the Omaha Chamber of Commerce in 1938. His service in this
202Omaha World Herald. 8 February 1942, p. 7-C, in the clipping files of the Douglas County [Nebraska]
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position and on the bi-partisan Metropolitan Utilities Board earned him a reputation as a
fair man to whom principles were more important than party politics.205 One
disagreement over contract negotiations in 1943 did result in Matthews having been
criticized by a local editor "as one who plays his politics, by preference, in the gutter."206
But this was the one exception in a long series o f glowing testimonials found in his
personal papers at the Truman Library and in the records o f the Omaha World Herald, a
Republican paper during this period.
By the end o f World War II, Matthews had become involved in national affairs.
When President Roosevelt died in 1945, Matthews issued a statement characterizing the
Nation's loss as "tragic" and expressing "confidence in the ability o f President Truman to
carry on."207 In a speech one week later to the Concord Club o f Massachusetts, Matthews
supported a strong post-war defense posture: "We must preserve what we have if it takes
the largest Army, Navy, and Air Force in the world."208 President Truman began to take
note o f this mid-Western leader in 1946, presenting him with the Medal of Merit for his
war work, praising his "selfless and courageous and wholly objective contribution to the
welfare o f the Nation" in his citation.209
Truman selected Matthews as a member o f his Commission on Civil Rights in
1947. The Nebraskan became convinced that the Nation's freedoms were not being
equitably shared and made some powerful enemies in the South with his statements on
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human rights. He also led the U. S. Chamber of Commerce's Committee on Socialism and
Communism from 1946 through 1951. Matthews made sincere and powerful statements
on communist influence in government, declaring Communism to be a "powerful and
persuasive" force in America.210 In probably his most significant political effort, he headed
the Nebraska delegation to the 1948 Democratic National Convention and was credited
with holding the group in Truman's camp despite the preferences o f the State's Party
Chairman for Senator Pepper o f Florida.211 Matthews' experiences, although by no means
high profile, did give him a limited familiarity with national affairs before Truman selected
him as Secretary o f the Navy in 1949.
The new Secretary of the Navy was also not ignorant o f the battles for military
unity being waged in the Nation's capital. In November 1946, he had presided at a dinner
where then-Under Secretary Sullivan presented an award to National Catholic Community
Service for its U.S.O. work. Sullivan joked about the progress o f unification and the joys
o f serving in the military establishment.212 Matthews had also called Sullivan in 1947 to
ask for help for a friend's nephew who was in trouble in the Navy. The conversation was
polite and impersonal with Matthews seeming very unprepared and uncomfortable dealing
with such an important government official.213 In 1949, Matthews was aware o f the
Navy's problems and the difficult job he was accepting. Henry Doorly, the publisher of the
Omaha World Herald, sent Matthews a congratulatory note on his nomination for the new
position:
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My hearty good wishes to you in your new job as Secretary o f the Navy. I
don't know why you want it, or why you would take it, but if you do, God
bless you, and I hope you enjoy it. I congratulate Truman more that I do
you.214
Francis Matthews went into his new assignment with his eyes open.
When the announcement was made that Matthews was to be the new Secretary of
the Navy, those who knew him were effusive in their praise. Omaha's Catholic
Archbishop G. T. Bergen wrote President Truman, declaring that "you can trust him
[Matthews] absolutely, and I am certain there will be no regrets on the part o f anyone over
his selection."215 J. Francis McDermott, a prominent Nebraska Republican and former
Commander o f the State's American Legion, also praised Matthews' selection in the
Omaha World Herald, doubting "if there is another man in the United States with the
moral, professional, and business qualifications o f Mr. Matthews." He went on to predict
that "while alert to protect the proper interests of the Navy he will be scrupulously fair to
the Air Force and the Army."216 Admiral Radford wrote to Admiral Denfeld that although
he did not know Matthews, the Navy's "head Catholic," Father Maurice Sheehy "gave him
a good mark."217 Sheehy, who was to play a prominent role in the events surrounding
Denfeld's removal later in the year, had served as a Navy chaplain during the war and was
currently the head o f religious education at the Catholic University in Washington. He
maintained a good friendship with all the Navy's leaders, both in uniform and mufti.
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There was speculation concerning why Matthews, from land-locked Nebraska, was
the President's choice to lead the sea services. The most credible opinion is that o f
Secretary Sullivan, who felt that Johnson, having just lost an Irish-Catholic Navy
Secretary, sought to placate the Catholic voters whom he might depend on in 1952 by
choosing another prominent Catholic to fill the position.218 Although there were other
Nebraskans in the top ranks of the Pentagon, they were all Army officers.219 The most
damaging observation made in this connection was Matthews' own statement in a news
conference that the largest waterborne craft he had ever been in was a rowboat.220 To his
chagrin, the new Secretary quickly picked up the nickname "Rowboat Matthews." The
Navy's uniformed leaders were hesitant to place their trust in a man with no naval
experience, especially since he was the hated Johnson's choice for the position.
Matthews accepted the job not because o f its prestige or for any potential personal
gain, but with a legitimate desire to serve his Country in any way the President asked.
Contrary to popular accusations, Matthews had not been a heavy contributor to Truman's
campaign and had not even met Louis Johnson before he assumed his new position.221 His
confirmation hearings were smooth, the only opposition to his nomination coming from
Southern Senators who objected to his earlier efforts in the President's Civil Rights
Commission and from liberals who brought up his staunch anti-Communist

218Sullivan interview, p. 73.
219Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer, the Deputy Army Chief, Maj. Gen. Gruenther, the Director of the Joint Staff, and
Maj. Gen. Pick, Chief of the Army's Corps of Engineers were mentioned as prominent military
Nebraskans in the Omaha World Herald article of 16 May 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska]
Historical Society, File "Matthews."
220Ralph Smith, "Navy Secretary Nominee Well Known for Public Service," Omaha World Herald. 13
May 1949.
221John A. Giles, "The Navy's Secretary Walks Alone," Washington Star. 23 October 1949, p. C-l.

72

pronouncements for the U. S. Chamber o f Commerce. Even with these objections, he was
confirmed unanimously by the Senate on 18 May 1949.222
History's depiction of Secretary Matthews is evolving based on recent research.
Paul Hammond's 1963 article on the controversy portrays the "soft-spoken lawyer from
Omaha" as "a Johnson man" who was ineffective in the Pentagon.223 Paolo Coletta
describes Matthews as "another Democratic party fund-raiser . . . [and a] friend o f the
defense secretary" in his articles on Matthews and Denfeld.224 E. B. Potter, one o f the
Country's foremost naval writers, stated that Matthews was "less a Navy advocate than
Johnson's loyal lackey."225 General Bradley's memoirs give a more charitable view o f the
Secretary: "He was a sincere, devout and decent man who could not have taken over the
Navy at a worse time."226 But Michael Isenberg's 1993 history o f the U. S. Navy in the
Cold War continues the denigration o f Matthews. His only characterization o f the
Secretary portrays him as "a man o f such cartoonish demeanor that he once sent part of
the nation's secret war plans to the cleaners in his jacket pocket."227 Isenberg provides no
documentation for this incident or his characterization o f the man.
Recent scholarly efforts should improve the Secretary's reputation. Jeffrey
Barlow's The Revolt o f the Admirals credits Matthews with being "a cautious and astute
lawyer," and depicts his role in the "revolt" as that o f an intelligent and dedicated public
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servant.228 Barlow's view is much more consonant with the impression this writer gained
from a review o f the Matthews Papers and other primary sources. The older historical
treatments all seem to have been biased by the two major events o f Matthews' term o f
service, the "revolt" and the outbreak of the Korean War. These occurrences certainly
should continue to tarnish his credentials as a successful Secretary o f the Navy, but give
no grounds for attempts to fault his character or intelligence.
Just before heading to Washington to assume his new responsibilities, Matthews
told an interviewer that his task would be "to see that the Navy co-operates with the other
divisions o f the armed forces to accomplish the very obvious desire o f the American
people [unification]." He also professed a full awareness of the "sublime traditions of the
Navy," and contended that unification could be achieved without sacrificing the Navy's
proud heritage. Matthews echoed Johnson's views when he stated that he planned to
pursue economy in government "to the greatest degree that it can be accomplished," and
he agreed with the President in assessing that war was not "probable in the near future."229
Possessing this focused approach, Francis Matthews was sworn in as Secretary of the
Navy on 25 May 1949. Despite his clarity o f purpose and commitment to his duties,
Matthews demonstrated how much he still had to learn about Washington when he
became lost in the Pentagon on the way to his swearing-in ceremony.230
Admiral Denfeld spoke positively about Secretary Matthews' selection as his new
boss, and promptly sent a congratulatory letter to the nominee:
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I am happy to know you will soon be our next Secretary. . . . I am certain that
we will enjoy the close associations that we will soon have and you may rest
assured that, we in the Navy, will support you completely and
wholeheartedly.231
The CNO also mentioned their mutual friend, Father Sheehy, and noted that he had
spoken well o f the Secretary-nominee. Admiral Denfeld needed to cultivate a good
relationship with Matthews. Given Denfeld's intention to help the Navy out o f its current
predicament and his recognition that the danger came from the civilian leadership o f the
Defense Department, he hoped Matthews would help convince Johnson that
dissatisfaction in the Navy was not confined to old admirals opposed to unification. If
Matthews lacked an understanding of naval matters, it would fall to Denfeld and his staff
to provide him with the information he needed to assess the situation intelligently and
convince the President and Congress of the national need for a strong Navy.
The first few months o f Matthews' term were generally harmonious. The new
Secretary delivered the commencement address at Annapolis on 2 June 1949, telling the
graduating Midshipmen that "the Navy has become for me the highest obligation in life"
and that the American people continued to recognize "the fundamental necessity for
American superiority on the seven seas."232 The Naval Academy Alumni Association's
magazine, Shipmate, quoted Matthews as having stated that "the slogan for all Americans
today and from this day forward must be: one for all and all for one."233 The new
Secretary was doing his best to reduce the Navy's tensions about unification. More
concretely during June 1949, he and Admiral Denfeld fought for the Navy's position on
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modifications to two Essex class aircraft carriers and convinced Johnson that these
improvements were needed.
Omaha expressed its pride in the Secretary by declaring 13 June 1949 to be
"Francis P. Matthews Day." Admiral Denfeld was to be in town to serve as the graduation
speaker at Boys' Town, and because the Secretary was a member o f the Boys' Town
Board, this occasion served well to get the two leaders o f the Navy together. The
celebration took on a very conciliatory inter-service flavor when the local Strategic Air
Command staged a fly-over where its planes dipped their wings in salute to the Navy's
leadership.234 Despite a heavy rain, the day o f unity went off well.
Denfeld and Matthews seemed to make a good team, and relations between the
services appeared to be on the mend. The new Secretary o f the Navy was very impressed
with Johnson and President Truman and also with the men in the Navy and Marine
Corps.235 During his first two months on the job, Matthews developed a great deal of
respect for the admirals. In a 29 July 1949 interview, he asserted that there was no other
group o f Americans "among whom the average of ability, personality, integrity and
education is higher than it is among the high-ranking officers o f the Navy. "236 But the
improved cooperation and harmony Matthews had observed within the defense
establishment was only surface deep. Within the same week, he said that "the three
service secretaries are in perfect mutual understanding," and that "the Air Force was
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unbalanced in favor of strategic bombing."237 The fundamental disagreements between the
services could not be glossed over or repaired simply by changing civilian leaders.
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ADMIRAL DENFELD ON THE DEFENSIVE OUNE - OCTOBER 1949)

"As you can well appreciate, it is going to be tough sledding for the Navy
from now on and all I can do is to fight in an effort to save as much as I can."
(1949 - Admiral Denfeld)238
I am so weary of this inter-service struggle for position, prestige and power
that this morning I practically 'blew my top." . . . I've seriously considered
resigning my commission, so that I could say what I pleased publicly.
(1949 - General Eisenhower)239

Denfeld, ever the optimist, consistently sought to establish a good working
relationship with the Navy's civilian leaders and the other services and to resolve their
differences through discussion and compromise. Captain Arleigh Burke, then an officer
on Denfeld's staff and later one of the Navy's best CNOs, observed that while Admiral
Radford and the senior aviators were "very concerned," Matthews' and Denfeld's offices
"were more sanguine. . . . They did not want to rock the boat. . . . They were still reluctant
to emphasize the views of the Navy and did not, at first, place the unification controversy
high enough on the priority list o f Navy problems."240 Vice Admiral Wellborne, DCNO
for Administration under Denfeld, agreed with Burke in thinking that Denfeld "had hoped
for quite a long while that the matter could be resolved in an amicable way without actual
confrontation."241
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The Admiral took his hopes into the JCS sessions o f mid-1949, but the continuing
budgetary pressures and the passions unleashed by the cancellation of the United States
were still the distinguishing features of the period. Denfeld continued to criticize the Air
Force's belief in the omnipotence o f strategic bombing, contending that no such claim
could be made, at least not until the capabilities and vulnerabilities o f the Soviet air
defense system were better understood. A report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on 3
March 1949, appeared to confirm most o f Denfeld's misgivings concerning the lack o f
reliable intelligence data.242 The Admiral also continued to encourage JCS planning for
the defense o f Western Europe and the Mediterranean following a Soviet attack rather
than placing total reliance on an atomic counter-offensive. He pointed out that the use o f
the atomic bomb might not be authorized by the President, that allies like France and
Great Britain might not approve the use o f their territory to launch atomic strikes while
they were within the range of Soviet retaliatory strikes, and that the B-36 was not capable
o f getting the job done.243 Denfeld also correctly observed that the spirit o f the JCS was
wrong, noting that "we have been meeting as Service Chiefs, not as Joint Chiefs of
Staff. "244 Despite the logic in these arguments and observations, the other representatives
were not interested in compromise. Their views had been validated by Johnson's
cancellation o f the carrier earlier in the year. Strategic airpower was in favor, and the
Navy's budget was going to be cut to pay for it.
The fact that the other Chiefs acted like vultures circling a dying animal frustrated
Denfeld to no end. Johnson ordered deep cuts in the supporting civilian manpower o f the
services and insisted that the Navy make more than half o f all reductions. Negotiations for
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the fiscal year 1951 defense budget were in their final stages with the Navy's share falling
to third place for the first time.245 The Army and the Air Force proposed even more
dramatic cuts in the Navy and Marine Corps, including doing away with the Marines' air
capabilities and cutting the number of active fleet aircraft carriers from eight to four
(Army) or zero (Air Force).246 Denfeld thought that the final numbers "were picked out
o f a hat."247 Vice Admiral Wellborne observed that the CNO
felt that his advice was not being accepted a t . . . full value . . . in the councils
of the Joint Chiefs and his reaction to this whole disagreement was one o f . . .
frustration. . . . He simply was very unhappy about the situation as it existed.248
Admiral Denfeld was in a losing position. Even if he convinced his new Secretary to
support the Navy's position, he would still be consistently outvoted in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and had no influence with the Secretary of Defense.
Compounding Denfeld's difficulties, the DCNO noted that there were problems of
"envy and distrust" developing between Denfeld and the other officers in the Navy due to
his apparent good relations with the NME's civilian leaders.249 Some historical accounts
o f this period have asserted that this disenchantment within the Navy was a significant
contributing factor in his eventual replacement.250 Burke confirmed the presence of
internal tensions but understood that Denfeld was only trying to follow orders to the best
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o f his ability and striving to promote improved relations.251 What was actually occurring
was Denfeld's increasing isolation from both his superiors and subordinates.
The economy program o f Secretary Johnson and President Truman squeezed all
the armed services. Edward Kolodziej concluded that "each o f the services was
approaching a breaking point where any additional budgetary restrictions would threaten
its very survival as a viable military instrument."252 In reducing the defense budget from
$45 billion to $11 billion in three years, the President had helped the economy in the short
term and balanced the budget, but the cuts being made in 1949 were clearly coming at the
cost o f actual readiness and capabilities. Johnson's report to the President at the end of
1949 stated that "the economy program of the Department o f Defense aims at achieving a
maximum o f national security at a minimum cost. Our watchword is and must be
economy in every activity."253 Given the fact that there existed no agreed upon national
security strategy at the time, the ability o f the armed services to provide what Johnson
defined as "national security" was highly debatable.
Admiral Denfeld, as the most consistent critic o f the economy program, fell further
out of favor. General Bradley, as Army Chief o f Staff and later Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs o f Staff, supported the Secretary in his efforts to save money. He thereby retained
his influence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff but cost his service and the Nation dearly. Thirtyfour years later he remarked that
from this distance, I must say that this decision was a mistake, perhaps the
greatest o f Truman's presidency. My support o f his decision . . . was likewise
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a mistake, perhaps the greatest mistake I made in my postwar years in
Washington.254
Admiral Denfeld rarely criticized the economy program in general but rather vocally
opposed its implementation^ He objected to the "practice of the Secretary o f Defense and
the JCS in telling each service what it could do with its money," not the overall limits.255
A good example of this distinction was the case of the U. S. S. United States. The Navy
had previously reprioritized within its budget to continue the carrier program by canceling
other funded construction projects. This flexibility allowed the service's leaders to
prioritize their own programs, an ability Johnson had firmly removed with the cancellation
of the carrier.
In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 18 June, the CNO
highlighted the Navy's weaknesses in aircraft procurement, modernization programs for
the active fleet, electronics development programs, and maintenance of the reserve fleet
under the fiscal year 1950 budget which was soon to go into effect.256 He pointed out that
the Navy was receiving delivery o f "far fewer" aircraft in 1949 than "at the time Pearl
Harbor was attacked," and that combat ships were manned "at about 67% o f war
complement. "25V He concluded his statement by stating that "the Navy will discharge its
responsibilities throughout the coming year to the utmost o f our ability, but not without a
considerable degree o f risk."258 This was as close as he could come to opposing the
President's budget under the Defense Department's rules on public statements.

254Bradley and Blair, p. 487.
255Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," Collier’s. 1 April 1950, p. 44.
256Denfeld, Statement to the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United
States Senate, on the Navy Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, 18 June 1949, pp. 10 - 12, in the White House
Official Files, File "Department of the Navy Correspondence - 1949," Truman Library.
257Ibid., p. 7, and Denfeld, "The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK," Collier’s. 25 March 1950,
p. 47.
258Ibid„ p. 12.
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The entire defense budgetary process from 1945 through 1950 was inherently
flawed. The absence o f a strategic plan to prioritize force structure decisions and
President Truman's philosophy of allocating defense funds based on arbitrary ceilings
rather than actual needs caused the military establishment to atrophy and forced the
Service Chiefs to compete for every dollar. The CNO understood this problem but was
unable to develop a solution or convince anyone else to do so. Admiral Denfeld, an
adequate, but by no means brilliant strategist, did not have the influence to make a
difference.
Congress also deserves a share o f the blame for this budgetary arrangement as
Edward Kolodziej points out in The Uncommon Defense and Congress. 1945 - 1963:
[Congress] interested itself essentially in the how, and not the why, o f military
spending. Largely ignored were the many interacting and seemingly
intractable relations between the nation's actual and potential military power,
and, correspondingly, its subtly shaded spectrum o f foreign policy goals that,
to be supported, required different kinds o f military power for varying
political contingencies.259
Kolodziej concluded that only two things could break the cycle o f defense reductions and
internal competition - war or forward, strategic thinking, noting that Korea ultimately
came first.
Each service's publicity machine continued to attempt to persuade Congress and
the public that its service needed a greater budgetary priority. Thomas Boettcher noted
that "during the summer o f 1949, the Navy League and the Air Force Association each
appropriated $500,000 for promotion campaigns to support their favored service."260
Secretary Matthews continued to try to downplay the dissension: "1 can find no evidence

259Kolodziej, p. 36.
260Boettcher, p. 179.
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among my associates in the top ranks of the three services of a spirit to do anything but
work for our country first, rather than for any single department of the military
establishment."261 Nevertheless, the attacks continued. Secretary Symington, in a private
letter to Ferdinand Eberstadt, a member of the Hoover Commission assessing the
Executive Branch's organization, complained that "action must be taken to resolve the
present conflict resulting from the Navy's continuous attacks." He went on to state that
"unless somebody can stop these attacks . . . efficient functioning o f the military
establishment is impossible; therefore the security of our country is seriously
jeopardized."262 Not surprisingly, this private letter was leaked to the press. There
seemed to be no end to the infighting.
The Hoover Commission's charter was to examine the "operation and organization
o f the executive functions and activities" in response to Secretary Forrestal's early 1949
recommendations for greater centralization in the Military Establishment and concerns
expressed by other cabinet members. Its membership included former President Hoover,
Dean Acheson, James Forrestal (until early 1949), and Joseph P. Kennedy.263 Its study,
completed just as Johnson took over, delved into the procedures of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and found that the Chiefs, "like the rest o f the National Military Establishment, are
not firmly under civilian control." The "divided loyalties" of the JCS members were also
highlighted as was the Commission's assessment that each Chief "will tend to answer much
more to the service secretary who is his direct superior than to the single policies o f a
unified Establishment." The Commission concluded that "under these circumstances

261Letter from Secretary Matthews to Judge Frank E. Day of Oregon, 10 June 1949, in Matthews Papers,
File "Correspondence - D," Truman Library.
262Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 489.
263Chairman., Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, The National
Security Organization. (The Hoover Commission Report), H. Doc. No. 86, 81st Cong., 1st sess.,
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 1.
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centralized civilian control scarcely exists," a fact that was patently obvious to
Forrestal.264
Given the clear-cut results of this study, Congress rapidly processed an amendment
to the National Security Act to give the Secretary o f Defense much greater control over
his subordinates. Johnson touted the legislation as a means o f preventing the sort o f
frustration that might drive future Defense Secretaries to suicide and thereby transformed
the bill into a personal memorial to Forrestal. At the time o f the carrier cancellation, the
Senate had already passed its version of the new National Security Act. A brief attempt to
delay the House's consideration o f the Bill was proposed due to the outcry over Johnson's
abrupt action, but, given the popular and Congressional sentiment generated by Forrestal's
suicide, there was no stopping this initiative.265 On 10 August the National Security Act
o f 1949 was signed into law, providing Johnson with just the authority he needed to
implement fully his concept o f defense unification.
The new National Security Act officially changed the title o f the military
department from the NME to the Defense Department, a term that was already in common
usage. The Act removed the Service Secretaries from the National Security Council and
left the Secretary o f Defense as the sole spokesman for the armed services. Another
change which significantly affected Admiral Denfeld was the creation o f the position o f
Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), thereby raising the body's membership from
three to four. When Secretary Johnson elevated General Bradley from Army Chief of
Staff to CJCS and replaced him with General J. Lawton Collins, the CNO found himself
outnumbered three-to-one in the JCS. His difficult position had now become nearly
impossible.

264Ibid., pp. 7 and 11.
265Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 501.
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Regardless of these difficulties, Denfeld was committed to continuing his fight for
improvements in national security and for the Navy. He had now completed, some would
say endured, most o f his two-year term as CNO and was willing to continue for another
term. As early as May 1949, Admiral Radford had urged him to "get your extension
nailed down" to enable the CNO to make some personnel moves and eliminate some o f
the dissension in the service.266 Because Denfeld's initial assignment as CNO was due to
expire in December and Secretary Johnson normally desired a three month turnover
process between his JCS members and their reliefs, Secretary Matthews needed to make a
decision on Denfeld's reappointment by early September.267 On this very important
choice, Secretary Matthews made his wishes known well ahead o f the deadline.
Admiral Denfeld and the Secretary o f the Navy had remained on good terms
during the first months of Matthews' service. In statements made in Omaha on "Matthews
Day" in June, Denfeld praised his boss as "one of the ablest people we've had in public
office in some time," and as a man "of integrity . . . and unquestioned patriotism." These
sentiments were reciprocated by Matthews.268 In July the two presented a united front
before Congress, testifying in opposition to the President's proposed budget and additional
cuts introduced in the House.269 Although they were fighting an uphill battle, it seemed
that Matthews and Denfeld made a good team and were comfortable with each other.

266Letter from Radford to Denfeld, 18 May 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 5, File "Correspondence - R,"
Naval Historical Center. The letter was particularly focused on Radford's annoyance with Admiral
Blandy, the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, who Radford wanted Denfeld to "send to the
showers."
267Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," Collier's. 18 March 1950, p. 15.
268"Unification Plan Gaining, Matthews, Denfeld Report Here," Omaha World Herald. 11 June 1949, and
"Honor is Paid to Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 14 June 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska]
Historical Society, File "Matthews."
269Their unity was noted in "Matthews and Denfeld," D. C. Times Herald. 8 July 1949, in Matthews
Papers, File "Miscellaneous Clippings," Truman Library.
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Despite this harmony between the two Navy leaders, rumors had circulated early in
1949 that Denfeld was to be fired.270 The Admiral was aware that some persons inside
and outside the Navy were unhappy with his performance and point of view, but he felt
confident that at least the President held him in high regard. Later he wrote that "several
people told me the President was very much pleased with my selection and had said I was
the best CNO the Navy had had since he had been in Washington."271 Even Secretary
Johnson said good things about his CNO:
May I say that since I have been in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Admiral Denfeld has done an outstanding service and has rendered loyal
support to the program I am endeavoring to carry out as laid down by the
Congress.272
Sensing that his superiors were satisfied in his performance and knowing that he still had
much work to do, Denfeld let it be known that he would accept a nomination for an
additional two-year term. Because the National Security Act limited JCS members to a
maximum tenure o f four years except in wartime, one two-year extension was all that
Denfeld could expect.
Matthews submitted his recommendation to reappoint Admiral Denfeld on 12 July
1949 and enthusiastically endorsed his subordinate:
[He] has worked with me in fullest harmony and cooperation from the day I
was honored with this office. His experience as Chief of Naval Operations,
coupled with his outstanding administrative abilities, makes him most valuable
to me, the Navy, and the National Defense Establishment. The wisdom o f his
reappointment is emphasized by the importance of the continuity o f the
members o f the Joint Chiefs of Staff, o f which Admiral Denfeld is the senior
270Barlow, p. 269, quoting a member of Denfeld's staff.
271Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," Collier's, 18 March 1950, p. 15.
272Letter from Secretary Johnson to Edward C. Holden, a New York American Legion official, 27 July
1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 3, File "Correspondence - H," Naval Historical Center.
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member, in dealing with the numerous long range problems with which that
body has been laboring.273
Matthews had served only 47 days as Secretary o f the Navy when he forwarded this
recommendation to Secretary Johnson. Although the Washington neophyte Matthews
was certainly impressed by Denfeld, a 40 year Navy veteran who had spent most o f the
last 15 years in the Washington corridors of power, an authentic mutual respect had
already developed between himself and Denfeld over this short period. This appreciation
o f their shared values and goals was to last through even the darkest days o f 1949.
Matthews' renomination o f Denfeld was a very conscious decision.
Johnson considered Matthews' letter for over three weeks before forwarding it to
the President on 2 August 1949 with the following brief endorsement: "I concur in this
nomination."274 Truman took less time to evaluate the recommendation and sent it to the
Senate for confirmation on 11 August 1949 with his blessing. In his news conference the
same day he announced that he had appointed General Bradley as Chairman o f the Joint
Chiefs o f Staff and had appointed Admiral Denfeld to another two-year term as CNO
beginning on 15 December.275 Hanson W. Baldwin, the New York Times' military
correspondent sent a telegram to the Denfelds with his "congratulations, but also
condolence" and his "hope" that "the next two years [would be] easier."276 Despite
Baldwin's hope, Denfeld's Senate confirmation was practically the only event in 1949 that
went easily for the CNO. On the 15th the Senate completed its consideration o f his
reappointment and approved his second term.
273Letter from Matthews to President Truman, 12 July 1949, in Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman
Library.
274Memorandum from Johnson to President Truman, in the Harry S. Truman Papers, White House
Official Files, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
275Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. 1949. (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 419.
276Telegram from Hanson W. Baldwin to Admiral Denfeld, 12 August 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 2,
File "Correspondence - B," Naval Historical Center.
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Some of the more radical Navy partisans imagined there must have been some sort
o f secret agreement behind Denfeld's reappointment. Rumors circulated in the press and
in naval circles that Denfeld had secured his extension by agreeing to support Matthews
and Johnson in the destruction of the Navy and the Marine Corps.277 Denfeld objected
strongly to these anonymous accusations as he explained to his friend Hanson W. Baldwin
o f the New York Times:
I want you to know that I did not seek reappointment and that I have made no
commitments conditioned on such a reappointment. I want you to further
know that when I find that I can be o f no further use to the Navy, I will be the
first one to get out.278
The Admiral received the signed official commission for his second term in mid-September
from Rear Admiral Dennison, Truman's Naval Aide and a close friend o f Denfeld's. The
CNO later reported that "shortly after I got it, I called on Secretary Matthews to thank
him for the commission. . . . 'There's nothing I have done since I have been Secretary,' he
[Matthews] said, 'that has given me more pleasure than getting you reappointed.’"279 The
Navy's leadership appeared ready to move in a positive direction and put some o f their
disagreements behind them.
Probably the most pressing weapons procurement issue facing the Department of
Defense in 1949 after the cancellation of the "supercarrier" was the acquisition o f the Air
Force's giant strategic bomber, the B-36. This decision involved the dedication of
hundreds of millions o f scarce defense dollars for the purchase o f enough B -3 6s to carry
out the atomic retaliatory strikes projected by the JCS in the event of war. Denfeld had

277See New York Times. 14 September 1949, and Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 507.
278Letter from Denfeld to Hanson W. Baldwin, 7 September 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 2, File
"Correspondence - B," Naval Historical Center.
279Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," Collier's. 18 March 1950, p. 15.
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gone on record in JCS meetings and in Congressional testimony opposing "excessive
reliance" on strategic bombing, and he continued to oppose procurement o f the B-36 in
quantity until its performance had been fully evaluated and the Russian air defensive
capabilities were better understood. But as a JCS member, he was tied to the corporate
position. When he lost a private vote he normally signed up to the majority opinion, at
least in public statements designed to give the impression of unity.280
Such was the case when a 1949 Congressional investigation sought to evaluate the
JCS' logic in committing the Armed Forces to follow a strategic bombing strategy in the
event o f global war. In an effort to keep the investigation from delving into classified
plans and information, Admiral Denfeld signed a JCS statement to Congress which was
characterized as "a ringing endorsement o f the strategic concept in the current war
plan."281 The CNO's subordinates perceived his endorsement of this agreement to be a
betrayal o f the Navy's interests and became even more disenchanted with his leadership.
Denfeld, for his part, continued to believe firmly in the futility o f the strategic bombing
plans as he explained after he was fired later in the year.
Suppose we do manage to transport concentrated explosives in $5,000,000
airplanes across the polar icecap. We can't win a war by terror. The Russians
die readily, but they don't scare readily. To defeat the Soviet Union, if it brings
war on us, we shall have to overcome the will o f the Russian people - to
convince them that they would be better off in a world where our ideas prevail
than in one ruled by the Kremlin philosophy. We shall not do that merely by
obliterating their chief cities and killing their people. Nor can we protect our
friends in Europe solely by dropping bombs, no matter how awful their
effect.282

280Arthur A. Ageton, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.), "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," Shipmate. July 1951, p. 3ff
provides a good overview of JCS operations and the process used when there were dissenting views.
281Condit, pp. 326 - 27.
282Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," Collier's. 1 April 1950, p. 37.
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Meanwhile, as Denfeld proved unable to articulate his objections to the existing
plans, the Air Force ordered hundreds o f B-36 bombers. The B-36 was the world's largest
bomber in 1949. It weighed over 278,000 lbs., was 163 feet long, and had a wingspan o f
230 feet. It was designed to fly 10,000 miles carrying 10,000 lbs. o f bombs, the weight of
an atomic bomb in the late 1940s.283 The B-36 was driven by the unusual arrangement o f
six "pusher-type, propeller-driven engines," which appear to the untrained observer to be
mounted backwards.284 The original design specifications for the bomber had been
developed in 1940 when it seemed possible that Hitler would gain control o f all o f Europe
and that eventually the United States would have to fight Germany at intercontinental
ranges. Because the eventual war was fought under different conditions, priorities were
shifted to shorter-range bombers, and the B-36 design sat on a shelf.
After the war the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation completed the design
contract and by 1948 had a B-36 ready for its initial testing. The Air Force held a public
competition to name the new, giant bomber and, instead o f martial-sounding submissions
like "Conqueror" and "Earthshaker," the name "Peacemaker" was selected.285 The Navy
found this name more than slightly ironic, since the "Peacemaker" became a central figure
in the budget and mission battles between the services. The huge aircraft acquired several
unofficial nicknames during its ten-year career, including "Magnesium M onster,"
"Aluminum Overcast," "Flying Apartment House," and "Ramp Rooster," the latter due to

283Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 486. The best source of detailed technical and
historical design information on the B-36 is a series of articles by Meyers Jacobsen in the American
Aviation Historical Society Journal between 1970 and 1974.
284Gregory S. Byard, Technical Sergeant, USAF, "7th Bombardment Wing - B-36 Chronology,"
unpublished manuscript, 1959, USSTRATCOM Archives, "B-36 File," Bellevue, Nebraska.
285Meyers K. Jacobsen, "Names and the B-36," American Aviation Historical Society Journal. Fall 1971,
pp. 186-188. Another good overview of the development of the B-36 can be found in Kenneth L. Moll,
"Nuclear Strategy, 1945 - 1949: America's First Four Years," Master's thesis, University of Nebraska at
Omaha, 1965, pp. 146 - 50.

91

early maintenance problems.286 Regardless o f its name, the B-36 became the standard
bearer o f the Air Force's strategic bombing strategy and a magnet for intense Navy
criticism in 1949.
The 7th Bomb Wing at Carswell Air Force Base near Fort Worth, Texas was the
first Air Force unit to operate the B-36 after taking delivery of its first one in June 1948.
By the spring of 1949 this Wing had grown to 36 operational bombers. Secretary
Forrestal approved the initial orders for B-36s, and due to Johnson's business connections
with Consolidated Vultee, was asked to finalize the decision on the purchase of auxiliary
jet engines for the aircraft before the new Secretary took over to avoid any perceived
impropriety.287 Johnson resigned his position as a director o f the aircraft manufacturing
company before assuming his new duties, but he recognized his vulnerability to charges o f
conflict of interest. The Air Force, with the approval o f the JCS and both Secretaries o f
Defense, placed orders for a total o f 170 B-36s in 1949 at a cost o f $5.8 million each - a
commitment of nearly $1 billion.288
Naval aviators, still smarting from the cancellation o f their new carrier, saw this
vast outlay as a bad investment and raised such a storm about the B-36's vulnerability to
their fighters that Congress presented Secretary Johnson with a resolution requesting a
public test between the new bomber and the Navy's best fighter, the Banshee.289 Admiral
Denfeld and the other members of the JCS evaluated this request on 27 May 1949 but
rejected the proposal, noting that secret aircraft performance data would then be available
to both the public and the Russians. Although Denfeld supported a classified test to assess

286Ibid.
287Millis, p. 551.
288Moll, p. 200, and Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," Collier's, 1 April 1950, p. 42.
289U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Unification and Strategy. H. Doc. 600, 81st
Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 7.
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the vulnerability o f the B-36 to enemy fighter defenses, this position was never publicized
and the CNO's reputation as "the Quisling o f the Navy" was strengthened.290
The B-36 survived the Navy's criticism and served as the Air Force's primary
strategic bomber until the B-52 assumed this role in 1958. The "Peacemaker" never
dropped a bomb in anger and was held in nuclear reserve throughout the Korean conflict.
One Air Force epitaph for the "massive, rumbling B-36" contends that it "single-handedly
protected an entire nation while preserving the American way of life."291 Admiral
Denfeld's and the Navy's memories o f this massive symbol o f American strategic
deterrence were not hardly as generous.
The conflict between the Navy and the Air Force continued to make headlines
during the summer o f 1949. One tactic which had proven successful in generating
negative publicity was to distribute to newspapers across the country propaganda
denigrating the capabilities o f the opposing service. The Navy's supporters, following this
recipe, sent copies o f a lengthy pamphlet, titled "The Strategic Bombing Myth" to over
200 editors across the country.292 This document took portions o f the report o f the
Strategic Bombing Survey which had analyzed the effectiveness of strategic bombing
during World War II, and presented them out o f context to convey the impression that the
Survey had found strategic bombing to be ineffective. The Air Force countered with a 33page essay o f their own, refuting the earlier piece o f propaganda charge by charge.293 The
effort involved in these anonymous attacks and the inter-service rivalry was enormous, and
largely unproductive.

290Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," Collier's. 1 April 1950, p. 42.
291Byard, pp. 49 - 50. A B-36 is on static display at the SAC museum in Bellevue, Nebraska.
292U.S. Department of the Air Force. Analysis of Another Anonymous Attack on the Air Force and the
Concept of Aerial Warfare Held bv the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unpublished manuscript, 1949, in
USSTRATCOM archives, File "B-36," p. 30.
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Admiral Denfeld continued to defend the capabilities of aircraft carriers and naval
aviation, but his well-reasoned arguments were not newsworthy compared to the
flamboyant charges o f the anonymous pamphlets.294 Secretary Johnson blasted the
propagandists, and particularly the Navy's "partisans," in a speech at the Naval War
College on 21 June 1949 by charging that they "had twisted the facts" about the carrier
cancellation and were waging "a campaign of terror against further unification o f the
armed forces."295 As Professor Isenberg has observed, "the Pentagon was sliding into
anarchy," and tensions in this inter-service war were building toward a climax.296

294A good example of Denfeld's rationale can be seen in his statement in U. S. Congress, House,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of the N aw Appropriation Bill. 1949.
80th Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 134.
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296Isenberg, p. 147.
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THE B-36 INVESTIGATION AND "THE REVOLT OF THE ADMIRALS"

"Nearly all dedicated military men are able to persuade themselves that what is
good for their service is good for the country." (1965 - Rear Admiral D. V.
Gallery, USN (Ret.))297
"True loyalty is loyalty not to men, but to principles." (1949 - Captain John G.
Crommelin, USN, to Secretary Matthews)298
The most famous o f the many "anonymous documents" circulated in the publicity
war between the Air Force and the Navy was placed in the hands o f several Congressmen
and newsmen sympathetic to the Navy in May 1949. It made over thirty specific charges
of corruption and malfeasance in the procurement of the B-36 bomber and in the resulting
decisions of the JCS to feature this aircraft in the Nation's contingency war plans. One of
these accusations claimed that Secretary Johnson had gained financially from the decision
to buy large quantities of B-36s and that Air Force Secretary Symington had made a deal
with Consolidated Vultee guaranteeing the Air Force's purchases o f the B-36 in return for
future employment with the company. If the allegations in this document were true, the
United States had been cheated o f millions of dollars and was relying on an inferior
weapon for its security.
James Van Zandt, a Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced these
charges and the document into the House record and called for a thorough
investigation.299 The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Carl
297Daniel V. Gallery, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.), Eight Bells and All's Well, (New York: W. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1965), p. 221.
298Captain Crommelin statement to Secretary Matthews, quoted in Omaha World Herald. 9 October 1949,
in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
299A copy of this "anonymous document" can be found in the archives of the Naval Historical Center,
"Double Zero Files 1965," Box 78, File "Thirteen - B-36." Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36
Bombers," p. 496.
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Vinson of Georgia, had been trying to avoid adding fuel to the fire by providing a
Congressional forum for the inter-service accusations, but he realized that these new
charges were too significant to ignore. He also recognized that if Van Zandt, a junior
Representative and a Captain in the Naval Reserve, was allowed to conduct his own
investigation there would be little restraint imposed on the presentations. Therefore
Vinson chose to take the matter under the auspices o f the House Armed Services
Committee and begin hearings in early August.300
The Committee met to plan these hearings on 9 June 1949 and unanimously
adopted eight agenda items. They decided to address the first two items in August before
holding a second session in early October to deal with the rest o f the list.301 The eight
agenda items aimed to:
1) Establish the truth or falsity o f the "Anonymous Document's" charges,
2) Determine the source of these charges,
3) Evaluate the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the B-36,
4) Assess the roles and missions o f the Navy

and the Air Force,paying particular

attention to the cancellation of the U. S. S.United States,
5) See if the Air Force is imbalanced in favor o f strategic bombing,
6) Assess the JCS procedures concerning weapons procurement,
7) Evaluate strategic bombing, and
8) Consider all other pertinent matters.302

300Love, The Chiefs of Naval Operations, p. 200. A good biographical sketch of Chairman Vinson and an
account of his role in this controversy can be found in John F. Tarpey, Captain, USN, "Uncle Carl," U. S.
Naval Institute Proceedings. January 1982, pp. 38-45.
30LU. S. Congress. House, Committee on Armed Services, Unification and Strategy. H. Doc. 600, 81st
Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 7 - 8 . (Hereinafter
cited as "House Unification and Strategy Report")
302Ibid.
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The Committee chose these topics in order to try to bring all accusations and arguments
before the public and thereby possibly settle the dispute once and for all. Obviously, some
disagreements could not be aired in an open forum, but Congressman Vinson decided that
as many o f the sessions as possible should be unrestricted. The American people had been
ted a nearly daily diet o f newspaper articles and anonymous charges for several years.
Now they could see whatever truth lay behind the allegations.
The armed services now set out to prepare their cases for presentation. The Air
Force brought in Barton Leach, a Colonel in the Air Force Reserve and a Harvard Law
Professor, to arrange its response to the anonymous charges and the Committee's agenda.
A dedicated team o f four investigators compiled a comprehensive document, "History o f
the B-36 Procurement," to serve as the basis for the service's presentation. Not neglecting
its public relations opportunities, the Air Force invited the House investigating team to
take up offices in the Pentagon adjacent to Colonel Leach's staff, and, by the start of the
official hearings, the House team had "reached the tentative conclusion that there was no
substance" to the charges.303
The Navy, in a fatal mistake, did not approach the preparation o f its testimony in
such a disciplined manner. In June, Under Secretary Dan Kimball initially attempted to
coordinate the service's efforts.304 He assembled a team o f nine officers and one civilian,
his assistant Cedric Worth, to oversee the development o f the Navy's official positions.
He gave leadership o f the team to Rear Admiral Brown, the President o f the Naval War
College. Captain Arleigh Burke, the head o f the Navy's OP-23, the "Organizational Policy
and Research Division," and Rear Admiral Ofstie, a member o f the Military Liaison
303Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 498.
304The best examination of the Navy's efforts in these hearings is found in a 42-page document prepared
by the Navy's "OP-23" in late 1949, entitled "A History of the Investigation of the B-36." It can be found
in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "B-36 Investigation," Naval Historical Center. The best published
sources are Barlow's The Revolt of the Admirals, and Hammond's case study.
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Committee to the Atomic Energy Committee, were also on this team, and both eventually
played important parts in the hearings.305
The Navy's team assembled appropriate records and assessed all the Committee's
issues. The staff members prepared position papers on all the topics and then presented
their efforts to Under Secretary Kimball on 19 July 1949. He found the positions
recommended by the team "too extreme," directed Rear Admiral Brown to return to the
War College, and disbanded the team. Captain Burke and the OP-23 staff were left to
"pick up the pieces" because no one had been directed to rework the papers for
Kimball.306 Burke's staff was already busy supporting requests from Admiral Denfeld's
office for additional research and assistance, and consequently, according to OP-23's
historical piece, the Navy's preparation "came to a virtual halt." No directives came from
the Secretary o f the Navy or the Chief o f Naval Operations to indicate their desires. "This
amorphous situation prevailed until. . . 10 August."307 Through disinterest or
procrastination, the Navy's leaders missed an excellent opportunity to focus their
arguments and possibly convince Congress that their point o f view was more than the
whining o f spoiled and disenchanted aviators.308 Admiral Denfeld clearly bears the
majority o f the blame in this case, since Burke's OP-23 was part o f his staff, and his
position as the senior uniformed leader o f the Navy made him responsible to provide
advice to the Congress based on the service's input.
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The first set o f hearings were held between 9 and 25 August and dealt only with
the specific charges in the anonymous document. The Committee called its primary
witnesses from the Air Force in order to investigate the B-36 procurement process and
found not "one iota, one scintilla o f evidence" to back up the charges.309 Secretary
Symington and General Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief o f Staff, made convincing
presentations and cleared the B-36 program. After the document and Representative Van
Zandt had been fully discredited, Cedric Worth, o f Navy Under Secretary Kimball's office,
came forward and admitted compiling and circulating the document. Matthews was
scandalized and referred to Worth's actions as "dastardly."310 $16,300 had been expended
by Congress to investigate the anonymous charges, identify Worth as the anonymous
source, and provide the Air Force with a public podium to present its side o f the
controversy.311
The Committee recessed until early October and the second phase o f the hearings.
Burke later observed that "after the Air Force testimony, it was evident that the Navy's
senior officers would have to speak for the Navy, that just a factual presentation for the
Record would not be enough."312 The Air Force had acquitted itself so well that
Matthews and Denfeld believed they needed to unify the Navy and make substantial
improvements in its case or cancel the hearings and let the Navy's embarrassing defeat
stand.
Rumors that Matthews and Denfeld were going to cancel the second set o f
hearings galvanized the agitated naval officers into action, precipitating the "revolt." The
309House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 8.
310Transcript of a telephone conversation between Secretary Matthews and John Giles, a reporter for the
Washington Star. 1 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar,
Truman Library.
311U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Investigation of the B-36 Bomber Program. H.
Rept. 1470, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 34.
312"OP-23 Disbanded," Army and N aw Journal. 5 November 1949, p. 251.
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Air Force had softened its publicity campaign during the summer while it developed its
case for the B-36 investigation. Naval officers, sensing their opportunity to finally get
their "day in court," increased the volume and emotion o f their public statements. Rear
Admiral Gallery's "An Admiral Talks Back to the Airmen" was only one o f the articles to
hit the presses during this period.313 Admiral Radford later observed that the events of
1949 had "convinced some o f this group [naval officers] that the time had come for drastic
and public reaction."314 The Admiral went on to assert that:
Many of these young men were good friends of mine, and some had asked for
my blessing in their efforts. In every case I tried to stop them, feeling that
theirs was a hazardous and insubordinate course.315
Needless to say, Radford failed in his attempts to calm the rebels.
History's view o f their actions has not been kind. Air Force Colonel Meilinger, a
leader o f the Air War College and the biographer of General Vandenberg, writes that these
officers "engineered a scandal" to allow their voices to be heard.316 Hammond
summarizes the ensuing situation quite well:
The Navy, having lost its confidence in the Office of the President, the
Secretary o f Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy, had maneuvered the
Committee into accepting this task [the second phase o f the hearings], as a
kind o f court of appeal from its own Secretary, from the Department of
Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and the President.317
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The Office o f the Chief o f Naval Operations was not included in this list o f officials
in which the Navy had lost faith because the CNO was expected to personify "the Navy."
The rebellious officers had come to ignore Denfeld's half-hearted efforts to direct the Navy
but retained their allegiance to his office as the true head o f the Navy. They intended to
either take Denfeld with them or work around him, but they wanted to get the opportunity
to state their case. Denfeld had not yet made up his mind how he was going to approach
the hearings. In a 7 September letter to Hanson W. Baldwin, the CNO wrote:
What will happen in the House Armed Services Committee when they
reconvene on October 5th is anybody's guess. But the Navy is going to have
its day in court at that time and I feel sure that the officers who testify will
give a good account of themselves.318
Now, at the eleventh hour, a Navy presentation was being put together more under the
direction o f Admiral Radford than Admiral Denfeld. Committee Chairman Vinson had
recalled Radford from the Pacific to serve as a Navy witness during the first phase of
hearings. Radford now collected the remnants o f Under Secretary Kimball's earlier effort
and began to put together a presentation strategy and a witness list.319
Admiral Radford constructed the Navy's presentation to provide authoritative
answers to the five remaining issues on the Committee's agenda. These topics included
evaluating the B-36, assessing the Air Force's strategic bombing plans, examining the
division o f roles and missions between the services, and reviewing the implementation of
military unification procedures. Congressman Vinson's Committee selected the senior
Naval officers who were to present their views on the agenda, but the Navy was allowed

318Letter from Denfeld to Hanson W. Baldwin, 7 September 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 2, File
"Correspondence - B," Naval Historical Center.
319See pages 25 and 26 of OP-23's "A History of the Investigation of the B-36," Denfeld Papers, Box 10,
File "B-36 Investigation," Naval Historical Center.
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to choose additional witnesses to clarify its position and supply technical details, just as
the Air Force had done during the first phase o f the hearings.320 The majority of the
Navy's active, senior admirals and some retired four and five-star officers were lined up to
provide the Navy's views on the implementation o f unification and the operation of the
JCS. Other admirals and captains were scheduled to testify concerning the Defense
Department's budgetary and procurement procedures and to discuss the roles and missions
issues relating to the cancellation of the U. S. S. United States. An additional group o f
naval officers with specific technical expertise was added to address the B-36's
performance, the capability o f Navy fighters to intercept the giant bomber, and the
feasibility and practicality o f the strategic atomic bombing campaign envisioned by the Air
Force.
The Navy's two most important witnesses were the Secretary o f the Navy and the
Chief o f Naval Operations. No matter how well Radford orchestrated the other
statements, the testimony o f the Navy's uniformed and civilian chiefs would either
undermine or amplify the entire presentation. The Air Force's statements in the August
hearings had demonstrated that service's solidarity and ability to appear as a disciplined
and single-minded organization. If Matthews and Denfeld supported Radford's team, the
Navy would likewise appear to have its house in order and present its case credibly. But if
the Secretary or the CNO testified in opposition to the Navy's witnesses, the latter would
continue to be portrayed as undisciplined rebels who opposed civilian control and their
duly appointed superiors. Matthews and Denfeld had recently shown a united front in
statements to Congress in opposition to the President's recommended budget, and they
had convinced Secretary Johnson to upgrade the two Essex class carriers earlier in the
summer. Nevertheless, neither Matthews nor Denfeld was firmly convinced that the
320Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," p. 63.
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October hearings should be held. Consequently, the October hearings on unification and
strategy were certain to be filled with drama and suspense.
OP-23, the organization which Secretary Matthews eventually made to serve as
the Navy's scapegoat, actually had little to do with the testimony. This small group on the
CNO's staff had evolved from an organization created in 1947 to assist Secretary Forrestal
in research related to the unification proposals. In this capacity it presented the Secretary
with important data and views which would have been difficult to obtain by an
organization outside the Navy. The head of Forrestal's organization, Captain Thackrey,
was eventually removed by Secretary Sullivan in January 1949 when Thackrey unwittingly
leaked material to the press which was embarrassing to the Navy. Vice Admiral Radford,
then the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, chose Captain Arleigh Burke to replace him, and
Burke quickly took charge and established a coherent and reasonable policy concerning
contacts with the press.321 His organization only provided clerical support to witnesses in
the Unification and Strategy Hearings, and reviewed their draft statements to "eliminate
slaps at personalities, innuendoes, and misrepresentations." Captain Burke later
mentioned that his organization prepared Fleet Admiral Halsey's first draft at his request,
but Halsey significantly rewrote the piece for presentation.322
Neither Secretary Matthews nor Admiral Denfeld, the Navy's chief spokesmen,
were deeply involved in the preparation o f the Navy's Congressional testimony. For
different reasons, the Admiral and the Secretary chose to distance themselves from
Radford's preparations. Some historians have claimed that Denfeld did not lead the Navy's
efforts because he spent much of the summer of 1949 in Europe implementing the naval
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arrangements for the new NATO alliance.323 This explanation is not plausible because
Denfeld made only one brief trip to Europe from 29 July through 9 August 1949, in
company with the other JCS members and well before the hearings were to commence.324
Hammond and Coletta attribute the Admiral's reticence to his non-combative,
"conciliatory" nature and his inability to articulate his beliefs.325 But Denfeld was by no
means inarticulate and had testified regularly and well before Congress. If he had decided
to actively guide the development of the Navy's presentation, he certainly would have been
up to the task. Although Admiral Denfeld was generally a tolerant compromiser who
disliked confrontations, he understood that, short o f canceling the hearings, the Navy's
presentation could not be avoided. The best explanation for his having played such a small
role in this process was his general pattern o f leadership through delegation and the fact
that he still had not made up his mind on the theme o f his own testimony. Denfeld
understood Admiral Radford's views on all issues under discussion and allowed him to
marshal the Navy's forces in support o f his position. Radford was the Navy's senior
aviator and had a long history o f dealing with Congress on unification and aviation issues.
As the concluding witness, the CNO could either continue to play the conciliator or
emphasize the Navy's points through a dramatic and assertive statement. What Denfeld
ultimately decided to do would depend on the presentation's reception in Congress and on
the attitude o f Secretary Matthews. He therefore had to delay this decision until just
before he had to present his testimony.
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The Secretary also faced a dilemma. His legal background led him to approach the
hearings "with great care," as if he were presenting a brief before the Supreme Court.326
Although he understood the need for a strong and capable Navy, he also was convinced
that the inter-service arguments o f the previous two years had been both undignified and
counterproductive. He wanted the Navy's witnesses to explain their service's capabilities
"and not discuss the B-36 or the Air Force unless we have to do it in answering
questions," but he did not impose these restrictions for fear o f impinging on the witnesses'
freedom to testify.327 Matthews' sensitivity to this concern was pointed out in his opening
remarks during the hearings: "There has been no censorship. There will be none."328
Perhaps a greater concern to Secretary Matthews was his commitment to the
President to support unification and to Secretary Johnson to support his programs outside
the councils of the Defense Department. Admiral Radford claimed that Matthews believed
"he had to give Mr. Johnson his complete loyalty and was inclined to suspect the loyalty o f
his immediate subordinates in the Navy. "329 This mindset made his role in the
development o f the Navy's case more like that o f an outsider than that o f the Navy's
leader. The essence o f the testimony being orchestrated by Radford's team was in
opposition to Secretary Johnson's policies. Therefore Matthews could not reconcile his
obligation to his superior with the positions being advocated by the Navy's witnesses.
Admiral Radford suggested that the Secretary conclude the Navy's presentation, thinking
that, seeing a unified Navy position, the Secretary would realize the depth o f feeling in the

326Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Admiral Radford, 24 September 1949, Denfeld Papers, Box 5, File
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Navy and support their position, but Matthews felt he needed to be the first witness.330
The Secretary was clearly uncomfortable with the entire process and was very interested
in postponing or canceling the October hearings.
Matthews and Denfeld continued to maintain good relations during this period.
On the first o f October the Secretary informed John Giles o f the Washington Star that he
and the Admiral had been "working in perfect harmony" on the preparations for the Navy's
testimony. Matthews also told Giles that there had been no "pressure from above" on
their presentation.331 During September, the Navy Secretary had traveled to Hawaii on an
inspection trip and had made a good impression on Admiral Radford, who wrote to
Denfeld:
I feel that Mr. Matthews is the kind of man who will stand up for what he
thinks is right against any opposition, and therefore, if he is given a good basic
understanding of naval problems, will represent us in a way that we have not
been represented in some time. He is a man you can certainly talk to and trust;
who certainly likes you personally and who, I am sure, wants to establish a
very close and personal liaison with you.332
Although the fact that the Navy's two leaders had not already "established a close liaison"
after working together for four months may indicate that there were some difficulties, it
does not appear that there were any severe tensions in their relationship.
As Admiral Radford began to build the Navy's presentation, Secretary Johnson
announced an additional $353 million cut in the Navy's budget for the current fiscal year.
This reduction would cut deeply into the Navy's aircraft procurement allowances and
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incensed many naval aviators already up in arms over previous restrictions. One such
pilot, Captain John G. Crommelin, elected to take his concerns outside the Pentagon, and
on 10 September 1949, called a press conference at his home to present his views on
unification and the budget cuts. Captain Crommelin was one o f five brothers who had
fought in the Navy against Japan. Two of the five had given their lives for their country
and all had distinguished themselves.333 Captain John Crommelin claimed that unification
had been "a terrible mistake" and that the Navy was being eliminated by the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His reputation and his position as a member o f the
Pentagon's Joint Staff gave his statements credibility, and the sensational nature o f the
charges ensured that they received wide publicity. He openly stated that he intended to
"blow the whole thing open," understanding that he would probably be court-martialed for
his actions.334 In short order, retired Fleet Admiral Halsey and other senior officers issued
statements supporting Crommelin's assertions. A full-fledged public brawl had now
begun, not between the services, but between the Navy and its civilian leadership.
Admiral Denfeld did not respond directly to Captain Crommelin's brazen violation
o f military procedures and protocol. In fact, the CNO agreed with Under Secretary
Kimball's position that Captain Crommelin was free to state his personal views at any time
and that no disciplinary action should be taken. As Paul Hammond notes, "Denfeld's
reaction was to ignore the unpleasant affair. "335 Secretary Matthews issued a statement
that Crommelin's actions indicated he was not qualified to serve on the Joint Staff and that
he would be transferred from that position. On 15 September, in what appeared to be
another slap at civilian control, the offending aviator was given a Rear Admiral's position
on the Navy Staff. The press quickly noted this move and hailed it as a promotion for the
333Ibid., p. 507.
334Crommelin statement of 10 September 1949, quoted in Ibid., p. 508.
335Ibid., p. 508.
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outspoken Captain. Secretary Matthews was furious. Denfeld disavowed any knowledge
o f the move and quickly shifted Crommelin to a different staff job under a Rear
Admiral.336 Although Captain Crommelin was now in a position where he was not
required to deal with officers from the other services, the Navy had not addressed his
complaints and its leadership had been exposed as confused and divided.
Captain Crommelin had stirred up a hornet's nest by obliging the Secretary and the
CNO to issue promptly to their subordinates a "guidance" memorandum on public
statements. This memo stated that all speeches and articles intended for public release
must be transmitted through proper channels to the Secretary of the Navy for
prepublication review. The Navy's leaders were careful to issue this new policy as
guidance and not as an order. They understood that emotions were running high and that
any official "gag orders" would be severely criticized.337 Matthews and Denfeld were also
concerned that Captain Crommelin would not retire from the public scene quietly. In
order to prevent a recurrence of his impromptu press conference, Admiral Denfeld issued
a direct, written order to the Captain prohibiting him from discussing "matters pertaining
to relations between the military departments . . . in public speech or by publication" until
otherwise directed.338 The CNO also enlisted the aid of Rear Admiral Clark, a close friend
o f Crommelin's brother Charles, in pacifying the recalcitrant aviator.339 The Secretary's
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Public Relations Officer, Captain Karig, added his efforts to prevent Crommelin "from
going off the rails once more, . . . making a damn fool martyr of himself."340 With the
Congressional hearings on unification and strategy scheduled to begin in two weeks, it
was imperative that the Navy keep its discipline if it held any hopes of convincing not only
the House, but also its own Secretary o f the merits of its case.
Secretary Matthews successfully headed off a Navy protest to Congress on the
additional budget cut by convincing the Navy's staff that any objections must be discussed
with Secretary Johnson before the Navy Secretary would bring them to Congress'
attention. Matthews understood the Department's civilian chain o f command well and was
not about to make a habit o f running to Congress rather than his boss with every
problem.341 While the Secretary was dealing with his service's internal conflicts, Chairman
Vinson was working to cancel the October hearings. As a preliminary step, two members
o f the House investigating team met with Matthews on 27 September and convinced him
to direct Navy witnesses not to mention the B-36 in their statements unless directly
questioned about it.342 This order would hamstring the case that Radford had been
building, eliminating all arguments about the inability o f the Air Force to accomplish its
strategic bombing mission, one o f the group's key points. Ultimately, this direction was
rescinded, and even Secretary Matthews' own statement discussed the B-36.
Admiral Denfeld's position in September was very shaky. Secretary Matthews had
at least a desire to work with the CNO in running the Department, but the Navy's other
senior officers were following Radford's lead rather than the CNO's. The main reason for
this was that Denfeld was not leading at all. He had no announced position, "holding
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himself aloof in his chosen role as conciliator."343 The Admiral had already lost a great
deal o f respect in the eyes o f his subordinates for not resigning over Johnson's carrier
cancellation and for opposing the test proposed between the B-36 and the Navy fighter.
Now, by having Radford direct the Navy's preparations for the Congressional hearings, he
was almost abdicating his responsibilities. Admiral Conolly, the Navy's European
Commander, recalled that "everybody knew Louis Denfeld was skating on thin ice except
Louis. Denfeld thought he was going to get the support of Mr. Vinson and the people up
on the Hill, and they'd keep the political scene in check, but he underestimated Louis
Johnson."344 Even Admiral Denfeld was beginning to realize that if he wanted to help the
Navy and earn the loyalty of his men, he needed to stand up for his beliefs and rally the
Navy around him. That was, after all, the CNO's job.
The Navy's case was taking its final shape in the last days o f September. Admiral
Radford staged a practice session for the senior admirals, most o f whom afterward
endorsed his approach. But Admiral Conolly strongly objected and denounced the
presentation as "an animal act," and "too aviation-oriented." He and Admiral Denfeld
discussed these objections with Secretary Matthews who gave Conolly the impression that
he agreed with his position and would work to reorganize the presentation.345 Denfeld
noted that the Secretary was "very much disturbed about this B-36 investigation, . . . and
is taking a great interest in the presentations."346 Matthews himself remarked to a reporter
on 1 October that "we've been in [practice] session for four or five days, so much so that
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I'm beginning to get a little bit weary."347 Despite all this work, there were reports that
Johnson had directed Matthews to "suppress the whole thing," and Chairman Vinson's
thinly veiled intention to cancel the October hearings was an ever-present concern to the
Navy partisans.348 Something certainly seemed wrong when Secretary Matthews, who
had earlier told Denfeld that he planned to sit through the presentation's final diy run on
the fourth and fifth o f October, skipped the sessions entirely.349
Just as Admiral Radford was planning his final practice sessions, another public
storm hit the Navy and the CNO. Secretary Matthews had asked that all officers route
any opinions on unification and the B-36 through his office before releasing them to the
media. He also requested opinions and advice from naval personnel on the major issues
facing the Department to use in preparing for the upcoming hearings. Vice Admiral
Bogan, the Commander o f the First Task Fleet in the Pacific, in compliance with this
guidance wrote the Secretary a short letter on 20 September to tell him o f the state of
Navy morale and the fleet's continuing fears regarding the Navy's position relative to the
other services. Bogan stated that "the morale of the Navy is lower today than at any time
since I entered the commissioned ranks in 1916. . . .In my opinion this descent, almost to
despondency, stems from complete confusion as to the future role o f the Navy." He went
on to describe the members o f his fleet's concerns about national security given the current
size o f the Navy and he voiced his whole-hearted support for Crommelin's views on
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unification.350 As a confidential memorandum, this letter was not open to the public and
was o f little significance.
Vice Admiral Bogan routed his letter through official channels in accordance with
Matthews' "guidance." Therefore Admiral Radford, as the Commander o f the Pacific
Fleet, and Admiral Denfeld reviewed his submittal and attached forwarding endorsements
before it reached the Secretary's office. Radford agreed with Bogan's views and asserted
that "rightly or wrongly, the majority of officers in the Pacific Fleet concur with Captain
Crommelin. . . . It would be a grave mistake to underestimate the depth and sincerity of
their feelings."351 Denfeld, in his attachment to this correspondence, stated that
I concur in the endorsement of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Naval
Officers have faith in the Navy and a knowledge o f the aggressive role it plays
in the defense of the country. They are convinced that a Navy stripped o f its
offensive power means a nation stripped o f its offensive power.352
He went on to add a quote from Fleet Admiral King, the CNO during World W ar II,
supporting this view: "Any step that is not good for the Navy is not good for the
nation."353 At the time, this endorsement seemed inconsequential. Admiral Bogan's letter
and the attachments reached the Secretary's office by 29 September. Denfeld later
recorded that "the Secretary did not show any concern over the letter when it was an
internal matter," but, of course in the Navy of 1949, very little stayed out o f the public
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Saturday and Sunday, October first and second, were the last days o f the Navy’s
semi-orderly approach to the hearings on unification and strategy. On the first, Secretary
Matthews discussed the proposed $353 million spending cut with Secretary Johnson and
was granted a formal hearing to be held in the near future to assess other options.
Matthews' strategy o f working through the Defense Secretary seemed to be the correct
one after all. On that same day, Captain Crommelin appeared on "Meet the Press." This
opportunity for disaster was avoided through the CNO's recent order to Crommelin not to
discuss unification or any inter-service issues.355 The Navy and the Defense Department
appeared to be returning to at least a civil relationship.
The highlight o f Sunday, October second was a dinner party held at the Denfeld's
residence at the Naval Observatory. The guests o f honor were Secretary and Mrs.
Matthews and their mutual friend, Monsignor Maurice Sheehy o f Catholic University. In
discussing the upcoming dinner, Matthews told Sheehy that he expected "it'll be a very
enjoyable evening. I've been very anxious to have Mrs. Matthews get closer acquainted
with Mrs. Denfeld . . ,"356 Later in his conversation with Father Sheehy, the Secretary
praised his working relations with the CNO:
There's no, absolutely no cramping o f any Admiral's style. We're working
together in the most beautiful harmony and I think as constructively as ever, as
there's ever been any work done for the Navy. There's strong opinions o f
course but I wouldn't want these men around me if they didn't have strong
opinions. They'd be no good to me [as "yes men"] . . . because they know
more about the Navy than I do.357
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After the dinner party Denfeld commented that the Secretary "gave no indication then that
he had any but the highest regard for me."358 These records indicate that the
Matthews/Denfeld team was solid and ready to face the upcoming hearings, but other
signs did not support this optimistic outlook.
Denfeld had been nominated for a second term by Secretary Matthews earlier in
the year, but he had not been the only candidate for the position. According to Matthews,
Admiral Blandy had nearly demanded to be made CNO during the Secretary's first few
weeks in office.359 Admiral Conolly also had a claim to the Navy's "throne" as Denfeld's
successor based on promises by Secretary Sullivan and Denfeld himself. Conolly recalled
that after Secretary Matthews took office, Admiral Denfeld had told him that he was still
slated to relieve Denfeld as the next CNO.360 And Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, the
Commander of the Fifth Task Fleet in the Mediterranean, was frequently mentioned by
Secretary Matthews as an officer he admired and respected.361 Johnson also expressed
some interest in these officers, stating in September 1949 that Conolly and Blandy were
the only admirals of whom he had "a high opinion."362 When the Navy Secretary began to
develop doubts about the wisdom of retaining Denfeld during the fall of 1949, these three
officers were the front-runners in his secret search for a new Navy Chief.
Admiral Blandy was the Commander in Chief o f the Atlantic Fleet and next in
seniority behind Denfeld. He was a "battleship admiral" who had distinguished himself in
combat and never hesitated to take on difficult problems. His strong views had cost him
his chance for the CNO position in 1947 and they continued to keep him from it in
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1949.363 When Matthews sat in on the practice sessions for the Congressional hearings,
Blandy's statement was as aggressive and anti-establishment as the rebellious aviators'.
Matthews knew that replacing Denfeld with a dogmatic fighter was not a viable option.
According to Admiral Richard Conolly, Matthews knew that Conolly was also
very interested in being the Chief o f Naval Operations, and the Secretary seemed to think
that he would be more flexible than Blandy. Matthews approached Admiral Conolly
during the preparation o f the Navy's presentation and told him "that things were not going
right between him and Denfeld, and he wanted my [Conolly's] support."364 When Conolly
seemed to respond positively, Matthews went on to tender what Conolly immediately
perceived as an amazing bribe.
I was Mr. Matthews' choice to succeed Denfeld. He practically told me so. If
Denfeld couldn't stay, he'd like to rely on me. . . . He gave me to understand
unmistakably that what I said in testimony would have a great deal to do with
my future career.365
Although Conolly felt that "Denfeld was completely under the control o f Radford," and
was leading the Navy in a direction Conolly thought was hazardous, he eventually decided
that he wanted no part in this type o f political game.366 His statement on 12 October
before the House Armed Services Committee pulled no punches and lost him his chance to
lead the Navy. Conolly's recollections placed Matthews' veiled offer about one week
before the hearings began, clearly indicating that the Secretary was at least leaving his

363Blandy and Denfeld had been Forrestal's final two candidates in 1947. The Secretary's opinion that the
President would find Denfeld easier to work with apparently decided the issue.
364Conolly interview, p. 395.
365Ibid., p. 396.
366Ibid., pp. 393 and 397. Conolly repeatedly met with the Secretary during the first days of the hearings,
spending more time in his office than Denfeld did. (Secretary Matthews' appointment calendar, Truman
Library)
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options open while he worked with Admiral Denfeld to control the dissension within the
Navy.
The third officer on Matthews' rapidly shrinking list was Vice Admiral Forrest
Sherman. Although he was only tenth in seniority on the Navy list, his previous
experience as DCNO for Operations under Nimitz during the unification debates had built
this naval aviator a strong reputation. Matthews stated that even before he became
Secretary o f the Navy, he "had been impressed with Sherman." As Truman's nominee for
the Navy position, Matthews had read the record of the 1947 Congressional hearings on
unification in which Sherman had testified eloquently. Regarding this testimony,
Matthews asserted:
As a lawyer . . . I was impressed by Sherman as the most intellectual witness
to appear for either side. When I came to Washington I asked where he was.
. . . I found that those whom I had begun to feel opposed unification regarded
him with great bitterness.367
In Forrest Sherman, Matthews had found an ideal choice for CNO. He was an aviator
with a brilliant war record who had maintained a low profile during the acrimonious public
debates o f the previous year. Over the course of several meetings during the summer of
1949, the two had built a good relationship.
With Secretary Matthews still undecided about replacing Admiral Denfeld and the
scheduled start o f the hearings only two days away, Congressman Vinson renewed his
attempts to at least delay, if not cancel, the testimony before his Committee. On 3
October he called a meeting between the Navy's leaders and selected members o f his
Committee to discuss their options. Secretary Matthews supported Vinson's request to

367Martin S. Hayden, "'Inside' Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald, 8 November 1949, and Omaha
World Herald. 1 December 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
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delay the start of the Navy's presentation until after Congress' Christmas break because he
wished to present the Navy's case to Secretary Johnson before public hearings began.
Admiral Denfeld agreed, believing that the delay would give him ''the chance, which he
had not yet had, to study the material prepared in the Navy for presentation."368 After his
removal, Denfeld gave a different rationale for this decision, contending that he was
willing to defer the hearings to allow the Navy to make "a studied and orderly
presentation. "369 Paul Hammond states that some naval officers, led by Vice Admiral
Price, Denfeld's Vice Chief of Naval Operations, did not support the group's decision to
delay the hearings, and called Admiral Radford to Vinson's meeting. Hammond credits
Radford with persuading Vinson that the hearings should be held as scheduled.370 But,
this explanation hardly seems plausible. A more credible explanation can be found in the
record o f an interview given by Matthews on 8 November in which he reported that the 3
October meeting adjourned with an agreement to delay the hearings but that Captain
Crommelin's actions later the same night forced Congressman Vinson to return to the
initial plan.371
Captain Crommelin, in his new position on the Navy's staff, was able to keep close
watch on the Navy's preparations for the Congressional hearings and the maneuverings of
the senior leadership. After hearing of the decision to delay the Navy's "day in court," the
Captain obtained copies o f Vice Admiral Bogan's letter to Secretary Matthews and the
endorsements o f Admirals Radford and Denfeld and distributed them to several local
newsmen with the understanding that he not be identified as the source. The headlines the
next morning were full of references to the poor state of Navy morale and the breadth o f

368Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 511.
369Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," p. 63.
370Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 511.
371Hayden, Martin S., "'Inside' Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 8 November 1949.
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Navy opposition to unification. Matthews and Vinson quickly realized that this new storm
had forced their hand and returned the hearings on unification and strategy to their original
schedule. This and anything else which could end the embarrassing intra-Navy and inter
service conflicts had to be tried.
Secretary Matthews later stated that he believed it was "more than coincidental"
that the leak occurred on the night he and Chairman Vinson decided to delay the
hearings.372 The first person Matthews suspected o f having distributed the Bogan
correspondence was Vice Admiral Price, the most outspoken officer on 3 October against
delay of the hearings. Matthews told Denfeld that he suspected the VCNO to be the
culprit and asked the CNO to "give some thought to taking Admiral Sherman as your
Vice-CNO."373 While this suggestion was offered for future consideration, the Secretary
ordered an immediate investigation to locate the source of the leak. Captain Crommelin,
realizing that his object had been achieved, quickly admitted to distributing the copies in
order to ensure the Navy's case would be heard.
Although most citizens, and even most naval officers, deplored Crommelin's
methods, he certainly achieved his immediate objective, but there was a high price to be
paid for this success.374 With the hearings opening on the following day, the Secretary of
the Navy and the CNO were sharply divided in their views of the Navy's case. Matthews
had had enough of the bickering and intended to pull no punches in his opening statement.
Crommelin's actions had convinced him that the most outspoken of his subordinates did
not merit his support. Denfeld was unable to abandon ship so easily. The CNO

372Ibid.
373Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 63,
374Edward P. Stafford, Commander USN (Ret.), "Saving Carrier Aviation - 1949 Style," U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings. January 1990, pp. 44-51 provides a good view of this incident from Captain
Crommelin's perspective. Commander Stafford based his article on an interview with Crommelin over 40
years after the episode.
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understood the gravity of the issues involved and realized that persevering in his attempts
at compromise would be fruitless. His careful consideration of his options was perceived
by his subordinates as a lack of leadership and disinclination to stand up for the Navy's
interests. This amplified their growing disenchantment with the CNO.375
After the leak Secretary Matthews set up a meeting with Captain Crommelin to
discuss loyalty and discipline. The Secretary, having only been in a military structure for
five months was in a difficult position trying to convince a twenty-five year battlehardened veteran that he did not understand loyalty, but Matthews made a valiant attempt.
What ensued turned out to be a leadership lesson for the lawyer from Omaha. The Omaha
World Herald reported that:
quietly Captain Crommelin explained to the Secretary that the Naval Academy
had taught him, and life had confirmed, that true loyalty is loyalty not to men,
but to principles. "Experience has convinced me," Captain Crommelin told Mr.
Matthews, "that you can't get loyalty from the men beneath you by demanding
it. What you get is counterfeit loyalty - not worth a damn when the shooting
begins. There's only one way to get loyalty, and that's to be lucky enough to
inspire it."376
If anything was missing from the Navy's leadership it was "inspiration." If Captain
Crommelin's words and not his actions had been followed by more naval officers, much of
the problems which followed could have been avoided. After the meeting, Crommelin
described the Secretary as "a good Joe; a fine chap, trying to do a job under impossible
circumstances. "377 Matthews probably wished that it was as easy to win over the
President and Congress.

375Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 512.
376Omaha World Herald. 9 October 1949, in the clipping files of the Douglas County [Nebraska]
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Public opinion also strongly objected to the tactics used by the Navy. One
example o f public reaction is a letter from Francis D. Felps o f St. Louis to the President.
"Concerning the current mutiny in the Navy, I have not the faintest notion about the merits
o f the Navy's case, but their methods stink."378 Despite this negative public reaction,
Admiral Denfeld discerned a bright side to the affair. Captain Karig, the Navy's Public
Affairs Officer, immediately wrote to the CNO: "Publication o f your Bogan endorsement
has done more to raise your prestige with the fleet than anything you have yet done and it
was needed."379 Despite his best efforts, Denfeld had become recognized as just another
"revolting admiral."
The story o f Admiral Denfeld's endorsement o f Vice Admiral Bogan's letter and its
impact on his relationship with Secretary Matthews goes much deeper than these surface
manifestations. Secretary Matthews saw Bogan's submission as more than just a note to
the boss informing him o f the author's thoughts and perceptions. Although the Secretary
received several similar letters from other senior officers, he believed that Bogan had
intended all along to publish his views and wanted to see the Secretary's response.380
Bogan had testified against the unification proposals o f 1947 and was known to Matthews
as an opponent o f his policies. Matthews also found that Bogan's letter had been
"circulated among various widely-scattered commands before it ever reached my desk,"
leading him to believe that the letter had not been "originally prepared just to inform

378Letter from Francis D. Felps to President Truman, 8 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers,
White House Official Files, File "Navy Correspondence 1949," Truman Library.
379Letter from Captain Karig to Admiral Denfeld, 4 October 1949, Chief of Naval Operations Papers,
"Double Zero Files - 1965," Box 78, File "13, B-36," Naval Historical Center.
38°paoio Coletta's The United States N aw and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. (Newark, Delaware:
University of Delaware Press, 1981), p. 204 lists several other letters to the Secretary during this period
which are filed in the Chief of Naval Operations Papers.
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me."381 When it found its way to the media in early October, Matthews was angered but
not surprised.
The circumstance that upset Matthews the most was the airing o f Admiral
Denfeld's outspoken views. The Secretary was surprised that Admiral Denfeld's
endorsement read as strongly as it did. Radford's endorsement was brief and restrained
and similar to many statements he had made in Congressional testimony. Its only
noteworthy aspect was Radford's agreement with Vice Admiral Bogan that the majority o f
the officers in the Pacific Fleet shared Captain Crommelin's concerns. Denfeld had
previously exercised great care in avoiding being perceived as one of the Navy's radicals
and had downplayed the scope o f the unrest in the service. His endorsement to the Bogan
letter was significantly more emotional and partisan than anything else he had written. It
also differs from his other public statements in containing very little o f Denfeld's own
words. The endorsement centered around a lengthy quote from Fleet Admiral King, the
Navy's World War II CNO. What especially got Denfeld in trouble was his opening
statement o f agreement with Radford's endorsement. This made it seem that Denfeld had
joined the camp o f the Navy's radicals. Transmitting Admiral King's fiery words (which
included the phrase "any step that is not good for the Navy is not good for the nation")
added to the endorsement's vehemence. In this sense, too, Denfeld's endorsement was
very much out o f character.
Matthews observed that "such an opinion was completely contrary to what he [the
CNO] had told me he believed when, just a few weeks before, I had recommended his
reappointment."382 Denfeld informed Senator Knowland in February 1950 that "since it
[the endorsement] was a confidential letter and an internal matter within the Department, I

381Martin S. Hayden, '"Inside1Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 8 November 1949.
382Ibid.
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felt I should give him the benefit o f my views." The Admiral went on to state that he had
told Matthews the morning after the correspondence was published that "had I known it
was going to be made public, I would not have written the endorsement in the way I did,
as I felt it might have been misinterpreted."383 It remains a mystery why Denfeld had not
verbally communicated his true feelings to the Secretary during their daily meetings if he
had actually felt this strongly at any time.
An even more disturbing revelation about the Admiral's endorsement quickly came
to light. Secretary Matthews may have noted how uncharacteristic Denfeld's submission
was and asked Vice Admiral Sherman about it. Although it will probably never be known
for certain what actually prompted the discussion of the matter between Sherman and
Matthews, the Secretary informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that it was
Sherman who effectively sunk Denfeld by explaining that Denfeld had not actually written
the endorsement. Matthews testified that Admiral Sherman "told me that a rough draft
was prepared, that that draft was put on after the signature was signed. Now, how
thoroughly, if at all, Admiral Denfeld examined that draft, I do not know."384 Matthews
concluded that his CNO was irresponsibly administering his office if he would sign a
"blank check" and allow some staff member to write what purported to be Denfeld's
personal views about a critical issue for transmission to the Secretary.

383Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
384Excerpt from Secretary Matthews' testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 30
January 1950 contained in Admiral Denfeld's letter to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in the
Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman Library. Secretary Matthews' testimony was given to explain
his rationale for removing Admiral Denfeld. This lengthy discussion was held in executive session and
the transcript is unavailable, but some excerpts from the Secretary's statement and Admiral Denfeld's
rebuttal are available in the Matthews Papers.
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Denfeld presented his side o f this story in detail in his letter to Senator
Knowland.385 The CNO admitted to having signed the endorsement before it was typed,
but explained his reasons for this procedure. His Executive A ssistant"normally would
have prepared the endorsement," but since he was out o f town, Denfeld's Aide for JCS
matters, Captain Woodyard drafted the note. Denfeld was eager to get the Bogan
correspondence to the Secretary "without delay," since Matthews had previously stated
that he wanted to use this type of material in the Congressional hearings. Denfeld stated
that Woodyard
presented his draft endorsement to me and, as I recall it, I changed a few
words in the text and cut out the last paragraph. I was waiting to sign the
endorsement when I received word that the Secretary was waiting for me to go
to the plane which was to take us to New York for the Armed Forces
Industrial Association dinner that evening. My secretary suggested, in order to
not delay me, that I sign a blank piece of paper and that she would type the
endorsement on it and that it would be transmitted to the Secretary's office.
This was not an unusual procedure, and I knew what was to be in the
endorsement and had complete confidence in Captain Woodyard and my
secretary, who had been with me approximately 7 years. The letter and the
endorsement reached the Secretary's office later that day, [28 September] and
the Secretary did not mention the letter to me until the 4th o f October, five
days later.386
Denfeld's final endorsement ends with the three paragraph quote from Admiral King, an
unusual procedure in official endorsements. According to standard correspondence
practice, the concluding paragraph that Denfeld struck out would normally have been
some type o f summation o f his personal views. That Denfeld felt uncomfortable providing
a definitive personal assessment o f Bogan's assertions is in character and lends credence to
his explanation.
385Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library, pp. 3 - 4 .
386Ibid.
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Even though Denfeld did not find this process "unusual," Matthews viewed it in a
much less favorable light, agreeing with Senator Morse that it was "not customary to good
management o f an officer's affairs."387 Secretary Matthews did not publicly raise this
aspect o f the Bogan incident, only discussing it in Congressional executive session and in
private conversation with trusted friends. The Secretary's handling o f this aspect o f the
Bogan matter demonstrates that he retained a concern for Admiral Denfeld's reputation.
Additionally, the fact that Matthews saw this incident as a major problem while Denfeld
considered it insignificant, indicates the width o f the communication gap which existed
between the Navy's leaders. The interactions involving the Bogan correspondence also
show that Admiral Sherman may have played an even greater part than previously realized
in the events leading up to the firing o f Admiral Denfeld.
The CNO's investigation into how the Bogan correspondence found its way into
Captain Crommelin's hands ultimately determined that although Vice Admiral Price had no
hand in the affair, his office was deeply involved. The CNO and VCNO shared their
highly classified files to simplify security arrangements. Therefore, the staffs of both
officers had access to the letters. Admiral Denfeld told Senator Knowland that he
discovered that "Admiral Price's first assistant had taken the letter out o f the files on two
or three occasions and had made copies of it. . . . The Inspector General found no one in
my immediate office culpable with regard to the release o f this letter. "388 The
investigation cleared Denfeld of any direct responsibility for the leak, but the CNO's
excuse seems weak. The VCNO was Admiral Denfeld's primary assistant and they shared
office areas. A stronger position would have been to accept the blame for this incident as
the officer responsible for the Navy's performance, and particularly, the performance of

387Ibid., p. 6.
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the Navy Staff. Denfeld's attitude illustrates why he had such a difficult time engendering
loyalty amongst his subordinates. A leader can have little effective authority unless he
accepts the accompanying accountability.
Secretary Matthews' morning routine in Washington was to get up early and attend
the dawn mass at St. Matthew's Cathedral. He then went to his apartment, had breakfast,
and read the morning papers.389 On Tuesday the fourth o f October 1949, the Navy
Secretary's morning ritual was badly disturbed as he found the Bogan letters splashed
across the front pages. His position seemed to be worse than ever before as his
subordinates now publicly bucked his authority and continued to embarrass the
Department. When he arrived at the Pentagon, he immediately called Admiral Denfeld to
his office to discuss the situation.390
Matthews recalled that at this meeting he asked Denfeld how the letters had been
released and then directed him to make an investigation of the matter. Matthews later
informed the President that he "frankly stated" to Denfeld that "his usefulness as Chief o f
Naval Operations had terminated."391 The Secretary later told Truman that the CNO's
handling o f his endorsement, "coupled with other things that happened," led to his
decision to replace the Admiral.392 The Omaha World Herald's Washington correspondent
confirmed Matthews' intent on 6 November 1949 by reporting that "back on October 4,
. . . Mr. Matthews told this reporter confidentially that Admiral Denfeld 'has outlived his
usefulness in the post o f Chief of Naval Operations.'"393
389John A. Giles, "The Navy's Secretary Walks Alone," Washington Star. 23 October 1949, p. C-l.
390Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 4 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman
Library.
391Letter from Secretary Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman
Papers, White House Official Files, File "Navy Correspondence 1949," Truman Library.
392Martin S. Hayden, "'Inside' Given by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 8 November 1949, and Letter
from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld,"
Truman Library, p. 7, quoting from Matthews' testimony, p. 180.
393"Admirals Still are Muttering Among Selves," Omaha World Herald. 6 November 1949, p. 1.
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Matthews' statement, in isolation, seems fairly clear in its implication that Admiral
Denfeld would be replaced as CNO, but that was far from the reality o f the situation.
Secretary Matthews' session with the CNO lasted about fifteen minutes. He then went to
see Deputy Secretary o f Defense Steve Early to discuss the situation with him. These two
officials met for several hours, but there is no record o f their conversation.394 The next
day, Matthews and Johnson met with President Truman, and the Navy Secretary
"mentioned the possibility o f Admiral Denfeld's replacement" to the President.395
Truman's reaction is not recorded.
Admiral Denfeld's account o f his meeting with Secretary Matthews differs on
several points and is important in understanding the controversy that later swirled around
the Secretary's removal o f the CNO. Denfeld's confidential letter o f 9 February 1950 to
Senator Knowland described this meeting in detail. He also covered it in more general
terms in his 18 March 1950 Collier's article, "Why I Was Fired." The Admiral
remembered that Matthews "was really much disturbed that the letter was published," and
asked him about his endorsement. When questioned, Denfeld admitted to having not
written the letter and also to having not read the final copy. He also stated that "I knew
what was in it."396 Denfeld recalled that the Secretary then told him
that he was sorry I had placed the endorsement on the letter, and was afraid it
might impair my value as CNO. But he continued, "I have had worse

394Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 4 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman
Library.
395Letter from Secretary Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman
Papers, White House Official Files, File "Navy Correspondence 1949," Truman Library. Hammond,
"Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 512 also discusses this situation and comments on the ambiguity
of Mr. Matthews' statement.
396Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library, p. 4. Matthews' questions would seem unusual unless he had already been
told (by Sherman?) that the CNO did not write the endorsement. After all, it did have his signature on it
and had come from his office.
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situations than this confront me and I am sure that if we work together we can
overcome this one." (emphasis added)397
Matthews then directed Denfeld to prepare a public statement to clarify the intent and
circumstances o f the Bogan correspondence and to investigate the leak in the
Department's security. In his Collier's article, the Admiral added that as this session was
breaking up, "Secretary Matthews said genially, 'I don't like all this formality o f titles
between us. I wish you'd call me Frank and I'll call you Louis.'"398 It is hard to
understand why, after having worked under great stress and in close quarters for over four
months, Matthews would choose this opportunity to ask the CNO to be more familiar
with him. Nevertheless, this was Denfeld's impression of their exchange.
Admiral Denfeld reported that "it was not clear" to him that Matthews intended at
that moment to replace him.399 Denfeld gave a more detailed description o f his
impressions to Senator Knowland:
I am willing to testify before your Committee under oath that I was never given
any intimation by the Secretary o f the Navy or by anyone else that my services
as Chief o f Naval Operations would be terminated, until the day an
announcement to that effect was made in the press. . . . On the contrary, when
through no culpability o f any one in my office, the Bogan letter discussing
unification policies was released for publication, the Secretary o f the Navy told
me that, much as he regretted the incident, we had weathered worse storms
than this before and that he and I working together would weather this one.400
On 4 October, the CNO continued with his duties as if nothing extraordinary had
been said in their meeting. Denfeld claimed that his endorsement o f the Bogan
correspondence had been misunderstood and that he did not approve o f the views
397Ibid.
398Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 63.
399Ibid.
400Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library, p. 2.
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expressed by Captain Crommelin or Vice Admiral Bogan. He described this endorsement
as a required formality and announced his continued support for unification because it is
"the law o f the land, the principles and objectives o f which 1 have wholeheartedly
endorsed and am striving to make effective. In this effort I am fully supported by a large
majority o f naval personnel."401 The CNO also continued to speak o f the importance o f
the Navy to national defense, and told the Navy Supply Corps graduates o f the Harvard
Business School that "as naval officers your duty to your profession entails a duty toward
your fellow citizens. A duty to keep them informed o f the need - - the absolute necessity - o f a Navy adequate to any emergency."402 Secretary Johnson was aware o f Denfeld's
predicament and was quoted as telling "a friend, 'Denfeld hasn't been disloyal - yet.'"403

401Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 512.
402Admiral Denfeld speech to the Supply Corps' graduates of the Harvard Business School in Boston, 4
October 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "Misc. Correspondence and Speeches, 1948 - 49," Naval
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Matthews' office at 1615 on 4 October and the hearings commenced the next day. Regardless of its
delivery, it is still a good indication of his sentiments.
403"Armed Forces: Facts & Fears," Time. 24 October, 1949, p. 27.
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THE HEARINGS ON UNIFICATION AND STRATEGY
"I felt it was about time that the truth be known and that a spade be called a spade
letting the chips fall where they may. As you know, it has been a difficult problem
for me but I simply could not continue without letting the public know what was
happening to the Navy and the National Security. Believe me, I shall continue to
fight for what I believe is right." (18 October 1949 - Admiral Denfeld)404
"Our military forces are one team - in the game to win regardless o f who carries
the ball. This is no time for "fancy dans" who won't play, unless they can call the
signals. Each player on this team - whether he shines in the spotlight of the
backfield or eats dirt on the line - must be an all-American." (19 October 1949 General Bradley)405
Congressman Vinson had set up the hearings on unification and strategy to permit
the services' leaders to release their pent up frustrations and to serve as a catharsis for the
defense establishment. His agenda ensured that the majority of issues that divided the
"unified" Defense Department would at least be aired in an open forum. Passions being
what they were, few observers believed that the senior officers would all survive the
hearings with their careers and reputations intact. Unlike August's generally factual
hearings on the B-36, this session revolved around opinions, not facts: Was the B-36 a
good airplane? Did strategic bombing make sense? Did Secretary Johnson do the right
thing when he canceled the "supercarrier"? Was the JCS structure working well? Vinson
hoped that this public brawl would help settle the debates.
The House Armed Services Committee held hearings from 6 through 21 October
1949, averaging three and one half hours per day.406 Thirty-nine witnesses testified on the
remaining six agenda items. The Navy alone sent two civilians, three Fleet Admirals, six

404Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, Ohio newspaper publisher, 18 October 1949, in Denfeld
Papers, Box 6, File "Correspondence - W," Naval Historical Center.
405House Unification and Strategy Report, pp. 536 - 37.
406Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 514.

129

Admirals, and thirteen other officers to the stand. The Marines added three additional
general officers to the list. In the hearings' concluding phase, former-President Hoover,
Secretary Johnson, and Generals o f the Army Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley all
testified on the merits and application o f military unification.407 The hearings' examination
o f military strategy was given added urgency by the President's 23 September
announcement that the Soviet Union had tested its first atomic device, ensuring that the
House's hearings on unification and strategy made front pages across the country.
Chairman Vinson understood that in order for all opinions to be freely aired, the
witnesses had to be protected from reprisals, because much o f the anticipated objections
would be directed at the policies and actions o f the leaders of the Department o f Defense.
Therefore, in opening the hearings on 6 October, Vinson declared:
It is the intent o f the Committee that all testimony given shall be frankly and
freely given and be given without reprisals in the Department o f Defense
against any individual presenting testimony during the course o f these hearings.
. . . We want these witnesses to speak what is in their minds, to put their cards
on the table and to do so without hesitation or personal concern. We are going
to the bottom of this unrest and concern in the Navy.408
This warning should have been unnecessary, since it was illegal either to threaten a witness
before he testified to Congress or to take action against him after he made statements on
the stand.409 Nevertheless, Vinson properly saw the need to reiterate what the law
required.
As he had requested, Secretary Matthews led off the Navy's presentation. He had
declined Admiral Denfeld's offer o f help in the preparation o f his statement, and, as Paul

407House Unification and Strategy Report, p. iv.
408Statement of Congressman Carl Vinson, 6 October 1949, quoted in Jurika, p. 179.
409In 1949, Title 18 of Section 1505 of the United States Criminal Code was entitled "Influencing or
Injuring Witness Before Agencies and Committees." Its provisions applied in this situation.
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Hammond observed, "while he did not accept Denfeld's suggestions for changing i t . .
nevertheless he continued to expect Denfeld to support his position. His refusal to take
into account Denfeld's suggestions . . . [had] unfortunate consequences."410 The
Secretary's testimony opened with a pledge echoing Chairman Vinson's caution on
reprisals. "Let me assure the Committee that any Naval officer or enlisted man or any
Navy civilian whom your Committee wants to hear, or who desires to be heard by your
Committee, is completely free to testify. There has been no censorship. There will be
none."411 He went on to mention a letter which he had previously sent the Committee
which addressed the six issues under discussion. After this letter was entered into the
record, the Secretary launched into a heated denunciation o f the "guilty" and "disloyal"
conduct o f a few individuals, mostly "in the Naval Aviation section o f the service," who
had engaged in the "indefensible procedure" of passing classified material to the press and
otherwise improperly addressing their grievances.412 He stated that "the general morale o f
the Navy" was good and that naval officers were not "gagged" in the Defense Department
but were free to express their views. These points reportedly elicited laughter from the
naval officers in attendance.413 Matthews made one final attempt to limit the hearings by
requesting that some testimony, specifically Admiral Radford's statement which was to
follow the Secretary's, be heard in executive session because o f potential security
concerns. The Committee agreed to hear the statement in executive session, but, if
nothing improper was heard, the hearings would be reopened and Admiral Radford would

410Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 515.
411 "Statement of Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews Before the Armed Services Committee of the
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repeat his statement. That, in fact, was the course the hearings took. Vinson was
committed to airing the services' differences in public.
Matthews' testimony pleased hardly anyone. The press criticized the Secretary o f
the Navy for abandoning his subordinates or for allowing the hearings to be held in the
first place. The Naval Academy Alumni Association's magazine, Shipmate, bluntly
characterized Matthews as "a Secretary against the Navy, not for it, and certainly not o f
it."414 Admiral Denfeld recorded that "Secretary Matthews . . . was much disturbed at
press comment on his testimony."415 Now the frustrated Secretary was forced to sit
through eleven days of Navy and Marine officers' testimony in opposition to much o f what
he had just submitted.
The following days' Navy testimony attempted to build a case that the B-36 was
not an adequate aircraft, that strategic nuclear bombing was immoral, inefficient, and
impossible with current aircraft, and that the Department o f Defense was not
implementing unification in a way that recognized the rights and contributions of all four
services. Admiral Radford was the first naval officer to testify. He opened this phase of
the hearings with a firm denunciation o f the B-36 as "a billion dollar blunder." He asserted
that it was too big and slow to penetrate enemy air defenses and that naval aircraft could
shoot it down unless it had fighter escort. These arguments were identical to those he had
presented during his testimony before the Hoover Commission in October 1948 and to
Congress during the budget hearings in early 1949.416
Admiral Radford then offered his views on unification o f the Armed Forces.
"Unification requires a sound legislative framework, but the framework by itself will not
suffice. Real unification must depend, in the ultimate, on leadership, mutual trust,
414"The Navy on Capitol Hill," Shipmate. December 1949, pp. 12 -13.
415Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 63.
416Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," pp. 488 and 518.
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understanding, and respect."417 This statement was a distinct shift away from his
testimony on the National Security Act o f 1947, when he had said, "I feel that we are not
ready for one department. I think we have to carry on for another generation and I would
be hopeful that we could have, eventually, when this new generation grows up, one
service."418 Despite the differences, Radford still advocated trust, respect, and
understanding as the keys to implementing the unification laws. In retrospect, Radford's
1947 statement was probably more accurate, since the Department o f Defense continues
to struggle with unification well into the 1990s. In response to questioning after his
prepared statement, Admiral Radford listed the "other officers" who supported his views:
"among others, Denfeld, Blandy, Conolly, Nimitz, King, and Leahy."419 Denfeld now had
to call Radford's bluff or stand with his fellow admirals in opposition to his civilian
supervisors.
During the week o f testimony before his concluding statement, Denfeld received
many requests from the Secretary's office for a copy o f his proposed statement, but he
could not give him one because he had not yet prepared his remarks. Secretary Matthews
maintained a good relationship with his CNO during this period. Denfeld's letter to
Senator Knowland states that before he testified "there was an intimacy and cordiality
between the Secretary o f the Navy and myself which supports my conviction that what
happened after October 13 was the direct result o f my testimony. "420 Both Navy leaders

417Admiral Radford statement before the House Armed Services Committee, 7 October 1949, p. 2, in "The
Navy and Marine Corps Presentation Before the Armed Services Committee of the House of
Representatives, United States Congress," unpublished transcript of the Naval Service testimony in the
Hearings on Unification and Strategy, microfiche, October 1949. In the files of the U. S. Army Combined
Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. (Hereinafter referred to as "Navy Testimony
Transcript.")
418Radford's testimony to Congress, 26 June 1947, in Jurika, p. 106.
419Radford's response is quoted in Coletta, The United States N aw and Defense Unification, p. 187.
420Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library, p. 1.
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attended the hearings together, but tensions ran so high during the sessions that neither
man appeared to be enjoying himself.
Admiral Sherman never made a statement before the Committee although he was
called back from the Mediterranean to Washington to do so. Captain Fitzhugh Lee, a
member o f Denfeld's staff, stated that Admiral Radford left Sherman off the list o f Navy
witnesses because Secretary Matthews was opposed to his testifying.421 Admiral Conolly
had quite different memories o f why Sherman did not testify. He recalled that Sherman
had been in the Capital for about a week before the hearings and had "made out a wishywashy statement that Denfeld and Radford rejected as compromising their position. They
said it was no good at all, and they weren't going to let him testify."422
The 28 October 1949, Christian Science Monitor presented another view o f
Admiral Sherman's role in the controversy. It cited "Navy sources" as stating that
Sherman had been ordered to Washington during the hearings at the direction o f Secretary
Johnson and further asserted that Johnson had recalled Sherman at the urging o f Air Force
generals "to have [him] testify in opposition to his brother officers in the Navy." The same
sources informed the Monitor's reporter that Sherman's immediate superior, Admiral
Conolly, "intimidated" him into declining to present his testimony.423 This report hardly
seems credible, yet there is other evidence which strongly supports its interpretation.
The official record o f the hearings on unification and strategy does not list
Sherman as a witness before the Committee.424 The Navy's compilation o f the testimony
o f its uniformed leaders also contains no mention o f any participation by Admiral Sherman

421Letter from Captain Fitzhugh Lee to Davis Merwin, 1 December 1949, quoted in Barlow, p. 364.
422Conolly interview, p. 405.
423"Navy 'Scuttlebutt' Brings Sherman in to Succeed Denfeld," Christian Science Monitor. 28 October
1949, p. 6.
424House Unification and Strategy Report, p. iv.
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in the affair.425 Nevertheless, included in Secretary Matthews' set o f mimeographed copies
o f the Navy witnesses' statements is a seven-page "Statement of Forrest P. Sherman . . .
Before the Armed Services Committee o f the House of Representatives Investigating the
B-36 and Related Matters." This piece is formatted exactly like all the other witnesses'
official transcripts. Matthews' staff filed the copies in order o f their presentation, and
Sherman's is placed, and even dated, on the same day as Secretary Johnson's 21 October
concluding presentation and one week after Admiral Denfeld concluded the Navy's
presentation.426 Another copy o f Sherman's phantom statement can be found in the Chief
o f Naval Operations' formerly classified "Double Zero" files in the Naval Historical
Center.427 As described by Conolly, Sherman's statement is very balanced and not nearly
as emphatic as either Admiral Radford's or Admiral Denfeld's. In it, Sherman supported
unification, did not attack the B-36, continued the Navy's advocacy for a balanced military
structure, and stated that morale, at least in the Mediterranean Fleet, was good. A
statement along these lines could not be reconciled with the remainder o f the Navy's
presentation, and, if given with Secretary Johnson's testimony on the last day o f the
hearings, could only indicate that the Defense Secretary had found a new voice for the
Navy. Drew Pearson's 31 October 1949 column even mentioned that some Navy sources
were referring to Sherman as the "Quisling o f the Navy" for his support o f unification and
Secretary Johnson.428
Admiral Sherman's role in the hearings, even though he never faced the
microphones, was certainly greater than any historian has given him credit for. Sherman's
involvement has never been fully analyzed and, if considered together with his involvement
425"Navy Testimony Transcript."
426Matthews Papers, Box 57, File "Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, 10/21/49," Truman Library.
427Chief of Naval Operations Papers, "Double Zero Files - 1965," Box 78, File "13, B-36," Naval
Historical Center.
428Drew Pearson, "Civilian Rule of Navy Held Basic," Washington Post. 31 October 1949, p. 1.
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in the Bogan matter, reveals a new side to the character o f this naval officer. Admiral
Forrest Sherman has traditionally been listed among the best CNO's o f the twentieth
century and described as a man o f great intellect and integrity, but it seems evident that the
Admiral prospered from his political machinations as well as his leadership skills.
Admiral Denfeld's testimony has been called "the dramatic focus" o f the
hearings.429 Up to this point, he had remained Matthews' and Johnson's loyal subordinate,
issuing his requested clarifying statement after the Bogan correspondence was published,
accepting Chairman Vinson's offer to delay the hearings, and supporting the Navy
Secretary's request for the testimony to be heard in executive session. Matthews hoped
that Denfeld would continue along these lines and "get him off the hook" with the press.430
According to the New York Herald Tribune. "Louis Johnson was evidently quite free with
his assurances throughout the hearings that Denfeld would repudiate his Navy colleagues
and 'toe the Johnson economy line.'"431 Despite the assurances and hopes o f the civilians,
Denfeld ultimately placed his career on the line by siding with his subordinates against the
leadership o f the Department.
The first draft o f Admiral Denfeld's statement was prepared by Captain Charles
Griffin, a member of the CNO's Office o f Special Projects. He delivered the draft to the
Admiral well before the hearings were to start, but received no feedback for several
weeks. He recalled that "it soon became quite apparent to me that Admiral Denfeld was
not going to take any fast action on this because he, himself, was feeling his way along. "432
As the CNO participated in the practice sessions for the Navy's testimony, he must have

429Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," pp. 527.
430Ibid.t p. 528.
431Bert Andrews, 16 October 1949, New York Herald Tribune, p. 1.
432Interview with Charles D. Griffin, Admiral USN (Ret.) by John T. Mason, Volume I, 1970, U. S.
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, Transcript, 1973, U. S. Naval Academy Library, Special
Collections, p. 187.

136

thought often about what effect his testimony would have on the entire case. As the final
naval witness he could either torpedo the Navy's whole argument and thereby earn the
enmity o f his fellow naval officers, or he could lend his support to those who opposed the
current implementation of unification and possibly loose his job.
The Navy's public affairs officer, Captain Walter Karig, was a close personal friend
o f Denfeld's. On the day after the Bogan correspondence was published and the same day
the Secretary had informed the Admiral that "his usefulness as CNO" had been hurt,
Captain Karig gave Denfeld the results o f a cross-country morale survey his office had
conducted. He concluded that "the complaint of the Navy and USNR [Reserve]
personnel, freely volunteered, was that the Navy had no evidence o f dynamic leadership."
Karig encouraged the CNO to "grab the ball and run with it. To put it bluntly and
impolitically, I think the immediate future of the Navy depends on your actions in the next
couple o f weeks."433 Karig's encouragement certainly added to Admiral Denfeld's internal
turmoil. In his heart, Denfeld knew that many o f the Navy's objections were valid, and he
could not disagree with Karig's assessment that "morale in the Navy, no matter what
Secretary Matthews says, is desperately low —due entirely to the lack o f internal public
relations."434 The Navy's personnel did not understand the battles he had been through in
the JCS over the past two years and the compromises he had had to make to protect as
much o f the Navy as he could. This was a failure of leadership - his leadership - and he
must have known it. This might be his best and last opportunity to make both the Navy
and the American people aware o f what had been going on.

433Letter from Captain Karig to Admiral Denfeld, 4 October 1949, in the Chief of Naval Operations
Papers, "Double Zero Files - 1965," Box 78, File "13, B-36," Naval Historical Center.
434Ibid. Another view of this disconnect between what the Navy understood and what Admiral Denfeld
had been through can be found in Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Volume II,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy. 1947-1949. (Washington: The Historical Division, Joint
Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1978), pp. 335 - 36.
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If the Admiral needed any additional urging, Air Force Secretary Symington's July
1949 speech to the Air War College would have served this purpose. "When convinced
that the national interest requires a strong military position we must not permit any fear o f
possible criticism to deflect us from recommending that position."435 The CNO knew
what the rest o f the naval officers were going to say, and knew that whatever he said, his
service was still going to be criticized. Only his personal reputation was at risk. Captain
Griffin recalled that
it took an awful lot o f courage for him, the nature of the man, to deliver his
statement. Because it was a statement in opposition to his own Secretary. . . .
He did it very courageously knowing quite well, full well, that he was laying
his career on the line. But he did it.436
After hearing Secretary Matthews' and Admiral Radford's testimony, and at the urging o f
his wife and personal staff, Denfeld concluded that he was "serving the Navy ill as a
would-be conciliator" and would have to take his stand during the hearings.437 Paul
Hammond states that even Congressman Vinson called the CNO to urge him "to take a
strong stand alongside his fellow naval officers."438
On Wednesday, 12 October, the CNO called Captain Griffin, Rear Admiral
Colclough (the Navy's head lawyer), and several other staff members to his office and got
them started on the revision to his draff statement. Rear Admiral Dennison, at the request
o f Secretary Matthews, also assisted in the process.439 Griffin sensed that the longer the
CNO had waited to finalize his testimony, the stronger it had become, assessing that "he

435W. Stuart Symington, "Our Air Force Policy,” Vital Speeches of the Day. 1 July 1949, p. 567.
436Griffin interview, p. 193.
437Barlow, p. 252, "Armed Forces: Facts & Fears," Time. 24 October, 1949, p. 27, and Potter, Burke.
p. 325.
438Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 528.
439Griffin interview, p. 189 and Dennison interview, p. 201.
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came under the influence o f people such as Radford, Burke, and myself "440 The team
worked deep into the night, with the final page coming off the typewriter at three in the
morning. The Admiral did not finish his corrections and additions until eleven o'clock on
the thirteenth, only two hours before he was to deliver his testimony.441 Therefore he was
unable to get a copy to the Secretary before he left the Pentagon to go to the hearings,
ultimately adding to the Secretary's shock at Denfeld's presentation.
The most profound o f the changes made by Admiral Denfeld on the morning o f his
testimony was the addition of an opening statement noting his agreement with the
conclusions o f the naval and marine officers who preceded him.442 With this statement,
the Admiral assumed personal accountability for the words and actions o f his
subordinates. This seems to have been a very conscious decision on his part to try to lead
the Navy at the risk o f appearing to follow it. O f course, this choice was difficult, and the
CNO appears to have had some second thoughts about being held responsible for all the
claims made by naval officers in the hearings. In his verbal presentation o f his written
statement he changed its opening from "I fully support the conclusions presented . . . " to
"I fully support the broad conclusions presented . . . " (emphasis added) Paul Hammond
notes that this limitation was generally lost on the public, and was "vague" and "feeble."443
Still, it demonstrates that Denfeld continued to be tom between two loyalties.
Denfeld's lengthy statement was a measured and reasonable summary o f the Navy's
case, concentrating on the areas in which the CNO could add his own experience and
expertise. He did not attack the B-36 or describe the merits o f the flush-deck carrier as

440Griffin interview, p. 193.
441Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 63 and Griffin interview, p. 190.
442Dennison interview, p. 201.
443The original language is found in the statement's transcript in the Matthews Papers and in the Navy's
compilation of the testimony. The minutes of the hearings record the actual testimony before the
Committee. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 528.
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these subjects had already been covered by the experts brought in for just this purpose.
Denfeld's testimony focused on unification and the integration of the Navy and naval views
into the Defense Department's decision-making groups. On some topics he disagreed with
some o f the aviators, but generally he took his place at the head o f the "revolting
admirals."
Following his introductory statement, the CNO tried to clarify the intent o f his
testimony, claiming that his words were based on concern for national security rather than
the parochial interests of his service or his career. He stated that the Navy understood the
need for economy in defense spending and did not want more money but only the freedom
to spend what was allocated to it. This point was in reference to the cancellation o f the
United States, where Denfeld believed the Navy should have been allowed to reprioritize
among its funded programs to build the best weapons possible to meet its assigned
missions. He had consistently objected to the JCS or the Defense Secretary "arbitrarily"
intruding into the Navy's weapons programs. Denfeld went on to describe "true
unification" as "essential," and to assert that the Navy fully supported military unification
in concept and law.444 In a rare point o f agreement with Secretary Matthews, the CNO
described morale as "high, if by morale you mean enthusiastic loyalty to the nation and the
service; in other words, the fighting spirit." But his assessment went on to describe a
"deep apprehension" about the ability o f the Navy to carry out its mission with the
available resources and within the current defense organization. Denfeld stated that naval
officers were genuinely concerned about the ability of the Navy to defend the United
States in a future conflict.445

444Admiral Denfeld's statement, in the Matthews Papers, Box 57, File "Admiral Denfeld, 10/13/49,"
Truman Library, pp. 1 - 3 .
445Ibid., pp. 4 - 7 .
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Regarding strategic bombing and the Air Force's capabilities, Admiral Denfeld
echoed the distinction made by Radford between "strategic bombing," which was longrange, high altitude, low accuracy attacks, and "strategic air warfare," which was precisely
targeted and delivered attacks on targets o f strategic value. The CNO strongly advocated
strategic air warfare as a more effective option and pointed out that naval forces, striking
from the sea, had an important contribution to make to this type o f campaign. He did not
distinguish between nuclear and conventional attacks, but reiterated his support for the
evaluations being done by the Weapons System Evaluation Group to determine the effect
o f an atomic attack and the ability o f the Nation's existing assets to deliver the bomb
accurately and reliably. Regarding the B-36, the Admiral did not pass judgment on the
aircraft, but firmly stated that it was "illogical, damaging, and dangerous" for anyone to
move this aircraft beyond the developmental stage without a full evaluation o f its
capabilities to perform its mission. A poor investment made in the production o f such an
untried aircraft could starve the Army and Navy o f funds needed for proven weapons
systems for little return on investment.446
Regarding his own service, the CNO justified the need for a Navy to "exert the
steady, unrelenting pressure . . . against the homeland of an enemy" regardless o f his naval
capabilities. "Fleets never in history met opposing fleets for any purpose other than to
gain control o f the sea - not as an end in itself, but so that national power could be exerted
against the enemy. "447 The Admiral went on to describe the essential place a balanced
force including aircraft carriers and submarines played in implementing this concept o f
naval power. Additionally, the development o f amphibious tactics by the Navy and

446Ibid., pp. 7 -10.
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Marine Corps team was supported, and he asserted that the Nation must maintain a
’’combined arms" Marine Corps.448
Turning to the administration of unification, the Admiral continued directly to
attack the procedures and policies o f the Defense Department which he believed did not
improve national security. In the most widely quoted part o f his testimony, Denfeld
asserted that the Navy was not being treated as a full partner in the unified defense
establishment. He pointed to the procurement o f B-36s during 1949 as a good example o f
how the JCS was not uniformly managing the Defense Department's expenditures. While
the JCS was allowed to vote to cancel the U. S. S. United States, twice during the year
the Air Force ordered additional B-36s, doubling their number to 170 and diverting
millions from other defense programs while the CNO "was under the impression that the
Air Force planned to cut back the B-36 program."449 The CNO used this issue and the
cancellation o f the flush-deck carrier to reiterate his proposal that each service be allowed
to manage its own allotted funds in weapons development with the understanding that no
weapons systems would go into full production without the JCS' approval.
Admiral Denfeld wrapped up his statement by reiterating that the Navy aimed first
and foremost to improve national defense. Unification was a good concept that was not
being properly implemented. "Improper operation of unification is more injurious than no
unification at all."450 The CNO next ventured his opinion on the hearings themselves:
I can understand the view that it is regrettable the basic differences revealed in
these hearings have been aired in public. I believe, however, it would have been
immeasurably more regrettable had these issues remained hidden and a false
sense o f security been permitted to prevail.451

448Ibid., pp. 18- 21.
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To overcome many o f the problems identified in his testimony, the Admiral proposed six
specific actions for the consideration o f the Defense Department's leaders. These included
allowing the Weapons System Evaluation Group to do its job by evaluating the B-36
before additional aircraft were procured. He also advocated following the National
Security Act and the Key West Agreement literally rather than continuously pursuing
changes while the cement of the Pentagon's foundations was still drying. Perhaps his key
recommendation was to ensure that "the views o f a particular service are entitled to
predominant weight in the determination of the forces needed by that service to fulfill its
missions."452 This returned everyone's attention to the conflict over the desirability o f the
"supercarrier" as opposed to the B-36, the former having been scuttled while the latter
flourished and multiplied.
Denfeld has not been given sufficient credit for the tolerance and factual accuracy
o f his address. He laid out the Navy's complaints without assigning blame and without
proposing any solutions not based on the best interests o f the United States.
Unfortunately, the focus o f public attention was on his opening statement by which he
supported the conclusions o f his subordinates. Denfeld had joined the rebels!
Nonetheless, much o f his testimony, in fact, echoed statements he had made in Congress
during the budget debates of the past two years. It was no secret that he objected to the
carrier's cancellation and to the "arbitrary" reductions in the Navy's allocated funds. At
least within the JCS it was also well known that he opposed the concentration on strategic
bombing and the build up of B-36s. Congressman Vinson praised the CNO's statement:
"Admiral Denfeld, in my judgment you have rendered a great service to the nation by

452Ibid., p. 42.
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making this statement." The Minority Leader, Dewey Short, also complimented the
Admiral:
"Amen" to your magnificent statement. . . . I personally appreciate the
frankness and courage that you have exhibited here. It is something that
needed to be said and it was forcefully and beautifully said.453
Paul Hammond also gives the CNO credit for his "underlying tone o f self restraint" and
"real moderation," yet he is in the large minority.454
Secretary Matthews, having had no advance warning that Denfeld was going to
side with his admirals rather than his civilian superiors, left the session "visibly flushed"
without speaking to the CNO. Captain Griffin observed that "the Secretary o f the Navy
was just wild."455 Later that day, when newsmen asked the President to comment on
Denfeld's statements about unification, Truman offered "no comment."456 The
Washington Post concentrated on Denfeld's opening: "by supporting fully all the
conclusions in Navy testimony before the House, Admiral Denfeld assumes responsibility
for statements a good deal more rash than those he himself makes."457 The Washington
newsmen Robert Allen and William Shannon claimed that "Denfeld, trapped in his own
tortuous game o f pussyfooting, won the resounding applause o f his nominal subordinates.
But that is all he won."458 Air Force Magazine wrote that Denfeld had "rebuffed higher
authority and by his actions encouraged insubordination within his command."459
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In fact, what the Admiral had done was to make the Navy his command again. No
longer would he remain aloof, attempting to compromise and bargain behind the scenes.
He had elected to take a firm stand, accept responsibility for his service, and assume the
leadership position he was assigned to hold. The only question was how long he would be
allowed to keep his hold on the reins.
On the day after Denfeld spoke, Secretary Matthews told him that he had been
"stunned" by the CNO's testimony. Denfeld concluded that Matthews would have rather
had him dissociate his views from the other witnesses and "submerge what he knew from
my expressions were my true opinions."460 Time magazine wrote that "one thing seemed
already clear at the end o f Denfeld's testimony: either he or Louis Johnson would have to
step aside: after Denfeld's testimony they could no longer work together."461 Matthews
had continued to meet with Admirals Conolly and Sherman during the hearings, often for
over an hour at a time.462 He had several options, but in the charged Washington
atmosphere, any decision would be fraught with danger.
The CNO's testimony concluded the Navy's presentation. Now it was the turn of
the other JCS members and the leadership o f the Defense Department to answer the
Navy's charges. Just as they had done during the initial hearings in August, Secretary
Symington and General Vandenberg presented a well organized and persuasive
explanation o f the Air Force's views on the B-36, strategic bombing, and unification.
They then went on to charge that the Navy's airing of technical details o f the B-36 had
been injurious to national security. Symington thus placed himself in opposition to the
admirals in taking this "completely uncompromising position."463 Much o f the Navy's
460Denfe1d, "Why TWas Fired," p. 63
461 "Armed Forces: Facts & Fears," Time. 24 October, 1949, p. 27.
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argument was refuted in these statements, particularly those aspects of the case which
attacked the efficacy o f strategic bombing based on documents o f dubious authenticity
such as "The Strategic Bombing Myth," a pamphlet which had been entered into the
record by Navy witnesses.
Following the Air Force's devastating rebuttal, the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f
Staff, General o f the Army Omar Bradley, took the stand. Bradley had close ties to the
Air Force and had been viewed as a "sworn enemy" of the Navy following the debates
over the fiscal year 1950 budget and the decision to cancel the flush-deck carrier.464
General Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief, had provided close air support for Bradley's
troops during the World War II European campaigns, and the two continued to function
well as a team. Bradley had moved reluctantly from Army Chief of Staff to CJCS in mid1949, deciding to accept the new position only out of "deep concern about the state o f the
military establishment." He believed that he could serve as a "moderating force" in the
JCS and "prevent a crippling brawl." Despite these good intentions, he had been
ineffective in this undertaking, and his testimony now proved that he was hardly a
"moderating force."465
As the hearings progressed, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs became more and
more frustrated with the Navy's presentation. He then came to view the naval aviators as
"insubordinate and mutinous crybabies." Bradley's autobiography records his
disenchantment at the Navy's criticism o f Air Force strategic bombing at a time when the
admirals were attempting to justify the development of their own capability to deliver
atomic strikes:

464Bradley and Blair, p. 496.
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I was profoundly shocked and angered by the Navy's case. The main thrust o f
it was dishonest. . . For the Navy to raise public doubt about the
effectiveness - or morality - of atomic bombs was the height o f hypocrisy.466
The General also objected to Denfeld's attack on JCS procedures and modified his
testimony to respond to the CNO's broadsides.467 He felt that "no one had publicly
censured them [the admirals] for the insubordination, and it did not seem like anyone
would. I therefore took it upon myself to administer the lash."468 This attack was merely
the first o f many spears to be thrown in Admiral Denfeld's direction now that he had
publicly sided with the Navy's rebels.
In his very forthright and direct statement, General Bradley placed the blame for
the Navy's low morale squarely on the shoulders o f Denfeld and the other admirals who
had not adequately explained to their subordinates the Navy's evolving role in national
defense: "The esprit of the men is but a mirror o f their confidence in their leadership. "469
He went on to present his famous football analogy comparing the Navy's leaders to "fancy
dans who won't play, unless they can call the signals."470 The national defense
organization had evolved from what then-Senator Truman saw in 1944 as "not one team
and one huddle, but two teams and two huddles," to one team without any unity in
1949.471 Although the transition to one, fully integrated team had not yet been completed,
it is difficult to understand why Bradley felt that publicly "administering the lash" was the
best way to build teamwork.
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The reaction to this latest salvo in the inter-service wars was quick and dramatic.
The Washington Post wrote that "the top-ranking officer o f the armed services accused
the admirals, in effect, o f being prima donnas and sore heads."472 Truman's biographer
Richard Haynes saw Bradley's "attack on the Navy" as "ill-tempered, not entirely fair, and
certainly ill-advised."473 The Navy’s OP-23 recorded in its 1950 history o f the
investigation that this statement created a clear impression that "somebody in the Joint
Chiefs o f Staff had to go."474
Retired Admiral Standiey transmitted his view of the Chairman o f the JCS'
testimony in a 25 October 1949 letter to Congressman Vinson:
To use the expression "fancy dans" in referring to officers who have given their
lives to the service and are willing to jeopardize their career in giving their
honest opinion in regard to matters o f national security is wholly out o f place
and unbecoming to a man who occupies the position o f chief o f staff o f the
national defense forces.475
Admiral Denfeld objected strongly to some particular items in the General's tongue
lashing, but was less bristling in his reaction, writing "I do not question that General
Bradley tries to be fair but he remains an Army officer with a one-service background and
viewpoint."476 To Chairman Vinson's dismay, the inter-service battle lines had firmed up
rather than becoming blurred in the hearings.
The Congressional hearings on unification and strategy ended with a fizzle on 21
October 1949. Secretary Johnson and former-President Hoover presented very low key
472John G. Norris, "Service Chiefs’ Chairman Assails Top Admirals for Hurting Defense," Washington
Post, 20 October 1949, p. 1.
473Haynes, p. 30.
474"A History of the Investigation of the B-36," p. 38, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "B-36
Investigation," Naval Historical Center.
475Letter from Admiral W. H. Standley, USN (Ret.) to Representative Carl Vinson, 25 October 1949, in
the Denfeld Papers, Box 9, File "Correspondence - V," Naval Historical Center.
476Denfeld, "The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK," Collier's. 25 March 1950, p. 46.
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and non-confrontational statements. Johnson, who certainly could have provided some
heated exchanges with the Congressional Committee, at times harshly criticized the Navy's
characterization o f JCS procedures and current battle plans, but he made few
inflammatory statements or accusations to fill the next day's headlines. E. B. Potter wrote
that Johnson had spoken in a "lofty" and "conciliatory" manner because he felt he had
already won and should therefore appear statesmanlike to the press.477 President Hoover
praised the witnesses who had testified before the Committee, calling them "great public
servants." He noted that "they are all moved by earnest and even emotional interest in our
national defense. "478
The Navy had tried to convince Congress and the American people that
maintaining a strong Navy was o f vital importance to national security. The sincerity and
conviction o f the admirals came across clearly, but the service's divisions and confused
priorities also became very evident. Admiral Radford had tried to argue that the Air Force
was not capable of conducting a strategic bombing campaign, all the while suggesting that
the Navy could accomplish the same mission with carrier-borne bombers. This
contradictory assertion gave the entire case a hypocritical appearance and helped the sea
service's opponents. The internal differences between Secretary Matthews and Admiral
Denfeld lent an air of personal drama to the hearings which also detracted from the Navy's
ability to get its message across. The hearings on unification and strategy did little to help
the Navy in the near term, certainly damaged the service's reputation, and pointed out the
need for a change in leadership.

477Potter, Burke, p. 326.
478President Hoover's testimony is quoted in the House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 9.
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LOUIS DENFELD GETS "THE AX"

"I feel sure that I have made bitter enemies of Johnson, Symington, and
Matthews, and that a purge will be in order unless I have the complete backing
o f the Congress and the people." (18 October 1949 - Admiral Denfeld)'179
"A military establishment is not a political democracy. Integrity o f command is
indispensable at all times. There can be no twilight zone in the measure o f
loyalty to superiors and respect for authority existing between various official
ranks. Inability to conform to such requirements for military stability would
disqualify any of us for positions subordinate to the Commander in Chief."
(27 October 1949 - Secretary Matthews)480
After so many fireworks, it seemed unusual that the hearings ended on such a quiet
note. Jeffrey Barlow has speculated that Johnson escaped the usually aggressive cross
examination from pro-Navy Congressmen by reaching a secret agreement in a meeting
with Vinson and other Committee members the night before his testimony. Johnson was
accompanied by Matthews, Symington, Admiral Denfeld and General Vandenberg at this
session, where Barlow believes they worked with Vinson to end the hearings as soon as
possible.481 There is no transcript of this meeting, but this interpretation seems plausible.
The cards were already on the table. Congress would have many more opportunities to
assail Johnson's economy programs. Now was the time to start healing the wounds and
addressing the problems which had been identified in the three weeks of testimony.
Admiral Denfeld's testimony had offered six steps to take following the hearings,
but there was no consensus on any course of action after this prolonged public battle.
OP-23's history stated that "the B-36 hearings closed in an atmosphere o f uncertainty with

479Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, 18 October 1949, in Denfeld Papers, Box 6, File
"Correspondence - W," Naval Historical Center.
480Letter from Secretary Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, in Harry S. Truman, Official
Files, File "Navy, 1949," Truman Library.
48barlow , p. 363.
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everyone wondering 'Where do we go from here?'"482 Defense Secretary Johnson had
some definite ideas which he transmitted to the service secretaries on Monday, 24
October:
There must be no 'reprisals' as a result of the hearings. We must, o f course,
continue to follow the policy of'selecting the best man for the job,' but no one
is to be punished for any testimony that he may have given in the past, or that
he may give in the future, before a Congressional Committee. This is not to
say, of course, that there will not be some changes in assignments within the
Department of Defense. Such changes will occur continuously, whenever any
individuals show themselves to lack the qualifications for jobs to which they
have been assigned, and as other individuals show themselves to possess the
necessary qualifications.483
The warning against reprisals was needed, because Johnson knew the Committee would
react strongly to any indication that its ability to obtain trustworthy testimony from
military personnel was being hindered. Chairman Vinson had made himself very clear on
that point. Johnson's letter is therefore worth reading carefully because it provides the
rationale he wanted the Secretaries to use if they wished to "change any assignments"
following the hearings.
In Admiral Denfeld's case, it must be remembered that before the hearings began
Matthews had told the CNO that his usefulness had been hindered by the release of the
Bogan correspondence and the poor administrative practices revealed by that episode.
Johnson had been present on 5 October when the Navy Secretary mentioned this matter to
the President and understood it provided a plausible excuse to "change" the CNO's
assignment, even if it was Denfeld's testimony which ultimately precipitated his removal.
482"A History of the Investigation of the B-36," p. 39, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "B-36
Investigation," Naval Historical Center.
483Letter from Secretary Johnson to the Service Secretaries, 24 October 1949, in Louis A. Johnson,
Statements and Speeches of Louis A. Johnson. Secretary of Defense March 29. 1949 - September 12,
1950. vol. II, p. 517, unpublished mimeographs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian,
Washington.
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Johnson and Matthews understood Congress' aversion to reprisals against witnesses and
had already developed a strategy to work around this objection if they decided to fire
Admiral Denfeld.
Following the conclusion o f the bitter hearings, Secretary Johnson set up a
"friendly golf match" between the members o f the JCS to permit them to "shake hands and
forget" the bitterness. Reportedly a pleasant atmosphere prevailed among the Service
Chiefs and, true to form, Air Force Generals Vandenberg and Norstadt won the two dollar
golfing prize.484 The generals and the admirals had proven they could still play together,
but could they work together following the public bickering?
Admiral Denfeld understood his precarious position, both on and off the golf
course. His service had "lost" the hearings, and he was at odds with his civilian leader.
Captain Holden, a reserve lawyer, wrote the CNO on 25 October to explain that he was
"working for you [Denfeld] through my political contacts."485 Denfeld was grateful,
definitely recognizing that he needed the help:
I appreciate so much what you are doing and know you will continue to carry
the banner for me. We cannot let anything happen to any o f the people
participating in the recent hearings because frankly the Navy and its associates
are hanging in the balance. . . . The situation at the moment is quite delicate. I
can't tell just what will happen. You may rest assured that with the exception of
one or two, the navy is completely united.486
Although the CNO did not identify the "one or two" he believed were not united behind
his banner, Vice Admiral Sherman was surely one o f the naval officers Denfeld saw as

484Phillip S. Meilinger, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today,"
Parameters. September 1989, p. 95.
485Letter from Captain Edward Holden, Jr., USNR to Admiral Denfeld, 25 October 1949, in the Denfeld
Papers, Box 3, File "Correspondence - H," Naval Historical Center.
486Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Captain Edward Holden, Jr., USNR, 26 October 1949, in the Denfeld
Papers, Box 3, File "Correspondence - H," Naval Historical Center.
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taking a different course. Sherman had gone back to his fleet in the Mediterranean but
was on the CNO's mind during this tense period.487 Denfeld certainly had the time to
speculate on the possibilities, since he was practically shunned by Matthews following his
testimony, only spending a total o f 52 minutes with the Secretary between 21 and 28
October.488
Many sources reported that rumors o f the CNO's impending removal were
circulating in Washington during the weeks following his testimony and the end o f the
hearings. The Christian Science Monitor noted that these rumblings were "originating in
Pentagon corridors adjacent to Defense Secretary Louis A. Johnson's office."489 The
Washington Star's John Giles attributed a statement placing Denfeld's removal in the near
future to "one high official in the Pentagon," and interviewed Denfeld's aides who insisted
that the Admiral had no intention o f stepping down voluntarily and was unaware o f any
plans to fire him.490 OP-23's history o f the investigation noted that "it looked as if the
Administration were sending up trial ballons [sic] to test public sentiment about the Navy
and particularly about Admiral Denfeld."491 The 22 October Omaha World Herald even
went as far as to predict that Forrest Sherman would be Denfeld's successor.492

487Barlow cites Lieutenant Commander Frank Manson, one of the CNO's personal staff assistants, as
remembering Denfeld being "incensed" at Sherman's presence in Washington during the hearings.
Manson felt that Denfeld "had a pretty good notion of what the call [Sherman's visit] was all about."
(p. 271.)
488Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 2 1 - 2 8 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman
Library.
489"Navy 'Scuttlebutt' Brings Sherman in to Succeed Denfeld," Christian Science Monitor. 28 October
1949, p. 6.
490John A. Giles, "Friends Insist Denfeld Won't Step Out of His Post Voluntarily," Washington Star.
23 October 1949, p. 1.
491"A History of the Investigation of the B-36," p. 39, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 10, File "B-36
Investigation," Naval Historical Center.
492Omaha World Herald. 22 October 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File
"Matthews."
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The CNO recognized that his position was tenuous, but even after testifying in
opposition to Matthews, Denfeld did not believe that he would be fired.493 After all, he
had just been nominated and confirmed for a second term beginning in December. He had
many influential friends on Capitol Hill, and the Committee's warnings against reprisals
seemed to provide him with some job security. The politically astute Admiral hoped that
the Republicans would not make the Navy's case into a partisan issue. In an 18 October
letter to Dudley White, Denfeld wrote that bipartisan Congressional support would be
needed to protect the Navy from the civilian leadership of the Defense Department.494
The CNO was riding out the storm while awaiting the report o f the House hearings. This
report, due to come out after the Congressional winter recess, would determine if his
testimony had been effective and would guide his future strategy for the protection o f his
service's and the Nation's interests.
Denfeld hoped that he would be allowed to continue to advocate the Navy's
interests as Chief o f Naval Operations. In his letter to Dudley White, the Admiral
commented on the possible "purge" which might be made o f the Navy's radicals: "I don't
mind the purge, but I think for the good o f the country, it would be well for me to
continue on no matter how difficult it is for me personally. My opponents will do a lot of
dirty infighting I know, but I have got to be prepared for that."495 During the hearings
Denfeld had finally made the decision to lead his service by forcefully endorsing the
majority opinion o f his fellow officers, and now he wanted to continue at the head o f the
Navy team.

493Griffin interview, p. 194, and Barlow, p. 269.
494Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Dudley White, 18 October 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 3, File
"Correspondence - H," Naval History Center.
495Ibid.
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Secretary Matthews was o f exactly the opposite mind during this period. He
thought that the senior naval officers had gotten out o f control and that he needed to
reassert his authority. On Friday, 14 October, the day after Denfeld's shocking statement,
Matthews called Admiral Nimitz in New York "in urgent need o f advice."496 The
Secretary agreed to meet the retired Fleet Admiral the next day in New York to escape
controversy-filled Washington in order to discuss the state o f the Navy's leadership.
Nimitz's account o f this meeting, as told by E. B. Potter in the Admiral's
biography, is very detailed, yet hardly believable in its depiction o f the Secretary.
Matthews was an experienced lawyer who had firmly allied himself with Secretary
Johnson and President Truman during the hearings. He was in a strong position, even
though his subordinates had disagreed with his views during the hearings. Nimitz recalled
that Matthews was "in a state o f agitation" and that "he said he felt himself to be the
victim o f a conspiracy, with Denfeld the principal conspirator. "497 Continuing this
portrayal o f Matthews as an incompetent weakling, Nimitz quoted the Secretary's
complaint that "Denfeld never tells me anything. Is that right?" Nimitz indicated his reply
was conditioned by his desire
not to appear critical o f Denfeld whom he liked, but in all honesty, he had to
admit that the Chief o f Naval Operations had no business concealing facts
about the Navy from the Secretary. "When I was CNO," said Nimitz, "I
reported to Mr. Forrestal every morning."498
Admiral Denfeld was certainly guilty of not keeping the Secretary informed o f his
intentions regarding his testimony, but considering that he had not made his final decision
until the night before his statement, there were mitigating circumstances. The CNO and
496Potter, Nimitz. p. 446.
497Ibid.
498Ibid.
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the Secretary were together on many occasions during the first week o f the hearings and
must have discussed the ongoing testimony and Denfeld's indecision on his own statement,
but the record is silent on this point.499 The papers o f Secretaries Sullivan and Matthews
indicate that Denfeld routinely met with his civilian supervisors and shared as much as
possible o f his concerns with the two Secretaries. This relationship must be contrasted
with the oft-repeated story from Nimitz's tenure that Secretary Forrestal had to resort to
walking to the Navy's communications room himself to look at messages the admirals had
screened from him.
E. B. Potter's biography o f Nimitz provides additional material on Nimitz's
impression o f Secretary Matthews:
[Nimitz] seems to have felt pity for this well-meaning but confused man who
was caught between his duty to support the Navy and loyalty to his friend and
patron, Secretary Johnson. The extent of Matthews' unfamiliarity with naval
matters was revealed by his final question: "How can I get rid o f Denfeld? It
seemed impossible for a man to be Secretary o f the Navy for six months and
not know the answer to that elementary question. Nimitz patiently explained.
. . . He told Matthews that if he really believed he could not work with
Admiral Denfeld, he should write to Mr. Truman, asking that Denfeld be
transferred to some other duty, and stating the reasons for the request. He
pointed out, however, that Matthews should not list among his reasons
Denfeld's statements before the Vinson Committee, since all officials had been
guaranteed against reprisals for their testimony."500
In fact, the removal o f Admiral Denfeld had been discussed with Secretary Johnson and
the President on 5 October, and the Secretary's own testimony had made it clear he
understood the reprisal problem.
499Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 4 - 1 3 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman
Library. Neither Matthews' later press conferences nor Denfeld's articles in Collier's mention whether or
not Denfeld's options were discussed with the Secretary prior to 13 October. But, given their frequent
meetings during the early part of October, it would have been very difficult for them to have avoided this
topic.
50°potter, Nimitz, p. 447.

156

Potter's account, although certainly putting the subject o f his book in a good light,
can not be substantiated in either the tone or substance of this characterization o f the
Secretary. It is true that Matthews met with the ex-CNO in New York to discuss the
removal o f Denfeld.501 But Nimitz was known to be friendly with Denfeld and had
worked with him for years. There is no reason to believe that the normally level-headed
Matthews would put himself in such an awkward and vulnerable position with Nimitz
unless there was another reason for the meeting. If he needed advice on how to fire
Admiral Denfeld, Secretary Johnson would have been a much more available and suitable
source. Jeffrey Barlow agrees that it is not plausible to suggest that Nimitz would have
needed to remind the lawyer Matthews o f Vinson's warning against reprisals.502
A more plausible reason for this meeting between the Navy's beleaguered
Secretary and retired Fleet Admiral Nimitz was the fact that Nimitz was reportedly one of
the few naval officers Truman trusted.503 Nimitz's statement during the hearings had been
calm and reasonable, and his proven abilities could certainly help Matthews restore order
in the service if he could be persuaded to follow Matthews' and Johnson's lead. It
certainly seems plausible that the President, in the 5 October meeting, may have suggested
bringing back the ex-CNO to restore order if Denfeld needed to be relieved following the
hearings. Matthews may have been on a mission to sound out Nimitz about this
possibility. In fact, Potter's book notes that Truman did call Nimitz and offer him the
CNO position after Denfeld's removal was announced.504 Francis Matthews may have

50 Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 1 3 - 1 5 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman
Library, and letter from Admiral Nimitz to Father Maurice Sheehy, 13 February 1950, cited in Barlow,
p. 364. In this letter, Nimitz reports that Matthews told him about his 4 October meeting with the CNO
and his decision to remove Denfeld based on the Bogan incident.
502Barlow, p. 364.
5°3potter, Burke, p. 327, and Nimitz. p. 420.
504Potter, Nimitz. p. 447.

157

been unfamiliar with the Navy, but he was far from the confused weakling portrayed by
Potter.
Secretary Johnson was certainly also deeply involved in the decision whether or
not to retain Denfeld as CNO. Paolo Coletta asserts that Denfeld's endorsement to the
Bogan letter had made Johnson so "furious" that he instructed Matthews to keep the CNO
in line or he would cancel Denfeld's reappointment. Coletta goes on to postulate that this
warning prompted the Navy Secretary to court Admiral Conolly and then Vice Admiral
Sherman as potential replacements during the hearings.505 General Eisenhower's papers
also attest to Johnson's anger at Denfeld's actions. A transcript of a telephone
conversation between Johnson and Eisenhower on 18 October 1949 records that Johnson
asked for Eisenhower's help in opposing Denfeld (Eisenhower was scheduled to testify on
20 October). Johnson declared that the CNO's testimony had been "an attack against the
President and civilian control and economy, [and that the admirals] have really gone below
the belt this time."506
Johnson's 24 October letter to the Service Secretaries lays out his initial plans for a
"constructive program" to enable the Department to "go forward promptly and speedily
with the strengthening o f our military team" following the hearings. He noted that "some
people have described the task we now face as one of'picking up the pieces.' I do not so
regard it."507 Johnson intended to carry on with business as usual by not altering his basic
plans while adjusting his tactics to accommodate the new lessons learned from the
hearings. These plans included promises that no reprisals would be made, that the

505Paolo Coletta, "Louis E. Denfeld," in Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., The Chiefs of Naval Operations.
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 201.
506Barlow, p. 255.
507Letter from Secretary Johnson to the Service Secretaries, 24 October 1949, in Louis A. Johnson,
Statements and Speeches of Louis A. Johnson. Secretary of Defense March 29. 1949 - September 12
1950. Vol. II, unpublished mimeograph, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian, Washington.
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Department should improve its overall relationship with Congress, and that the services
should adhere to the current distribution o f roles and missions. In other areas, he sated
that "my own views as to the steps we should take are by no means definitive as yet."508
But, concerning the future o f Admiral Denfeld, he already appears to have made his
decision.
Regardless o f his stated position on reprisals, it seems clear that Johnson had
already made up his mind to remove Denfeld by the end o f the hearings and was only
waiting for Congress to recess and the Presidential approval to be processed before
making the decision public. Robert Love and Jeffrey Barlow note that Drew Pearson's
diaries record a 20 October meeting with Johnson where the Secretary stated
"categorically that Denfeld will be kicked out and replaced by Forrest Sherman."509 This
private comment to a member o f the media was made even before the hearings were
completed. Truman's Naval Aide, Rear Admiral Dennison, felt that Matthews made the
"arbitrary" decision to remove the CNO "probably with the concurrence o f Johnson and
maybe more than concurrence."510 Given Johnson's aggressive character and record, and
the solid relationship between Matthews and the Secretary o f Defense, it is inconceivable
that Matthews made a unilateral decision to remove the CNO and that the Secretary o f
Defense had to be persuaded to take this course. Johnson's only concern was to avoid any
political opposition if he appeared to violate his pledge against reprisals.
Secretaries Matthews and Johnson met with the President on Tuesday, 25 October
to present their recommendation regarding Admiral Denfeld's future as CNO. The
President later disclosed that the final decision to transfer Denfeld to other duties was

508Ibid.
509Barlow, p. 272, and Robert W. Love, Jr., History of the U. S. N aw . 1942-1991. (Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1992), p. 332.
510Dennison interview, p. 200.
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made at this meeting.511 The only thing left to do was to process the paperwork. The
chosen mechanism was to have Secretary Matthews send through Johnson to the
President a letter requesting Presidential approval to transfer the CNO. This procedure
placed the primary responsibility for the decision on Matthews rather than the politically
ambitious Johnson. It also allowed the Navy Secretary to document his rationale for the
transfer rather than letting the press and Congress draw the obvious conclusion that the
action was a reprisal. The three officials understood that the decision would be seen as a
reprisal regardless o f their stated rationale, so Johnson called Senator Tydings, the
Chairman o f the Senate Armed Services Committee, to notify him o f the pending transfer
and to obtain his concurrence before announcing the decision. Meanwhile, Secretary
Matthews spent most of Wednesday, 26 October at home, presumably drafting his letter
to the President.512
Secretary Matthews' 27 October 1949 submission to the President was a carefully
crafted letter which never mentioned the CNO's testimony or any specific deficiencies as
causing his removal.513 It hinted that Denfeld was not fully supportive o f unification, but
never explained the details of his opposition. Matthews included a brief description o f the
4 October meeting with the CNO where he had "frankly stated to him that I feared his
usefulness as Chief o f Naval Operations had terminated." It also noted for the record that
"the possibility o f Admiral Denfeld's replacement" had been discussed with the President
and the Secretary o f Defense on 5 October.514 Once again, no details of this discussion
are provided.

511Omaha World Herald. 28 October 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File
"Matthews."
512Barlow, p. 274.
513Copies of Matthews' request and Truman's response are attached as Appendix III.
514Letter from Secretary Matthews to President Truman, 27 October 1949, p. 2, in the Matthews Papers,
File "Denfeld," Truman Libraiy.
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While this scenario could serve to deflect any criticism that the firing was a reprisal
for Denfeld's testimony, it does not explain why the President and the leaders o f the
Defense Department permitted Denfeld to testify. The Congressional hearings were

receiving extensive press coverage, and any statement by the CNO was sure to make
headlines. If Matthews felt that Denfeld understood "his usefulness as CNO had
terminated" there was no reason for him to expect the Admiral's testimony to support the
Administration's position. Certainly, when Denfeld did not discuss his statement with
Matthews in advance, the Secretary must have suspected that the CNO was going to
oppose his position. Although it seems illogical that Denfeld was permitted to testify as a
"lame duck," this anomaly was never addressed by the Secretary. The most likely
explanation for this inconsistency is that the final firing decision had not yet been made,
due either to Matthews' or Truman's desire to see how the hearings played out.
Ignoring this question, the Navy Secretary continued his letter to the President.
He explained his rationale for renominating the Admiral for a second term, citing the
expected benefit o f "continuity" as one o f the most significant reasons for his decision. He
also described his "harmonious relationship" with the CNO at the time o f the
renomination, and his belief that they "were in complete agreement on all important
questions" affecting the Department.515 But, after making this recommendation,
Matthews soon found that his "expectations would not be realized." Relations between
the two men were described as becoming "increasingly difficult." The Secretary then
hinted that the Admiral did not have sufficient "loyalty" and "respect for authority" to
continue in his present assignment. This situation forced Matthews to conclude that it was
"utterly impossible . . . to administer the Department of the Navy in the manner 1 believe
vital to national security." As the clinching argument, the Secretary explained his
515Ibid.
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commitment to "civilian control over the military establishment" and requested the
"transfer o f Admiral Denfeld to other important duties" for the good o f the country.516
Matthews' letter did not directly accuse the CNO of any mismanagement or direct
opposition, it only highlighted an unacceptable situation and proposed his prompt removal.
President Truman's response was direct and concise. He noted that he had
"devoted considerable thought" to the Navy's problems "over a long period of time." And
concluded that "the action which you recommend meets with my approval." He
authorized Matthews to "carry out the transfer which you recommend."517 Truman's
response does not even mention Admiral Denfeld by name or position, seemingly ignoring
the man behind the situation. Despite the four pages o f correspondence which effected
Denfeld's removal, nowhere is the reason for his dismissal clearly stated.
The 4 p.m. presidential news conference of 27 October contained only one agenda
item. President Truman announced he had received and approved a request from
Secretary Matthews asking that he transfer Admiral Denfeld to other duties.518 The
reason for the transfer was announced as the Admiral's endorsement o f the Bogan letter
and "other unspecified acts o f disloyalty," specifically omitting the Admiral's testimony
before the House. One of the first questions asked of Truman was whether or not Admiral
Sherman would be Denfeld's replacement. The President declined to answer this query,
but later stated that he had not yet decided whom he wanted to appoint. Another reporter
asked if Admiral Denfeld had been informed o f the President's decision to transfer him.
This time, Truman responded, "I suppose so," prompting another correspondent to ask if

516Ibid., pp. 2 - 3.
517Letter from President Truman to Secretary Matthews, 27 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
518Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. 1949. (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 531 -35 provides a transcript of the entire conference
including the letter from Secretary Matthews and Truman's response.
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the President himself had told Denfeld. Truman replied that he "had no conversation with
anybody but the Secretary o f the Navy" on the matter, later clarifying this by noting
Johnson had also been present.519 Despite their careful preparations, this one step had
slipped through the cracks of Matthews' and Johnson's plans. Adding to the apparent
callousness o f the removal was the fact that, until 1949, October 27th had been celebrated
as Navy Day. 27 October 1949 was certainly no holiday for the Navy.
Admiral Denfeld was in his Pentagon office when Truman made his announcement.
A startled Admiral Price came into Denfeld's office and informed him that his staff had
overheard a radio report o f the President's announcement removing him as CNO. This
unexpected news was quickly confirmed by a yeoman with a news ticker tear sheet.520
Admiral Griffin stated that Denfeld "took it like a man but he was, no question about it,
hurt that the President had seen fit to fire him without even calling him and telling him in
person."521 The CNO had not met with Secretary Matthews since the morning o f
Tuesday, 25 October and had not been given the courtesy of even a telephone call to
prepare him for the President's announcement.522 Rear Admiral Dennison, who
considered the CNO an "old and dear friend" asked Truman if it would be acceptable for
him, as the President's Aide, to visit Denfeld at his home the night o f his removal. Truman
had no objection, so Dennison spent the evening with the Denfelds, noting that the
Admiral "wasn't resentful. I think he was really relieved because of the intolerable
situation he'd been in . . ,"523
519Ibid.
520Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 14. Admiral Griffin's account of this episode states that Denfeld,
Griffin and Admiral Ingersoll (DCNO for Operations and Plans) were in a meeting when Rear Admiral
Dennison called to notify the CNO about the announcement. (Griffin interview, p. 191.) I have used
Denfeld's scenario, since he should have the most reliable memories of this event.
521 Griffin interview, p. 191.
522Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 24 - 28 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman
Library.
523Dennison interview, pp. 141, 201 - 02.
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Later, when Secretary Matthews found out that Dennison had visited the fired
CNO, he was furious at him for having done so. Dennison reported that Matthews "could
hardly speak," but did say, "That's the most disloyal act that I can possibly imagine. Here
an officer's been fired and you go up to see him." As soon as Dennison told Matthews
that President Truman had given advance approval o f this visit, "the Secretary's face fell a
mile."524 This incident well illustrates the character and competence o f Francis Matthews.
He was a brilliant lawyer and administrator, and covered all the contingencies in his
decision to replace Admiral Denfeld except the one action o f common, human decency
that would have been the first concern o f any experienced leader.
To ensure its smooth operation, the Navy needed managers to direct its day-to-day
activities and administration, and leaders to inspire the institution with vision, commitment
and a sense o f purpose.525 Matthews was a manager o f the Navy, not its leader. He was
not inconsiderate, only inexperienced in leading and motivating people. Denfeld, who had
finally assumed a true leadership position following his Congressional testimony, was now
able to rally the Navy as a courageous leader wronged by impersonal government
bureaucrats.
Matthews called Admiral Denfeld to his office at 10 a.m. on 28 October to discuss
his removal from office. This meeting was tense and uncomfortable and lasted for only
nineteen minutes.526 Admiral Denfeld later described Secretary Matthews as being "cold"
with "no pretense o f politeness or remorse."527 The businessman Secretary treated this
decision like a corporate transaction, not like the end o f a patriotic career. Matthews

524Ibid., p. 202.
525A good, concise differentiation between managers and leaders can be found in Christopher H. Johnson,
Captain, USN, (Ret), "Where's the Chief?," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. February 1995, pp. 64 - 66.
526Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 28 October 1949, in the Matthews Papers, Truman
Library.
527Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 14.

164

recalled that "we had a satisfactory talk, and parted as good mutual friends." He went on
to state that "there is nothing personal in what I have done. It is a matter o f policy and
principle. I have no ill-will toward anyone in the Navy and I am not going to entertain any
such thoughts."528 The trouble was that this should have been treated as more o f a
personal matter. Denfeld felt "particularly bitter" about the manner in which he received
word o f Matthews' decision.529 This incident only heightened the tensions between
Denfeld and Matthews resulting from the CNO's removal.
Matthews stated that he did not inform the CNO of the President's impending
announcement because he did not know whether or not the Defense Secretary and the
President would approve his request and, if they did not, he did not wish to have already
hurt the Admiral's feelings.530 Prematurely informing the CNO o f his impending removal
also would have damaged Matthews' authority if Johnson or Truman had overruled the
Secretary. While it seems highly unlikely that either Johnson or Truman would have
rejected the request, especially after having concurred in this decision at their 25 October
meeting, the potential cost o f informing the CNO that he was to be removed, then having
the President keep him on, would have destroyed the Secretary's ability to function in his
position.
Historians have consistently objected to Matthews' failure to inform the CNO of
Truman's planned statement. Coletta claims that the firing o f the Admiral "was made in an
utterly gross manner."531 Even Jeffrey Barlow describes as "pitiful" Matthews' excuse for
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530Barlow, p. 365.
53Coletta, Paolo E. The United States N aw and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. (Newark, Delaware:
University of Delaware Press, 1981), p. 223.
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not informing Denfeld o f his firing before the President's announcement.532 Nevertheless,
when more "considerate actions" were taken in a very similar situation in 1994, the result
was even more damaging to the Defense Department. Shortly after taking office, new
Navy Secretary Dalton announced that he had recommended the removal o f his CNO,
Admiral Kelso, for poor leadership during the Tailhook scandal. When the Secretary o f
Defense rejected Dalton's request, both Kelso's and Dalton's effectiveness had been
seriously degraded. The astute lawyer Matthews may have actually considered this
possibility and opted to hurt Denfeld rather than risk other embarrassments. But no
matter what Matthews' concerns were, he could have clearly communicated the fact that
Denfeld's removal was a real possibility. This was not done and the opportunity to
forewarn Denfeld was lost. Admiral Denfeld was forced to pay the price for the
President's haste to make his announcement and Matthews' and Johnson's failure to act
with any sense o f common courtesy.
Matthews' letter had not recommended firing the CNO, but instead, transferring
him to other important duties. The Navy Secretary saw this as an important distinction
and often criticized reporters who described his action as a "firing."533 A transfer was
certainly less susceptible to being seen as a reprisal, and Secretary Matthews still
reportedly held the Admiral in great esteem. After meeting with Denfeld on the morning
o f 28 October, the Secretary announced that he was trying to arrange a new assignment
for the CNO "where he could complete his outstanding Navy career with distinction."534
Regardless o f the new position, Denfeld would have to accept a cut in pay as well as loss
o f face, since his position as CNO included a tax-free expense account o f four to five
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thousand dollars and handsome living quarters.535 He would also lose his status as the
senior officer in the Navy to his relief.
The new position Matthews offered Denfeld turned out to be Admiral Conolly's
job in London as Commander in Chief o f the Navy’s forces in the North Eastern Atlantic
and Mediterranean. Conolly had been in this billet for three years and was due to be
transferred. Admiral Denfeld was not sure if he wanted to accept this new position or
even to remain in the service because he was eligible to retire at any time. He therefore
asked the Secretary to give him sixty days o f leave to allow him to think the possibilities
over. Matthews agreed and the meeting broke up. Although Matthews insisted he did not
"fire" the CNO, this semantics argument was weak. He had removed the Admiral from his
current position and was prepared to shift him to one o f lower pay, status, and
importance. In this writer's view, the Secretary's action clearly meets the criteria to be
termed a firing.
The immediate reaction to Denfeld's firing was highly emotional. The Omaha
World Herald recorded that "two admirals wept openly when they visited Admiral Denfeld
to express sympathies."536 In the afternoon o f the 28th, "a demonstrating crowd o f 250
Navy enlisted men" packed the CNO's office to offer their condolences. Their spokesman
told Denfeld, "Admiral, when you are President we hope you will put the Navy back on its
feet."537 On Saturday the 29th, Matthews and Denfeld had been scheduled to attend the
Navy - Notre Dame football game in Baltimore. Denfeld appeared and received a
"standing ovation from the Midshipmen that lasted fully three minutes." Matthews

535"New Leader Being Sought by Matthews," Omaha World Herald. 29 October 1949, in the Douglas
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167

canceled his appearance just before kickoff.538 Denfeld was accompanied to the game by
Father Maurice Sheehy o f Catholic University, well known as a friend of both the CNO
and the Navy Secretary.
Sheehy knew all the key players in this incident and had strong ties o f personal
friendship to Louis Denfeld. His bond to Matthews was also strong, given both men's
commitment to the Navy and the Catholic Church. The three had shared dinner as
recently as 2 October 1949. Regardless o f his feelings o f friendship for both men, Sheehy
quickly lashed out at Matthews for his action. In a hastily scheduled 27 October news
conference, the Catholic leader declared that those responsible for the removal of Admiral
Denfeld "have committed a heinous crime against their country and against national
security." He went on to term 27 October 1949 "another day o f infamy."539 Sheehy sent
five telegrams to Matthews between 27 October and 2 November urging him to either
reconcile with the CNO or resign. Finally, after receiving no response, he concluded his
efforts on 2 November and telegrammed the Secretary, "May God forgive you."540
Admiral Denfeld was still serving as CNO during these first few days following
Truman's announcement pending the identification of his relief The Admiral was deeply
hurt, but had decided that he had no regrets. He wrote to Captain C. W. Wilkins on 31
October that
you probably know as well as anyone what a terrific time we were having in
the JCS. Finally, I just had to make it an issue. Result - 1 am no longer CNO!
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I am very proud o f what I did and at least can look myself straight in the eye
for the balance o f my life.541
Matthews issued orders to his CNO on 1 November detaching him from his
position following the announcement that President Truman had nominated Vice Admiral
Forrest Sherman to be the new Chief o f Naval Operations. Quite in keeping with recent
Defense Department operating procedures, Denfeld first learned o f this nomination from
his driver who had heard about it on a radio newscast. Denfeld’s orders o f 1 November
directed him upon their receipt to "stand relieved o f your duties as Chief o f Naval
Operations. You will report to the Secretary o f the Navy for duty pending further
assignment." A more specific set o f orders was delivered to him on 3 November,
authorizing his requested sixty days of leave to begin on 10 November and directing him
to report to the Commandant o f the First Naval District in Boston for duty upon the
completion o f his leave period.542 The Secretary attached a personal endorsement to the
second set, specifically granting Denfeld the authority "to continue to bear the title and
wear the uniform o f an Admiral, U. S. Navy."543 This permission was not given lightly.
Most senior officers who are relieved for cause are reduced in rank or immediately retired
because the number o f officers authorized to hold Admiral's rank in the Navy is limited by
Congress. Since Denfeld retained his four stars, the Navy was unable to promote another
officer. With this small token of appreciation, Louis Denfeld left the Pentagon to ponder
his future.

541Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Captain C. W. Wilkins, the Commanding Officer of the U. S. S.
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542Military Change of Duty Orders, from Secretary Matthews to Admiral Denfeld, 1 November and 3
November 1949, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
543Memorandum from Secretary Matthews to Admiral Denfeld, 3 November 1949, in the Matthews
Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
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THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRING

"I am unimportant, but what happened to me, and the manner o f its
happening, are of the greatest moment to the nation." (1950 - Admiral
Denfeld)544
"Admiral Denfeld has been made to walk the plank for having testified before
the Armed Services Committee." (28 October 1949 - Congressman
Vinson)545
The removal o f Admiral Denfeld did not end the problems o f unification or help
the leadership o f the Defense Department settle on a effective and affordable national
security strategy. The root issues remained. The services still could not agree on the
nature o f future warfare, and defense budgets continued to be sparse. Denfeld had not
been the cause o f the Department's difficulties, he had been only one man trying to do the
best he could for his service and his country under adverse circumstances. His removal
had sent a clear message to all senior officers that to disagree with Secretary Johnson's
policies in public was, in effect, a resignation. Congress also reached this conclusion and
challenged the policies o f the Department as threatening the ability o f Congress to
properly carry out its constitutional function to raise and organize armies and navies.
Although Johnson had ended the "Revolt o f the Admirals" with his firing o f Louis
Denfeld, the dust was far from settled.
Denfeld's removal as Chief o f Naval Operations unified the Navy as few other
events or individuals could have done. When the crowd o f enlisted well-wishers visited
the CNO's office on 28 October, Denfeld "faltered with emotion" and told the crowd that
this demonstration o f support was "the most wonderful thing that has happened to me in
all my years in the Navy."546 Dynamic leadership for constructive purposes had proven
544Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 13.
545Press statement by Congressman Carl Vinson, 28 October 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 9, File
"Correspondence - V," Naval Historical Center.
546"Denfeld Offered New Navy Post," Washington Star, 28 October 1949, p. 1.
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successful in unifying the Navy behind the CNO where two years o f conciliatory behavior
and compromises had failed. The departing CNO's response to his supporters was to urge
them to continue the fight to save the Navy and ensure national security. "The Navy is
bigger than any individual, bigger than me, bigger than anyone in government, but only as
big as all o f us together. In order to keep it that way, the thing to do is go back to your
jobs and do the best you can."547 Nevertheless, Navy spirits sagged. The following "New
Prayer for the Navy in 1949 A.D. (After Denfeld)" was circulated in the Navy's offices:
Our Father, who art in Washington
Truman be thy name
Thy Navy's done . . . The Air Force won
On the Atlantic as on the Pacific
Give us this day our appropriations
And forgive us our accusations
As we forgive our accusers
And lead us not into temptation, but
Deliver us from Matthews and Johnson
For thine is the power, O B-36
The Air Force forever and ever,
Airmen.548
Although like his service, Louis Denfeld was "considerably crushed" at his
removal, according to Hanson W. Baldwin o f the New York Times, he "emerged from it
more o f a hero than he had been as Chief o f Naval Operations."549 Just as Secretary
Sullivan had seen his popularity skyrocket when he resigned in protest over the
cancellation o f the flush-deck carrier, so Denfeld found he was more recognized and
sought after than he had ever been before. Given his political interests and his connections
on Capitol Hill, it was inevitable that he would be tempted to try his hand at electoral
politics rather than continuing to labor at the beck and call o f civilians he was unable to
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effectively oppose. As the Admiral contemplated his future, the battles raged on in
Washington.
Secretary Matthews was under considerable pressure, but he was confident that he
was in control o f the situation. Many members o f Congress and the press echoed Father
Sheehy's outrage and called for Matthews' resignation. Matthews responded, "I'm
confident I'm the boss and when I'm not, the President will have to find a new Secretary
. . . . I haven't the slightest intention o f resigning."550 He continued to justify his actions
logically and dispassionately: "the prime reason for relieving Admiral Denfeld, in my
opinion, is that it was not possible for us to function harmoniously. It is necessary to get a
Chief o f Naval Operations who believes in unification."551
He had a valid need for a good relationship with the CNO and certainly had a
strong motivation to remove Denfeld. But his comments about unification were mere
window dressing. As has been discussed, "unification" meant, and continues to mean,
whatever a listener decides he wants it to mean. Denfeld had repeatedly testified that he
was in favor o f unification, yet Matthews' letter requesting his transfer contained several
veiled allegations that his opposition to unification was one o f the key causes o f his
problems with the Secretary.552 In fact, both Denfeld and Matthews favored closer
cooperation between the services. Only on the means o f implementing "unification" did
they disagree.
Despite Matthews' bravado and public confidence, the rumors persisted that he
was also on the way out. George Dixon o f the Omaha World Herald sent in a humorous
piece which captured the spirit o f the situation:

550Omaha World Herald. 31 October 1949, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File
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A Washington news photographer was sent to the Pentagon to get pictures o f
Admiral Denfeld gloomily packing out. Instead, the photographer ran into the
Navy's Secretary, and, misunderstanding his assignment, asked Matthews to
pose for some shots unhappily packing his bags after his firing. Matthews
complied with the request, probably wondering all the time what the
photographer knew that he didn't.553
Matthews tried to ignore the public controversy and concentrate on the selection o f
Admiral Denfeld's replacement.
Secretary Matthews had always wanted Forrest Sherman to replace Denfeld when
the appropriate time came to select a new CNO. Now all the Navy Secretary needed to
do was to convince Sherman to take the job, persuade Secretary Johnson and President
Truman to make the nomination, and then shepherd it through the angry Senate. In his 28
October meeting with Denfeld, Matthews requested that the CNO order Admiral Sherman
back to Washington to meet with the Secretary. Matthews had been unable to transmit
this message himself since Sherman was at sea and could not be reached except through
Navy communications circuits. It then became obvious to Denfeld that his fears about
Sherman's behavior during the hearings had been correct.554
The President decided to explore another option for Denfeld's successor. Retired
Fleet Admiral Nimitz had probably already received hints from Secretary Matthews about
Truman’s interest in recalling him to active duty to resume his place as CNO. When
Truman called him on Monday, 31 October 1949, Nimitz stated that "only an order from
[the President] would bring me to Washington as CNO."555 The retired Fleet Admiral had
already committed himself to a United Nations' diplomatic mission to Kashmir and felt that
he was too old for the Navy job. He recommended either Conolly or Sherman for CNO,
preferring Sherman since he was "younger and even less involved in politics."556 Although
553George Dixon, "Photographer's Error Starts 'Speculation,'" Omaha World Herald. 5 November 1949,
p.3, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
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this effort to return Nimitz to Washington failed, it did provide Matthews with an
unexpected supporter in the debates over Denfeld's firing. Nimitz wrote to Father Sheehy
that, at their 15 October meeting in New York, Matthews had told him the decision to
remove Denfeld had been made following the Bogan incident. This conversation
convinced the former-CNO that "I cannot accept the statement that Denfeld was removed
by Secretary Matthews as an act o f reprisal for the testimony which he gave."557
Speculation and recommendations about the new CNO came from all corners
during this week. Governor Adlai Stevenson o f Illinois wrote the President on 28 October
to inform him "many officers . . . seemed emphatically to prefer Admiral Blandy or
Admiral Radford to Admiral Sherman."558 Regardless o f the Navy's preferences, Sherman
was still the media's best bet to replace Denfeld. The Omaha World Herald even
mentioned the intriguing combination o f Admiral Nimitz returning as CNO with Sherman
as his second in command.559 Denfeld refused to comment on his preferences for a
successor.
Secretary Johnson had no favorite candidate but certainly wanted the new Navy
Chief to be someone who would be willing to work within Johnson's system. Many o f the
potential candidates had disqualified themselves due to their testimony during the
Congressional hearings. Blandy's and Conolly's statements had been harsher than
Denfeld's, and Radford certainly would be a poor choice to heal the wounds within the
Department. Deputy Secretary o f Defense Wilfred McNeil stated that Matthews sold
Johnson on Sherman as the officer who could bring the Navy into line. McNeil felt that
the decision to choose Sherman was Matthews' most consequential act as Secretary o f the
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Navy.560 Matthews was very happy with his new CNO. Admiral Sherman had previously
shown a willingness to work with the lawyer from Nebraska. He overcame the initial
resistance o f many naval officers who saw him an enemy, and quickly demonstrated his
proactive leadership style that built on the Navy's strengths and rapidly made
improvements in its morale.
Most defense insiders approved o f Sherman's selection. Army Lieutenant General
Gruenther, the Director of the Joint Staff, wrote General Eisenhower that he was
"extremely well pleased" with Admiral Sherman, describing the new CNO as "probably the
smartest U. S. planner living today."561 Newsmen Robert Allen and William Shannon
drew a perceptive comparison between the incoming and outgoing CNOs: "'Uncle Louie'
Denfeld was affectionately regarded by men who did not respect him as a commander;
Sherman is respected by many who will never love him."562 One notable dissenting voice
in this parade o f praise was Hanson W. Baldwin o f the New York Times. Maybe because
of his friendship with Admiral Denfeld, this correspondent saw another side o f Sherman:
"he was not as straight-forward as others that I knew. . . . I may be quite unfair to him in
saying that he was a manipulator, but he handled power like that."563 President Truman
approved Matthews' choice on 2 November. That same day Forrest Sherman was sworn
in as Denfeld's replacement for a four-year term.564 Senate confirmation would have to
wait until January when Congress returned to session.
The public outcry over the removal of Admiral Denfeld was loud and long.
President Truman's files contain innumerable letters and telegrams commenting on this
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removal, most o f which were strongly opposed to Matthews', Johnson's and the
President's actions.565 Included in this massive outpouring were messages from Senators
and Congressmen demanding to know what the Chief Executive intended to do to ensure
the freedom o f military officers to speak their mind in testimony before Congress without
fear o f reprisals. Many messages compared Admiral Denfeld to Army Air Corps General
Billy Mitchell as men who sacrificed their careers for what they believed were the defense
needs o f the Nation. Others charged that Johnson was establishing a "communist-type"
dictatorship in the Defense Department.566
Congressman Vinson captured the feelings o f many Americans when he issued the
following statement in response to the announcement o f Denfeld's transfer:
Admiral Denfeld has been made to walk the plank for having testified before
the Armed Services Committee that the Navy is not being consulted as to its
functions, that the Navy's roles and missions are being altered, that the Naval
Air Arm is being forced into a state o f weakness, and that the Navy is not
accepted in full partnership in the National Defense structure. For having
warned Congress and the country that such a state o f affairs in his opinion
exists in the Navy, he has been relieved of his high office. The security o f the
Nation demands that responsible military men at all times be free to give to the
Congress and the country the true state o f affairs as they see it in the Armed
Services even though their views run counter to those o f the civilian heads, and
in consequence of their having done so, there should be no reprisals. . . . The
Congress and the Committee cannot sit quietly by and permit reprisals against
witnesses who have testified before them.567
Although Matthews was certainly persuaded that his removal o f Denfeld had improved his
control over the Navy, the consequent public outcry forced the Secretary to devote much
o f the next three months to defending his action.
Other members o f Congress, dispersed across the country, also reacted
passionately to the firing o f Admiral Denfeld, but in an uncoordinated manner. Some joint
565Harry S. Truman Papers, Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
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statements were issued, but as Truman and Johnson had expected, their delay in removing
the Admiral until after Congress recessed certainly hindered the Legislative Branch's
ability to respond. Leslie Arends (R - 111.) appears to have been the first Representative to
react to the firing. He heard about it before the President's news conference and
immediately cabled Vinson to recommend an immediate recall o f the House Armed
Services Committee to address "this insult to Congress." He feared that "a campaign o f
terror" was being initiated in the Pentagon and wanted to exert Congressional pressure to
protect the witnesses.568
Senator Robert C. Hendrickson o f New Jersey telegrammed the President on 28
October to characterize Denfeld's removal as "shocking" and "reminiscent o f purges in
Russia and Nazi Germany."569 Congressman George Bates, a Republican from
Massachusetts, sent an angry telegram to Secretary Johnson on the evening o f Denfeld's
removal:
I consider [the] Denfeld removal distinct violation your pledge o f no reprisals.
Such action would have very serious repercussions in both Congressional and
Naval circles at time we are trying to find solution o f very complex problem.
Acting as conciliator you can make great contribution to these ends.570
Johnson chose to send an explanation o f his actions to Congressman Bates in response to
this telegram, and to release both pieces of correspondence to the press to head off any
other criticism. Quoting from his letter to the Service Secretaries on 24 October, the
Secretary o f Defense explained to Congressman Bates that a lack o f "necessary
qualifications" and not offensive testimony had caused Denfeld's removal.
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Four members o f the House Armed Services Committee; Sasscer (D-Md.), Hebert
(D-La.), Arends (R-Ill.), and Cole (R-N.Y.), issued a sharp statement on the firing on 29
October. Their blast charged that Johnson's justification for firing Denfeld due to his "lack
o f qualifications" took the "prize for outright quackery and injustice." Furthermore, they
asserted that any suggestion "that his removal is not a reprisal would be laughable were
the situation not so tragic. . . . Evasive and misleading excuses and specious arguments do
not cover up this reprisal."571 Committee Chairman Vinson issued a sharp condemnation
o f the firing, but decided not to act on the matter until January when tempers would have
cooled. Although this decision effectively sealed Admiral Denfeld's fate, Vinson probably
made a choice that well served the national defense.572 Any hasty actions could have
inflamed the conflict and made its settlement more difficult.
Congressman W. Sterling Cole sought information from senior Navy and Marine
Corps officers to support his view that the firing would effectively "gag" widespread
military dissent. He sent telegrams to all flag and general officers of the naval services:
"In strict confidence, please advise if you are in accord with views expressed by Admiral
Denfeld before Armed Services Committee."573 Matthews got wind o f this survey and
authorized his senior officers to reply, provided they sent the him a copy o f their response.
Even with this monitoring, 55% of the 308 officers who received Cole's telegram
responded to it. 16% o f those who responded stated they could not answer the question
due to Navy regulations. O f the rest, 82% supported Denfeld and the remainder gave
non-committal replies.574 When Congress returned to Washington in January 1950,
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Admiral Denfeld's removal, and the larger issue o f protecting witnesses from reprisals,
would receive great attention.
The reaction o f senior naval officers to the removal o f the CNO was
understandably bitter. Vice Admiral Felix Stump, the Commander o f the Atlantic Fleet's
Air Forces, wrote to Admiral Denfeld on 31 October to praise his testimony as
"courageous" and predicted that Denfeld would "go down in history as one who stood
courageously for what was right."575 On 4 November, retired Admiral Standley sent
Congressman Vinson a letter characterizing Matthews' action as a "crucifixion" o f Admiral
Denfeld.576 Admiral Radford considered the firing to be "punitive and cynical."577
Denfeld's patron, retired Fleet Admiral Leahy, wrote sadly to one o f his Naval Academy
classmates that "Denfeld is the only one who put up a rational defense for the Navy and he
is now being removed. . . . He will be replaced by a stooge. Things like that did not
happen in our day."578 Despite these sentiments, there was no cohesiveness to the
opposition to the Secretary's action, and most o f the "revolting admirals" muttered in the
background without taking any effective action. When reporters asked Vice Admiral
Bogan to comment on Denfeld's removal, he offered no opinion, stating only, "I learn
quickly."579
O f course, the Navy's foremost publicist, Rear Admiral Gallery, continued his
unofficial campaign to raise public awareness o f the Navy's predicament. His January
1950 Collier's article, "If This Be Treason - " attacked the firing and its implications. He
described the issue o f permitting military officers freedom o f expression before Congress
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as a matter "bigger . . . than the B-36 or even the fate of the Navy." Gallery saw Denfeld's
removal as a reprisal which would effectively gag all officers' future testimony. He went
on to charge that "while we are pouring billions into Europe to stop the Communist
advance abroad, we have seen fit to adopt their thought-control tactics in the United
States." Gallery characterized Johnson's claims that the firing was not a reprisal as
"pettifoggery."580 He helped raise public awareness o f the Navy's understanding o f
national defense and anger at Denfeld's removal, but could not change the fact that
Admiral Denfeld was no longer CNO.
The public was very interested in the struggle between the armed services and
responded vigorously to the firing o f the CNO. The President's and Navy Secretary's files
in the Truman Library contain thousands o f letters and telegrams commenting on the
decision. By a ratio o f about 50 to 1, they objected to Admiral Denfeld's removal.581
Winona Mensch o f Williamsport, Pennsylvania asserted that the "timing o f the dismissal
seems to have been cunningly planned - on what we all honor as Navy Day and at a time
when Congress was not in session. "582 Los Angeles' Katherine Calvin cabled that the
"firing is [a] deliberate crucifixion of [a] patriotic honest man."583 Harry Burkett of
Johnstown, Pennsylvania wrote Truman that "I never expected you to pull such a rotten,
low down trick as to fire Admiral Denfeld for speaking his mind in defense o f his
Navy."584 And Ruth Begley o f Honolulu chided the President, for having sacked "a man
just because he doesn't agree with you. That's not the American way to do things, that's

580Daniel V. Gallery, Rear Admiral USN, "If This Be Treason - Collier's. 21 January 1950, p. 14 - 16.
581Truman Papers, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," and Matthews Papers, Box 27, File "Denfeld
Correspondence," Truman Library.
582Letter from Winona Mensch to President Truman, 30 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers,
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
583Telegram from Katherine Calvin to President Truman, 28 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman
Papers, Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
584Letter from Harry Burkett to President Truman, 28 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers,
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
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Russia's way o f doing things."585 The majority o f the letters were not from Denfeld's
friends or acquaintances but from average Americans who were more concerned about
protecting democratic, representative Government than about the fate o f the Navy.
A typical submission in support o f Secretary Matthews' action shows the opposite
focus. "Your displacing o f Admiral Denfeld is applauded. Not only have his recent
utterances shown him to be in the wrong place, but his strangely sleepy, slouching
appearance long have marked him as not up to the high position o f Chief o f Naval
Operations."586 In this case, the letter's author, Walter Strong, reacted to the details o f the
situation rather than its broader implications and precedent.
Another peculiar undercurrent o f opinion in the debate on the firing of the CNO
involved religious rather than constitutional issues. Matthews' public image as a
prominent Catholic caused Christian Century magazine to charge that he was "turning the
U. S. Navy over to the Pope as a Catholic convert."587 Mrs. Paul Regalia of San
Francisco echoed this fear in her 28 October letter to the President, "I implore you, for the
good o f the country, do not replace Admiral Denfeld with a Catholic. One Catholic is
Enough!"588 The Secretary was a devout Roman Catholic, but there is no evidence that
his religious beliefs in any way influenced any of his decisions or his overall performance
as a member o f Truman's cabinet.
The press was much more evenly divided on the firing of Admiral Denfeld than
either the public or Congress. David Lawrence, a consistent Navy supporter, wrote that
Admiral Denfeld might become a "martyr to the cause of free government," and that "a
good case for impeachment" of Matthews and Johnson could be made. He contended that
585Letter from Ruth Begley to President Truman, 27 December 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers,
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
586Letter from Walter W. Strong to President Truman, 29 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers,
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
587H. W. Becker, "St. Pat Was His Patron Saint," Dundee (Omaha. Nebraska) Sun. 11 March 1976, p. 15A, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
588Letter from Mrs. Paul Regalia to President Truman, 28 October 1949, in the Harry S. Truman Papers,
Official Files, Box 1637, File "Naval Operations," Truman Library.
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civilian control was not at issue but only the ability o f military officers to express their
views freely to Congress.589 The San Francisco Chronicle added that "the public has more
reason to be impressed with Admiral Denfeld's judgment than with that o f Matthews."590
The editors o f the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Honolulu Advertiser also opposed the
firing o f the Admiral. The former stated that "there is nothing that can excuse the ruthless
manner in which President Truman 'fired' Admiral Denfeld," and that "laying a whip over
the shoulders o f able officers and gagging them into terrorized silence" is no way to
achieve true unification.591 The Hawaiian daily concluded that "for expressing his honest
opinion, born o f experience and a sense o f duty to his service and his nation, Admiral
Denfeld has been publicly fired."592
Attempts to maintain journalistic objectivity were few. The Army and Navy
Journal, whose readership was obviously divided over this issue, reported that Secretary
Matthews had not mentioned Denfeld's testimony in his letter to the President. But it
went on to assert that "it was obvious" Denfeld's statements before the Armed Services
Committee "relative to the administration o f the Unification Act were those to which the
Secretary took such vigorous exception."593 The Naval Academy's alumni magazine,
Shipmate, observed that "the management of the military establishment is entirely
political," and excused some o f the confusion within the Navy and the inter-service
misunderstanding by stating that the uniformed leaders' "lips have been sealed by orders
. . . or by the need to protect naval secrets."594 Nevertheless, the article advocated a more
vocal Navy campaign to get the sea services' message across.

589David Lawrence, "Contempt of Congress," U. S. News and World Report. 4 November 1949, p. 34.
590"Denfeld Ouster Outrageous," San Francisco Chronicle. 29 October 1949, p. 10.
591Philadelphia Inquirer, quoted in "House Committee Members Angered at Denfeld Relief," Army and
N a w Journal. 5 November 1949, p. 250.
592"The Ouster of Admiral Denfeld," Honolulu Advertiser. 29 October 1949, p. 6.
593"Adm. Denfeld Loses Post in Service Row," Army and N aw Journal. 29 October 1949, p. 236.
594"The Navy on Capitol Hill," Shipmate. November 1949, p. 2.

182

The Alsop brothers and Drew Pearson o f the Washington Post came out strongly
in favor o f Secretary Matthews' stand against the rebellious admirals. Pearson compared
him to W oodrow Wilson's Navy Secretary, Josephus Daniels, who banned alcohol from all
naval vessels, as a civilian leader who could stand up to the Navy's "brass."595 The Alsop
brothers, while recognizing Denfeld's dilemma o f trying to please both his aviators and the
Secretary, praised Matthews for his "courage and conviction" in taking an action both
logical and essential to continued civilian control o f the Armed Forces.596 From Britain,
the London Economist asked: "What faith can the United States have in Chiefs o f Staff
who behave like children? What faith can the powers who signed the North Atlantic
Treaty have when their strongest partner shows much internal weakness?"597
Probably the most perspicacious comment on the affair came in Cedric Worth's
Mutual Radio broadcast o f 28 October 1949. Worth was a friend o f Secretary Matthews
and had spoken with the Navy Secretary several times during the day following the
President's announcement. According to a transcript o f a 28 October conversation
between Matthews and Worth, the Secretary informed the broadcaster that there were
some sensitive matters relative to Denfeld's removal which he could not discuss.
Matthews asserted that his decision to transfer the CNO had been made on 4 October, but
told Worth that "I can't tell you why that is because I won't talk about that even on the
phone."598 Based on the Secretary's later statements, the unspoken reasons centered
around Denfeld's signing of the blank endorsement to Admiral Bogan's letter. Worth
understood the Secretary's reasoning if not the specifics, and stated that "there is a great
595Drew Pearson, "Civilian Control Essential," Washington Post. 31 October 1949. Matthews liked this
comparison, later borrowing it for use in a 7 November interview with the Washington Star. (Martin S.
Hayden, "'Revolt' is Over, Matthews Says in Revealing Role in Navy Fight," Washington Star. 8
November 1949, p. 1.)
596Joseph Alsop and Stewart Alsop, "The Denfeld Story," Washington Post. 31 October 1949.
597"State of the Unification," London Economist. 22 October 1949, quoted in Phillip S. Meilinger,
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today," Parameters. September
1989, p. 94.
598Transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary Matthews and Cedric Worth, 28 October 1949,
in the Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, Matthews Papers, Truman Library.
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deal more to the controversy in Washington than has been revealed on the air or in the
press, and there is a great deal which will never be revealed because it is locked in the
hearts o f men."599
Admiral Denfeld's opinion o f his removal was one aspect o f the controversy which
was unclear at this juncture. He avoided making any statements and only expressed his
feelings privately to friends. He planned to maintain a low profile during his sixty days o f
leave by making some repairs to his home in Massachusetts and possibly spending some
time at Miami Beach.600 Captain Karig, his public relations officer, told the media on 29
October that he thought Admiral Denfeld would probably retire rather than accept a
"lesser post," but this was by no means a foregone conclusion.601 Denfeld wrote to retired
Admiral Stark that "my conscience is clear and each morning I can look myself in the face
while I shave, which I am quite sure many others we know cannot do."602 He later told
Admiral Staton that "it is my fervent hope that the issue will be kept alive until the
reconvening o f Congress and at least clarified to such an extent that other members o f the
Armed Forces will feel free to appear before the elected representatives o f the people
without fear o f reprisal."603 The Admiral understood that he was not in a position to
demand an inquiry and did not want to follow Captain Crommelin's example. He planned
to wait for public opinion and Congressional discontent to provide him with an
opportunity to challenge his removal.

599Transcript of Cedric Foster's 28 October 1949 radio broadcast in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld,"
Truman Library.
600Letters from Admiral Denfeld to Captain P. D. Stroop, 22 November 1949 and W. L. Tabb, Jr., 21
November 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box 9, Files "Correspondence - S," and "Correspondence - T,"
Naval Historical Center.
601 "Storm Bursts Over Firing for Denfeld," Omaha World Herald. 29 October 1949, in the Douglas
County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
602Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Admiral Harold Stark, 17 November 1949, in the Denfeld Papers, Box
9, File "Correspondence - S," Naval Historical Center.
603Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Admiral Adolphus Staton, 28 November 1949, in the Denfeld Papers,
Box 9, File "Correspondence - S," Naval Historical Center.
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Admiral Denfeld was not the only participant in the "revolt" to suffer the wrath o f
the Navy Department. In November Captain Burke's OP-23 office was closed down by
the Navy's Inspector General for two days at Secretary Matthews' direction. This allowed
the Department to search the organization's files for any evidence tying OP-23 to Captain
Crommelin's disclosures or other breeches o f security. Burke himself narrowly escaped
Matthews' anger to continue his career to an eventual term as CNO.604 The investigation
o f OP-23 found no incriminating evidence, and both Matthews and Burke downplayed its
significance. Nevertheless, one o f Admiral Sherman's first acts as CNO was to disband
this organization, stating that "its functions had been completed."605
Vice Admiral Bogan had also clearly lost Secretary Matthews' support. In 1949,
Bogan's memorandum had precipitated the split between the Secretary and the CNO and
had irretrievably connected his name with the Navy "rebellion." Shortly after Denfeld's
removal, Bogan heard through the press that he was going to be issued orders to report as
Commanding Officer o f the Atlantic Fleet Air Command in Pensacola. This two-star billet
was significantly junior to his current three-star fleet command. Bogan asked to retire
rather than accept this demotion. Under normal circumstances, his retirement would have
been accompanied by a ceremonial promotion to four-star Admiral, but Secretary
Matthews is reputed to have personally canceled this promotion.606 Denfeld later wrote
that "I never let such a thing occur when I was Chief o f Naval Personnel."607
Admiral Blandy, passed over twice for CNO, had also had enough, and elected to
retire effective 1 February 1950. Denfeld, although never especially close to Blandy, felt

604The details of this attempt are outside the scope of this study, but can be found in Potter, Burke, pp.
326 - 28, and Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers," p. 548.
605"OP-23 Disbanded," Army and N aw Journal. 5 November 1949, p. 251, and Harold B. Hinton,
"Sherman Puts End to 'Operation 23'," New York Times. 4 November 1949, p. 1.
606Edward P. Stafford, Commander USN (Ret.), "Saving Carrier Aviation - 1949 Style," U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings. January 1990, p. 50.
607Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 15.
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that the callous firing o f the CNO influenced Blandy's decision to end his naval career.608
Vice Admiral Price, Denfeld's Vice Chief o f Naval Operations, was transferred to another
lower-ranking position shortly after Admiral Sherman's arrival, but this was not unusual.
Typically an aviator was chosen as VCNO when a non-aviator was CNO. Now that the
airman Sherman held the Navy's top spot, Price needed to be moved to retain this balance.
Nevertheless, some saw Price's transfer as another reprisal against the officers who had led
the Navy's "revolt."
On several occasions during November, Denfeld discussed his own proposed
transfer to Conolly's European position with Secretary Matthews, but did not decide
whether or not to accept it until 10 December.609 On that date, he informed the Secretary
that he intended to decline the European post because he felt he would be unable to obtain
"the necessary respect and confidence" from allied governments. Denfeld based his
concern on the Secretary's veiled allegations in his letter to the President that Denfeld
lacked "loyalty and respect for authority." He also feared that his opinions on allied
planning would either be discounted or would "reopen the recent controversy to the
embarrassment of my colleagues, my superiors and our government."610 Denfeld had been
the champion o f a conventional response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Since the
proponents of the "atomic blitz" had seemingly prevailed in the recent hearings, placing
Denfeld in another position where he would be forced to either repudiate his convictions
or openly oppose his civilian superiors did not seem to be in the Nation's best interests.
Matthews believed that Denfeld had made a bad decision, but accepted it and let
the Admiral return to Massachusetts to complete his leave.611 The press agreed with the
608Ibid. The correspondence relative to Admiral Blandy's retirement can be found in the Truman Papers,
Official Files, Box 1285c, File "Department of the Navy - 1950," Truman Library.
609Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, 28 October - 10 December 1949, Matthews Papers,
Truman Library.
610Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Secretary Matthews, 14 December 1949, in the Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
61 transcript of Secretary Matthews' interview on "Meet the Press," 28 January 1950, in the Matthews
Papers, File "Speeches," Truman Library.
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Secretary. The Washington Post's 21 December editorial described Denfeld's action as
one o f "picayunishness," based on "pouting."612 The Milwaukee Journal similarly asserted
that Denfeld's "bitterness" determined his decision and that his conduct was characterized
by a "pettiness and peevishness that is beneath him."613 Now that the initial shock of
Denfeld's firing had worn off and the Admiral seemed to be placing personal concerns over
national interests, popular support for his position seemed to diminish.
His refusal to take Conolly's position did not force Denfeld into retirement.
Previously, the Secretary had offered to consider the ex-CNO "for any other four-star job
in the Navy."614 Denfeld wrote to Matthews that he would "be glad, o f course, to serve in
any assignment that you may choose in which the handicaps imposed by recent events will
not be present. "615 But at the time, the Secretary had nothing else to offer Denfeld.
Matthews later stated that upon adjournment o f the 10 December meeting, Denfeld had
told the Secretary that if he had been in Matthews' place, he would have done the same
thing (removed the CNO). This amiable parting was consistent with Matthews' other
statements that the two Navy leaders retained a cordial relationship even after Denfeld's
transfer. But Denfeld objected to this account, informing Senator Knowland that "I don't
recall ever having said t h a t . . . . I was not in a mood that would have given rise to such a
statement."616 The differences between Matthews' and Denfeld's views on this situation
were hardening, just in time for Congress to return from its recess and begin to look into
the matter.
Secretary Johnson certainly believed himself to be totally in control o f the
Department following his triumph in the Congressional hearings. Although he knew that

612,'Denfeld's Refusal,'' Washington Post. 21 December 1949.
613J. D. Ferguson, "Admiral Denfeld Hurts Himself," Milwaukee Journal, 21 December 1949.
614Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 14.
615Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Secretary Matthews, 14 December 1949, in the Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
616Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, p. 8, in the Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
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members o f Congress would demand an investigation o f the removal o f the CNO, he
believed that he could defend his decisions and had the President's support. In December
1949 he visited Admiral Conolly's headquarters in London and, according to the Admiral,
was very contemptuous o f Conolly and his service. Johnson was reported to have told a
crowd o f British and American naval officers, "we're going ahead and we're going to build
up the Air Force . . . . I'm a great friend o f the Air Force." Later in the visit Johnson
privately told Conolly, "Well Admiral, all I want to tell you is, you'd better keep your nose
clean."617 Shortly thereafter, Admiral Conolly was transferred to a "twilight tour" as
President o f the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Secretary Johnson seemed
fully to have consolidated his authority over the Department.

617Conolly interview, pp. 402 - 04.
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CONGRESS EXAMINES THE REMOVAL OF THE CNO

"The removal o f Admiral Denfeld was a reprisal against him for giving
testimony to the House Armed Services Committee. This act is a blow against
effective representative government. . . " (1950 - House Armed Services
Committee Report on the Hearings on Unification and Strategy)618
"I have waited in the hope that some Committee o f Congress would ask me. I
have been willing at all times to testify and have never had the slightest
objection to anything in connection with the whole matter being made public."
(1950 - Admiral Denfeld)619
Congress returned to Washington in early January 1950 to many unanswered
questions regarding the Navy's future and the firing o f the CNO. Congressman Vinson's
Committee was preparing its formal report on the unification and strategy hearings and
intended therein to address the Denfeld firing. While this report was being compiled, the
Senate's Armed Services Committee quickly took up Admiral Sherman's confirmation and
the accompanying investigation into the removal o f his predecessor.
Secretary Matthews and Admiral Sherman answered questions before Senator
Tydings' Committee on 12 January 1950. Their questions concentrated on Matthews' and
Sherman's views on the freedom o f naval officers to testify before Congress. Both
Matthews and Sherman stated that witnesses were always able to give their personal views
to Congress without fear o f punishment, yet "punishment" did not include transfers within
the service. They asserted that the Navy depended on loyalty and a unified chain o f
command. If an officer did not agree with his superior on an important principle, he
should be moved to another position.620 When Secretary Matthews was asked his opinion
o f Rear Admiral Gallery's recent accusations in Collier's about reprisals, the Secretary
618House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 56.
619Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, p. 10, in the Matthews Papers,
File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
620John G. Norris, "Senate Unit Indorses Sherman: Denfeld Ouster Probe Dropped," Washington Post.
13 January 1950, p. 1.
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restated his belief that moving an officer out o f the chain of command did not "constitute a
'reprisal' or 'punishment.'"621 He also claimed that he "could not have administered the
Navy with Admiral Denfeld as Chief o f Naval Operations."622
The new Navy team was convincing. Admiral Sherman impressed the Senators,
and Matthews' explanation o f his views about Congressional testimony seemed to quiet
some o f his critics. John Norris' 13 January 1950 article in the Washington Post stated
that, following the Secretary's presentation, both Tydings and Vinson had decided that no
formal investigation into the Denfeld ouster would be necessary.623 Admiral Denfeld
recognized that the Congressional "day in court" he had hoped for was slipping away. He
wrote to his friend Davis Merwyn,
He [Matthews] is cleverly trying to lay stress on the Crommelin matter and the
Bogan letter to put up a smoke screen so that it will look as though he fired me
for those two incidents, before my testimony before the Committee, but you
and I know that our relations were most cordial up to the time I made my
statement and that is the reason I was replaced.624
Republican members o f the Senate Armed Services Committee continued to call for an
official investigation of the firing, but Senator Tydings was able to override their
objections and get Sherman's confirmation to the Senate floor by 13 January.
It is often said that among the best ways to judge a man is to identify his enemies.
Under that criteria, Secretary Matthews received a fine compliment when the then-obscure
Senator Joseph McCarthy rose on the Senate floor to challenge the Navy Secretary's
actions. The Senator from Wisconsin did not object to Admiral Sherman, but desired to

621Ibid., p. 12.
622Omaha World Herald. 13 January 1950, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File
"Matthews." Another good account of this hearing can be found in "Sherman Wins," New York Herald
Tribune, 13 January 1950, pp. Iff.
623John G. Norris, "Senate Unit Indorses Sherman: Denfeld Ouster Probe Dropped," Washington Post.
13 January 1950, p. 1.
624Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Davis Merwyn, 13 February 1950, in the Radford Papers, Naval
Historical Center, quoted in Barlow, p. 365.

190

discuss the '"viciously dangerous' situation o f lowering an 'iron curtain' between Congress
and the Armed Services."625 Using tactics which he would later make infamous, the
Senator dramatically questioned the integrity o f Secretary Matthews rather than dealing
with the pertinent facts o f the case.
Matthews testified before the Armed Services Committee on 12 January that
Admiral Denfeld had not been given his commission for his second term even though the
Senate had confirmed his nomination. Since his commission had not been delivered, a
vacancy in the CNO position had existed since 15 December. Because Denfeld had
vacated the office, Sherman had a clear title and could be confirmed using standard
procedures.626 Both Matthews and the Committee saw this issue as a mere technicality
and moved on to other matters. But Senator McCarthy latched onto this point like a
bulldog.
Somehow the Wisconsin Senator had obtained a photostatic copy o f Denfeld's
signed commission for a second term, and he waved it like a flag while he charged the
Navy's Secretary with providing incorrect testimony to the Senate. McCarthy asserted
that the commission raised the question of whether a vacancy did exist in the CNO's
office, and "whether the Secretary of the Navy is a man who is incompetent or just plain
untruthful."627 Addressing the vacancy issue, the Senator pointed to a 1935 Supreme
Court decision where the Court ruled the President did not have the authority to fire a
public official merely because his views differed from those o f his superiors.628 McCarthy
had done his homework so well that Senator Tydings was unable to respond to this charge
without additional study.

625John G. Norris, "Senate Unit Indorses Sherman: Denfeld Ouster Probe Dropped," Washington Post.
13 January 1950, p. 12.
626Memorandum from Secretary Matthews to Senator Tydings, 23 January 1950, in the Matthews Papers,
File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
627Senator McCarthy's statement is reprinted in "Denfeld Commission for 2d Tour Revealed," Army and
N aw Journal. 21 January 1950, p. 554.
628This decision is "Humphrey's Executory. U. S.," 27 May 1935.
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Senator McCarthy's tactics disturbed Denfeld, who had no intent to ruin Matthews
or to get his position back. After the events o f the last several months, he recognized that
he would be unable to effectively run the Navy as CNO. To guide the Senate's attention
back to the issue o f free testimony, Louis Denfeld announced that he was requesting
retirement effective 1 March 1950 "in order to remove any legal technicalities."629 He
announced that "it has never occurred to me to question the President's authority to
remove me, or to claim that I was still CNO." The Admiral also realized that retirement
would allow him to freely express his concerns about national security and, in his view,
enable him to better serve the Navy and the Nation.630
Secretary Matthews had the Navy's Legal Counsel prepare a position paper on the
legal precedents and attached this to his own 8-page explanation o f how Denfeld's
commission was delivered.631 This package helped convince the Committee that a
vacancy did exist. The Omaha World Herald wrote that "Senator Tydings called the
whole issue a 'sham battle' and added: 'The President could have removed Admiral
Denfeld if he had taken 10 oaths, signed 75 commissions, affixed 415 seals to it, and
served in the office for 15 years 6 months.'"632 This debate was easily settled in Matthews'
favor, but McCarthy's other points were more difficult to refute.
McCarthy had pointed out Matthews' unfamiliarity with the Navy and questioned
how he was able to require that any officer "disloyal to his concept o f naval strategy," or
"who disagreed with him on how to run the Navy will be transferred to the Siberia o f an
inferior post." The Senator went on to ridicule Matthews' position, observing that he had
"no background which could even remotely entitle him to this claim o f being a great naval

629Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Secretary Matthews, 24 January 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
630Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," pp. 15 and 63.
63 Memorandum from Secretary Matthews to Senator Tydings, 23 January 1950, in the Matthews Papers,
File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
632Omaha World Herald. 24 January 1950, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File
"Matthews."
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strategist." McCarthy had served with the Marines in the Pacific during World War II and
had high praise for "outstanding naval officers" such as Captain Crommelin and Vice
Admiral Bogan who placed the good of the country above their own careers. He
recommended strengthening the current laws on reprisals to prevent any recurrence o f the
Denfeld removal.633
Senator McCarthy had conducted some research to support his contention that
officers saw Admiral Denfeld's removal as a signal to conform or be quiet.
I have talked with many o f the officers in the Pentagon during the past few
weeks. . . . I asked them if they would be willing to testify if the unification
hearings were reopened. The strange thing to me was the unanimity o f their
replies. You could sum them up as, "I would be willing to testify today only if
I was prepared to resign tomorrow." Isn't that a strange situation? Isn't it an
unhealthy one?634
McCarthy had raised enough questions concerning the entire episode that Admiral
Sherman's confirmation and the Denfeld firing were referred back to Tyding's Committee
for further study.
The Republican members o f the Senate Armed Services Committee clamored for
Matthews to be subpoenaed to answer McCarthy's charges, but Tydings and his allies
defeated their proposal. Rather than demand the Secretary's views, Tydings asked
Matthews to appear to try and "clear up the Denfeld thing." Apparently, Matthews had
previously told the Senator of the blank Bogan endorsement issue, and Tydings felt that
this "story . . . might put a different light on it, and it might end the whole thing."635 On
30 January 1950, the Secretary testified in closed session for over 5 hours and answered
extensive and difficult questions from all sides. The transcript o f this discussion is not

633Senator McCarthy's statement is reprinted in "Denfeld Commission for 2d Tour Revealed," Army and
N a w Journal. 21 January 1950, p. 554.
634Ibid.
635Transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary Matthews and Senator Tydings, 10 January
1950, in the Secretary of the Navy's appointment calendar, Matthews Papers, Truman Library.
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available, but excerpts are included in a 10-page rebuttal Admiral Denfeld submitted to the
Committee and which is included in the Matthews Papers.636 News reports stated that
Matthews "did a good job" and "satisfied" the Committee.637 Senator Tydings1statement
concluded that Denfeld's removal resulted from an "honest difference o f opinion upon
Navy Department policy," and that there was no existing condition which would preclude
naval officers from presenting honest testimony to Congress. Although the Committee
took no formal vote, there was "no dissent," and Sherman's nomination went back to the
Senate floor where it was quickly confirmed.638
The fragments o f Matthews' testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee included in Admiral Denfeld's letter to Senator Knowland give the best
indication o f the Secretary's true rationale for firing the CNO. Admiral Denfeld was never
asked to provide his side of the story, even though he made it clear that he was ready to
testify if asked. Senator Knowland recommended that the Committee provide Denfeld a
copy o f Matthews' testimony and give him an opportunity to respond.639 This option was
approved, yet Senator Tydings announced his assessment of the CNO's removal before
Denfeld's comments were even requested. Although Denfeld's extensive response seems
to have had no influence on the Congressional debate, it can help researchers understand
the circumstances o f Denfeld's removal.
The most precise statement o f Matthews' actual thought process in firing the CNO
can be found in an exchange with Senator Cain during the 30 January session:

636The transcript of this session was at least 259 pages long, but is not available to the public. Letter from
Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, 9 February 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman
Library.
637" B o s s of the Navy Now in Solid," Omaha World Herald. 12 February 1950, in the Douglas County
[Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
638"Denfeld Firing Probe Closes," Omaha World Herald. 31 January 1950, in the Douglas County
[Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
639Letter from Senator Knowland to Admiral Denfeld, 2 February 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld," Truman Library.
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Senator Cain: It seems clear to me that Admiral Denfeld's usefulness to you
was not terminated because o f the Bogan letter and the two endorsements,
but it was terminated because o f the illegitimate release o f those documents.
Have I put that right?
Secretary Matthews: No that is not true. Not because of illegitimate release
but it was because of what was in the endorsement and the manner in which
he handled i t . . . the release had nothing to do except in so far as it indicated
a lack o f control of his own office.640
Secretary Matthews also testified that he believed Admiral Denfeld was "in opposition to
things I had publicly announced and the policies in which I believed," clearly meaning
unification.641 Based on the available excerpts, Matthews' primary reasons for firing the
CNO were their philosophical differences on unification and the Secretary's concern about
Denfeld's ability to administer his office effectively.
On 1 February, Drew Pearson gave some details about the closed hearings based
on "inside Senate sources." Pearson reported that Matthews believed Admiral Denfeld
had played a part in the Crommelin incidents and asserted that the CNO's signing a blank
endorsement to the Bogan letter persuaded the Secretary that this "double-dealing"
behavior "had to be stopped immediately."642 This article was the only public hint that
Matthews had any reservations about Admiral Denfeld's abilities. The Secretary's letter to
the President had not indicated any problem with Denfeld's performance or talents. In
fact, in a 28 January 1950, "Meet the Press" interview, Matthews stated that "I was very
careful not to criticize Admiral Denfeld in any particular . . . [and was] careful to see that
he kept his rank as a full Admiral."643 Historians are unlikely ever to determine whether
this hesitancy publicly to criticize Denfeld was based on friendship or a very "lawyer-like"

640Excerpt from Secretary Matthews' discussion before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 January
1950, in letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, p. 7, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld,"
Truman Library.
641Ibid., p. 5.
642Drew Pearson, "Talk About Dissension in the Navy," Washington Post, 1 February 1950, p. 12-F.
643Transcript of Secretary Matthews' interview on "Meet the Press," 28 January 1950, pp. 6 and 9, in the
Matthews Papers, File "Speeches," Truman Library.
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fear o f possible slander charges. Nonetheless, Matthews' interview revealed a
performance dimension to Admiral Denfeld's removal not previously publicized.
The ex-CNO strenuously objected to many o f the Secretary's statements. He told
Senator Knowland that "there are in the record which you sent me many contradictions
and inaccurate observations, revealing, I regret to say, the unfamiliarity o f the Secretary o f
the Navy with the simplest procedures o f the Office o f the Chief o f Naval Operations."644
The Admiral singled out Matthews' concerns over the blank endorsement as particularly
ill-founded. Regarding unification, Denfeld wrote that "I have always been for unification
and did my level best to make it work satisfactorily."645 He thereby repeated statements
he had made in Congressional testimony and again when he announced his decision to
retire.646 No matter how much Denfeld protested, he continued to be labeled as an
opponent o f unification.
Equally revealing are Denfeld's comments that he had become convinced after his
testimony that he would be fired because he "felt that the Secretary's attitude was such
that we could not get along together. "647 Admiral Denfeld also indicated that he "was
particularly bitter about the manner" by which he had been informed o f his removal. "At
that time [28 October] I was not sure o f the part the Secretary had played in having me
removed, because he had not kept me informed o f what he was doing."648 Denfeld's
statement to Senator Knowland much more explicitly addressed the firing than did
comments he later published. He therein presented a detailed explanation o f the
circumstances surrounding his endorsement o f Vice Admiral Bogan's letter and concluded

644Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, p. 2, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld,"
Truman Library.
645Ibid„ p. 5.
646His 19 January 1950 press statement included the following line on unification: "I have always been
for it and believe it would work out." (Omaha World Herald, 20 January 1950, in the Douglas County
[Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews.")
647Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, p. 8, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld,"
Truman Library.
648Ibid.
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that "in spite o f the Crommelin incident and the Bogan letter, the decision to remove me
was made as a result o f my testimony."649 This conclusion is consistent with the Admiral's
other statements. What is unusual is the seemingly unconscious highlighting o f the poor
communications which existed between Matthews and Denfeld. This situation, even
without the other issues, could have justified Matthews' decision to change CNOs.
Admiral Denfeld's letter to Senator Knowland stated that the House Armed
Services Committee had requested a copy o f the Secretary's testimony o f 30 January to
facilitate their evaluation o f the hearings and the firing of the CNO. Understandably, the
Admiral requested that a copy o f his submission be forwarded to Chairman Vinson's
Committee along with the other material.650 This request seems reasonable, but, based on
the House's final report issued on 1 March, neither Matthews' nor Denfeld's statements
were ever given to the House. Communications problems were not confined to the Navy.
Matthews continued to demonstrate his feelings o f friendship for the fired Admiral.
When the Commander o f the Boston Naval District, Rear Admiral Thebaud, asked the
Secretary if he could plan a standard retirement ceremony for the ex-CNO given the
possibility for negative publicity, Matthews responded very positively. He "heartily
approved" o f Rear Admiral Thebaud's plans and authorized the typical honors for
someone retiring with four stars, but he made no mention o f any award for the CNO for
his years o f dedicated service.651 There were other indications that relations between the
two men were not close at all. John Floberg, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
since November 1949, recalled that "the feelings o f animosity between those two
incidentally, were highly reciprocal. I was on good terms with both o f them, but there was

649Ibid., p. 9.
650Ibid., p. 3.
65 better from Rear Admiral Thebaud to Captain Ruble (Secretary Matthews' Aide), 27 January 1950, and
letter from Captain Ruble to Rear Admiral Thebaud, 31 January 1950, in the Matthews Papers, File
"Denfeld,” Truman Library.
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certainly no love lost between them."652 What comes out o f a complete review o f their
correspondence and statements during this period is a sense that they had enjoyed a good
personal relationship, but the firing had transformed their friendship into mere surface
civility.
Matthews and Denfeld spent February 1950 waiting for the House's report to put
the firing to bed. Tensions remained high given Vinson's earlier pronouncements and the
many telegrams and letters from members o f his Committee supportive o f Denfeld's
position and the principle o f free testimony. The Navy Secretary was still smarting from
Senator McCarthy's accusations in the Senate and almost became involved in a fist fight
with the ex-Marine from Wisconsin when they met at a Washington party. Amazingly,
only the timely intervention o f Secretary Symington prevented physical violence.653
Matthews' patience with the entire issue was wearing thin. He was uncharacteristically
harsh in his 8 February response to J. D. Ryan's criticism o f his decision to fire the CNO:
"I am giving you the foregoing with the suggestion that before you pass judgment on
something you know nothing about, you secure a knowledge o f the facts involved."654
Denfeld maintained a low profile, waiting until his retirement to begin a public
campaign to reverse the Navy's fortunes. He hoped that Congressman Vinson would
continue to support his position. In his 9 February letter to Senator Knowland he justified
his Congressional testimony by claiming that he would "have been derelict" in his duty if
he had altered his convictions "to suit the expediencies o f the moment."655 Concerning the
Bogan endorsement and the commission issue, he complained that

652Letter from Assistant Secretary John Floberg to Paolo Coletta, 1976, quoted in Paolo E. Coletta, The
United States N a w and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. (Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware
Press, 1981), p. 208.
653George Dixon, "First McCarthy vs. Matthews Meeting Almost Exploded," Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch,
21 February 1950.
654Letter from Secretary Matthews to J. D. Ryan of Larchmont, New York, 8 February 1950, in the
Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld," Truman Library.
655Letter from Admiral Denfeld to Senator Knowland, p. 1, in the Matthews Papers, File "Denfeld,"
Truman Library.
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all these minor circumstances have been magnified out o f all proportion with
the result that the real point in this case is beclouded, namely, that I was
punished for having expressed my honest convictions before a committee of
the Congress o f the United States.656
The long-awaited House Report on the Hearings on Unification and Strategy was
issued on 1 March 1950. Its 58-page narrative summary is a masterpiece o f dispassionate
analysis. Vinson thereby provided a report which avoided placing Congress in the position
o f evaluating military weapons or constructing war plans, even though much o f the
testimony seemed to ask for the House Committee's vote on these issues. The report
encouraged the services to settle their differences through training and mutual respect
rather than public argument. It supported the assessment o f weapons such as the B-36 by
the Department's Weapons System Evaluation Group, criticized the National Security
Council for failing to provide the JCS with an adequate national security strategy to
support military planning, and pointed out many specific areas where unification could be
improved. The report concluded by stating that the Committee found "no unification
Puritans in the Pentagon."657
The report urged the services to "resolve their professional differences fairly and
without rancor and to perform their professional duties . . . with dignity, with decorum,
and" with due respect to the other services' views.658 It praised the "extended frank and
honest testimony" and recognized that petty rivalry was not the cause o f the disagreements
but rather "a genuine inability for these services to agree, fundamentally and
professionally, on the art o f warfare."659 Noting the emotional moments during and after
the hearings, the report labeled the witnesses "patriotic men" and characterized the

656Ibid., p. 2.
657House Unification and Strategy Report, pp. 1 - 4 2 .
658Ibid„ p. 55.
659Ibid„ p. 33.
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"captious criticism o f such men" as "unworthy and a disservice to the Nation's defense."660
Only one o f the report's 33 conclusions was not approved unanimously - its
characterization o f the firing o f Admiral Denfeld as a reprisal for his testimony.
Much o f the report dealt with the fundamental issue o f the freedom o f witnesses to
testify without fear before Congress. Three pages were devoted to describing the
assurances given by Matthews and Johnson that there would be no reprisals. The
Committee stated that if free testimony was hindered, "effective representative
government in this country [would be] gravely imperiled. "661 Given this understanding, 23
o f the Committee's 31 members supported the finding that
the removal o f Admiral Denfeld was a reprisal against him for giving testimony
to the House Armed Services Committee. This act is a blow against effective
representative government in that it tends to intimidate witnesses and hence
discourages the rendering o f free and honest testimony to the Congress; it
violated promises made to the witnesses by the Committee, the Secretary of
the Navy, and the Secretary o f Defense; and it violated the Unification Act,
into which a provision was written to specifically prevent actions o f this nature
against the Nation's highest military and naval officers.662
The report expands on this finding, stating that "the Committee deeply regrets and
deplores this retaliation against a witness who gave a committee o f Congress, at its
request, his honest, frank and candid views o f matters of great national importance."663
The document rejects the arguments that "some more distant cause" led to Denfeld's
removal, and warns that if this type of reprisal is repeated, "the Committee will ask the
Congress to exercise its constitutional power of redress."664
The eight dissenting Representatives on the House Armed Services Committee
issued a supplemental explanation of why they did not think Admiral Denfeld's removal

660Ibid.,
661Ibid.,
662Ibid.,
663Ibid.,
664Ibid.
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was a "reprisal." All eight Congressmen were Democrats: Kilday (Texas), Havenner
(Calif.), Price (111 ), Fisher (Texas), Green (Pa.), Walsh (Ind.), Clemente (N.Y.), and Doyle
(Iowa). Four o f them had previously served in the Army or the Air Force, and another
had had a son killed in World War II with the Army Air Corps.665 Their statement noted
Secretary Matthews' "carefully weighed words" in his letter to the President and
concluded that "there is absolutely nothing before the Committee, privately or publicly, to
controvert this statement o f the Secretary o f the Navy." Taking a very legalistic approach,
the group decided that the Committee's conclusion was based entirely on "a priori
reasoning" and that it had made the Secretary appear to have been a liar.666
It is difficult to argue with this minority opinion's logic. The Committee had held
no new hearings following the firing o f the CNO and had not even obtained copies o f
Matthews' January testimony before the Senate on this issue, yet most o f its members felt
adequately informed to judge the motivation o f Secretary Matthews. The dissenting
statement contended that although the Secretary o f the Navy had "adequately settled the
matter" in his Senate hearing, "the House Armed Services Committee has reached a
diametrically opposite conclusion without hearing the testimony o f the Secretary o f the
Navy against whom the verdict is rendered." Neither side mentioned the fact that Admiral
Denfeld had not been given any opportunity to air his views on this matter. The eight
Representatives concluded their statement by asserting, "this is an unsound manner in
which to conduct public business. It is prejudging a case without hearing the evidence. It
is assuming, not proving, the facts o f a case."667
Because the House Committee was not a court and delivered no legal verdict, it
was not required to cite evidence in support o f its 1 March report. Nevertheless, the
Committee's credibility suffered greatly from the perception that it was only based on
665Congressional Directory: 81st Congress. 1st Session. (Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1949).
666House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 57.
667Ibid., p. 58.
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rumor and supposition. The Omaha World Herald supported the minority opinion and
concluded that the report was "manifestly unfair" on its characterization o f the Denfeld
firing as a reprisal.668 Even the ten Representatives in the majority who advocated turning
the matter over to the Justice Department agreed that only "a prim a facie case" had been
made.669 For whatever reason, Vinson's Committee had chosen to take an aggressive
stand against the civilian leadership o f the Defense Department based on supposition and
circumstantial evidence.
The ten Congressmen who urged the Justice Department to look into the firing
included nine Republicans and one Democrat, Hebert o f Louisiana. The Republicans in
this group included Representatives Arends, Cole, and Van Zandt who had played
prominent roles in earlier stages o f the hearings. Their recommendation followed the
defeat o f a motion in Committee to seek criminal action against Secretary Matthews for
injuring a witness.670 The ten believed that he had violated Title 18 o f section 1505 o f the
United States Criminal Code, "Influencing or Injuring Witness Before Agencies and
Committees." It authorized a maximum penalty o f $5,000 and/or five years imprisonment
for injuring "any party or witness in his person or property on account o f his . . . testifying
or having testified."671
This recommendation seems to have been the most legally correct o f the three
because it made no attempt to pass judgment without evidence or reject out o f hand any
possibility o f impropriety. This group made the logical recommendation to pass the
investigation o f this matter to an agency which was authorized to investigate possible
criminal acts and determine possible legal action based on the available evidence:

668"The Navy is a Team," Omaha World Herald. 3 March 1950, in the Douglas County [Nebraska]
Historical Society, File "Matthews."
669House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 58.
670The vote on this motion was 21 to 11. John Jarrell, "Denfeld Case Was Reprisal," Omaha World
Herald. 1 March 1950, in the Douglas County [Nebraska] Historical Society, File "Matthews."
671House Unification and Strategy Report, p. 58.
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we do not question the powers inherent in the executive establishment to
transfer or demote personnel. Nor do we attempt to pass judgment on the
motives which may have actuated those in responsible positions . . . . We
simply state that a prim a facie case has been made which indicates that the
statutes o f the United States relating to the protection o f witnesses may have
been violated.672
Although this option appears in hindsight to have been the most logical o f the choices
open to Congressman Vinson, he elected to merely state his majority opinion that
Matthews had fired Denfeld as a reprisal, and take no action on any further investigation.
There is no evidence that the Justice Department ever made any attempt to look into the
matter, and the two houses o f Congress made no effort to reconcile their different
interpretations o f the firing o f Admiral Denfeld.
The ex-CNO was now retired and free to openly express his frustrations. Denfeld
chose to issue a series o f three articles in Collier's magazine to tell his side o f the firing and
to try to convince the American people that the Navy's position in the hearings had been
correct. His first piece, "Why I Was Fired," appeared in the 18 March 1950 issue o f this
magazine and is a concise and factual representation o f his impressions o f the
circumstances involved in his removal. The only significant omissions are the Admiral's
signing o f the blank endorsement to Bogan's letter and Admiral Sherman's role in the
hearings. Denfeld never directly criticized the President, the Secretary o f Defense, or the
Secretary o f the Navy, preferring to keep his points professional and respectful. He
defended his record on unification by asserting that "no one can say t h a t . . . I did not do
my level best to make unification work."673 Despite his strong support for an unpopular
position, Denfeld felt he had received only "contemptuous treatment" at the hands o f his
civilian supervisors. Regarding the charge that he did not demonstrate sufficient loyalty,

672Ibid., p. 59.
673Denfeld, "Why I Was Fired," p. 64.
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he wrote that "a superior cannot expect loyalty from his subordinates unless he gives it in
full measure. And one essential o f loyalty . . . [is] common everyday politeness."674
Denfeld describes himself as "the first victim o f the reprisal" and asserts that "there
is not the slightest doubt that the reason for my removal was my testimony. "675 He based
this conclusion on his sense that relations between himself and the Navy Secretary had
been good until he had testified before Congress. He acknowledged the Secretary's
statement at their 4 October meeting concerning his continued usefulness as CNO, but
believes that the words were not meant to indicate that the Secretary had decided to
remove him. Regarding his future, Denfeld notes that he had been urged to run for
political office, but "I have no thought o f doing so. The last thing I want to do is become
a political issue."676 This concern seems incredible given the political firestorm which his
statement and firing had already produced.
"Why I Was Fired" presents the Admiral's case well, but not so comprehensively
and forthrightly as his private letter to Senator Knowland had done. His omission o f the
blank endorsement issue and reticence to criticize the Navy's civilian leaders weakened this
article. All incidents therein described support the conclusion that a leadership vacuum
existed in the Navy and that a communication breakdown between the CNO and the
Navy's senior officers caused the former's removal.
The Admiral's second article appeared on 25 March and was titled "The ONLY
CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK." It concentrated on the circumstances surrounding
the cancellation o f the U.S. S. United States and the functioning o f unification in the
Department o f Defense. More directly than the Admiral's first submission, it included
some emotional descriptions and accusations about the participants in the cancellation o f
the carrier. Denfeld came very close to calling Secretary Johnson a liar in reflating the

674Ibid., p. 13.
675Ibid., pp. 13 and 64.
676Ibid., p. 63.
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Defense Secretary's statement that he had read all the Joint Chiefs' statements on the
carrier project by Friday, 22 April. The ex-CNO claimed that his draft hadn't even been
completed until late on that day, and reports that he "was never able to find any official
record indicating that he [Johnson] was given the Joint Chiefs' views before . . . April
23rd."677 Denfeld offers several recommendations for improving the operation o f the
Defense Department, including the adding o f the Commandant o f the Marine Corps to the
JCS, and adopting a new law to require Congressional approval for any "administrative
cutbacks" in approved defense budgets.678
In his third and final article, the retired Admiral focused on the future. "The
Nation NEEDS the Navy" attempts to justify the requirement for a strong sea service by
analyzing the various missions assigned to the Navy and assessing the forces required to
accomplish them. Denfeld points out that "we have a tremendous fleet - in mothballs,"
and continues his advocacy for each service to control the use o f its allocated funds, rather
than allowing a 2-to-l vote in the JCS to restrict vital weapons development projects.679
In the realm o f strategic planning, he writes that "the Navy has been plagued by having its
strategy dictated by nonprofessionals who are ignorant o f the conduct o f warfare in
general, and by others who know nothing o f the Navy or its use o f air power."680 Sadly,
Denfeld's arguments all appeared to object to civilian control and unification, no matter
how many times he claimed to have supported these principles.
Secretary Matthews declined to comment on Denfeld's Collier's pieces, but did
ruffle some feathers with a March speech in Denfeld's home state. The Navy Secretary
was effusive in his praise for the great job Admiral Sherman was doing to restore order to
the Department. Admiral Denfeld refused to comment on this matter.681 By this time,

677Denfeld, "The ONLY CARRIER the Air Force Ever SANK," p. 46.
678Ibid„ p. 51.
679Denfeld, "The Nation NEEDS the Navy," p. 44.
680Ibid., p. 37.
681 "Denfeld Tight-Lipped on Navy Chiefs Blast," Boston American, 15 March 1950, p. 11.
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Denfeld had decided to run for the Republican nomination as Governor o f Massachusetts
and was forced to repress his personal feelings in the interest o f his campaign. Secretary
Matthews had begun to feel much more confident in his position after having weathered
the "Revolt o f the Admirals" with flying colors.
In early 1950, the Defense Department began to recover from the bitter hearings.
The Weapons System Evaluation Group finally presented its assessment o f the current
strategic bombing plans to the President in January. Its report concluded that the "atomic
blitz" strategy "could be carried out presently only in theory" and estimated a 30 to 50
percent B-36 attrition rate on the initial missions.682 It went on to note the lack o f reliable
intelligence on Soviet air defenses and generally echoed all o f Denfeld's concerns about
this plan. In yet another indication o f the poor communications in the Nation's defense
leadership, a witness to this briefing recorded that "as the briefing ended, Johnson
exclaimed, 'There, I told you they'd say the B-36 is a good plane,' but Truman looked
disgusted and snapped, 'no damnit, they said just the opposite.'"683 Even an 18 month
evaluation could not settle this basic question or bring the Defense leadership together.
The Navy made several notable changes after Denfeld's removal. Admiral
Sherman recognized the poor job that the Navy's public relations office had done during
the unification controversies and overhauled its organization along lines Admiral Denfeld's
friend Captain Karig had recommended. The newly created "Chief o f Naval Information"
would work directly for the CNO in the future.684 In an amazing turnaround, Johnson
approved the construction o f a new aircraft carrier on 22 June 1950, only three days
before the North Korean attack. This new vessel was to be named after Secretary
Forrestal and, although not the revolutionary flush-deck type that Denfeld had wanted,
was capable o f carrying modem jet aircraft.685 Even using its existing carriers, the Navy
682Rearden, p. 409.
683Ibid., p. 410.
684Coletta, The United States N aw and Defense Unification. 1947 - 1953. p. 214.
685"Navy Carrier Has Go-Ahead," Omaha World Herald. 23 June 1950, p. 1.
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began taking nuclear weapons to sea with attack aircraft in February 1950 and has
continued to deploy a sea-based nuclear capability to this day.686 Admiral Sherman was
proving capable o f getting done what Denfeld had only dreamed o f doing, but it will never
be known if this was due to his own performance or was merely a consequence o f his
predecessor's personal sacrifice.
The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 highlighted many other
deficiencies in the Nations' defense structure. Truman's and Johnson's economy plan had
been based on the premise that there would be no war in the near future. Now that they
had been proven wrong, the President allowed his Defense Secretary to take most o f the
criticism for the lack of preparedness. Because Johnson had already fallen out o f favor
with the President due to what the President saw as his "egotistical desire to run the entire
government" and his poor performance in managing the Defense Department, Truman
requested his resignation on 19 September 1950.687 Rear Admiral Dennison stated that
one reason why Truman decided to remove Johnson was his displeasure at Johnson's part
in the firing o f Admiral Denfeld.688 Although never publicly acknowledged, the poor
grades given the B-36 by the Weapons System Evaluation Group and the demonstration
o f the Navy's utility following the Korean attack had validated much o f Denfeld's position
and discredited his opponents.
Secretary Matthews eventually outlasted both Johnson and Admiral Sherman but
not by much. Admiral Denfeld's successor died o f a sudden heart attack in July 1951 after
having done a spectacular job in his brief tenure as CNO. Secretary Matthews stayed on
but was removed by the President at the end o f this same month for having "indiscreetly
called for a preventive war against the Soviet Union."689 Matthews was given the post o f

686Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. N aw . 1943 - 1946. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 256.
687McCullough, p. 792.
688Dennison interview, p. 142.
689Potter, Nimitz. p. 448.
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Ambassador to Ireland but only lived until October 1952. Within three years o f Denfeld's
removal, his strategic concepts had come back into favor and his opponents had been
discredited, yet his reputation did not recover.
The ex-CNO failed in his quest to become the Governor o f Massachusetts and
settled in as the Shell Oil Company's Washington office manager, a position he retained
until his death in March 1972. He held various voluntary jobs including President o f the
Naval Academy's Alumni Association from July 1951 through 1955, but never regained
his national prominence. In 1951, he joined Leahy, Nimitz, Halsey, King, Radford,
Blandy, and Spruance as honorary pall bearers at Admiral Sherman's funeral, but he never
joined these legendary naval heroes in the history books.690 The Navy named entire
classes o f ships after Leahy, Nimitz, Sherman, Forrestal and Burke, and individual
combatant vessels for Blandy, Conolly, and even Crommelin, but Denfeld's name has not
even graced the stern o f a yard tug.691 Even President Truman was honored in 1995 by
having named after him an aircraft carrier twice as big as the "supercarrier" he had
canceled in 1949. Admiral Denfeld was left to take comfort in his real achievements
which had generally been obscured by the enduring ignominy o f the "Revolt o f the
Admirals."
The inter-service rivalry o f the 1940s continues somewhat muted to the present
day. A 1993 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings article actually called for another
"Admirals' Revolt" to oppose the Army's and Air Force's efforts to redistribute the roles
and missions o f the Armed Services.692 The Navy Times observed in March 1994 that
these conflicts "are deeply ingrained and seemingly intractable, and every now and then
they manifest themselves in bizarre ways."693 Another March 1994 newspaper article,
690"Admiral Sherman Laid to Rest," Shipmate. September 1951, p. 6.
69 dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. 8 vols., (Washington: Naval History Division, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, 1991).
692James L. George, "Where's the Admirals' Revolt?" U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings. May 1993,
pp. 66-71.
693N a w Times, 14 March 1994, p. 31.
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titled "Navy, Air Force in Power Struggle Bombers vs. Carriers," would certainly not have
seemed unusual Denfeld's day.694 In 1994, Admiral Boorda, the CNO, employed a
football analogy borrowed from General Bradley's "Fancy Dans'" speech and reiterated
Admiral Denfeld's basic arguments in stating that "we can't put all our money into defense,
offense, or special teams . . . We have to be good at all three or we will lose. One player,
or set o f players, will not win the Super B o w l . . . it takes 'em all. "695 Neither Admiral
Denfeld's efforts as a conciliator nor his courageous stand in the Congressional hearings
were able to materially effect the course o f this debate. Many of 1949's passionate issues
and philosophical differences continue to dominate the Department in 1995.

694"Navy, Air Force in Power Struggle Bombers vs. Carriers," Norfolk Virginian Pilot. 21 March 1994,
p. 1.
695Jeremy M. Boorda, Admiral USN, "Naval Service Day Presentation, CNO Brief to the Roles and
Missions Commission, 20 September 1994," Copy of briefing slides in author's possession.
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CONCLUSION

Admiral Denfeld was a man of conscience, committed to the defense o f his Nation
and the best interests o f his service. He was placed in the extremely difficult position of
having to implement the President's passionate desire for military unification while
maintaining the morale and efficiency o f his subordinates who were not convinced o f the
wisdom o f this course. Denfeld appeared to compromise and postpone wherever possible,
thereby acting as an impediment to progress rather than a constructive force for change or
restraint. He neglected to keep his subordinates informed o f his efforts and compromises,
thereby causing them to lose confidence in his leadership and eventually so exasperating
them that they took matters into their own hands.
Compounding these difficulties, the CNO seems to have failed in communicating
clearly and promptly both up and down the chain o f command. All evidence indicates that
Denfeld and Matthews liked each other personally but never understood each other
professionally. This divided and dysfunctional leadership team was doomed to fail.
Matthews was an intelligent and patriotic individual who was far from being Johnson's
loyal lackey. If the Admiral and the Secretary had been able to agree on a consistent and
compelling policy, the history of the Defense Department in the year before the Korean
War probably would have been less chaotic and painful. The poor communications
between Denfeld and Matthews hamstrung the Navy and justified a change in CNOs.
Secretary Matthews' greatest mistake in dealing with the firing was his having
explained his decision too much like a lawyer and not enough like a statesman. His public
contention that the Bogan endorsement alone caused him to decide to remove Denfeld
certainly could not have been disproved but was not persuasive. Matthews' private
mention o f Denfeld's mismanagement allowed the Secretary to convince the Senate that he
was acting properly while protecting Denfeld's reputation. But this strategy did not have
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any impact on the House, the Navy, or the public. Matthews seems to have forgotten that
he was no longer in an insulated courtroom with a twelve-person jury. The verdict on his
conduct was delivered by millions of citizens who had no knowledge o f all the information
concerning Denfeld's performance at Matthews' disposal. His misjudgment hurt the
President and the country by unnecessarily adding fuel to the already-burning fire o f inter
service rivalry.
Admiral Denfeld was a good strategist and a capable naval officer. He made a
sincere and dedicated effort to protect the best interests o f the Nation but was not enough
o f a motivational team-builder to dispel the festering anger among naval officers over what
they believed to be funding for an ineffective weapon - the B-36 - and Secretary Johnson's
favoritism toward the Air Force. Denfeld's ineffective leadership and inability to
communicate his ideas and concerns to both his subordinates and superiors inevitably led
to his downfall. The testimony he delivered during the Congressional hearings on
unification and strategy was courageous and, for the most part, accurate. It was not the
cause o f his removal. It does facilitate assessment o f Matthews' decision to fire the CNO
to the extent that it reveals poor coordination at the highest levels of the Navy
Department. Admiral Denfeld failed as a communicator and as a leader; and Matthews
was unable to make the transition from lawyer to statesman. Both Admiral Denfeld and
Secretary Matthews, as individuals, deserve far more thorough and objective historical
evaluation than they have heretofore received. But, as a team, their accomplishments
were sadly deficient. The CNO's firing was driven by personality conflicts and perceived
administrative deficiencies, not by any dramatic insubordination or disloyalty.
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27 O ctober 194-9

D e a r M r. P r e s i d e n t :
When I becam e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e N avy on May t w e n t y - f i f t h « f
t h i s y e a r , I d id so r e a l i z i n g t h a t b e c a u se o f c e r t a i n c o n d i tio n s
t h e n e x i s t i n g i n t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e N a v y a n d w h i c h we d i s c u s s e d
a t t h a t t i m e , t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e d u t i e s o f S e c r e t a r y w o u ld
in v o lv e grave d i f f i c u l t i e s .
E v e n t s w h ic h h a v e s i n c e t r a n s p i r e d
h a v e m o re t h a n j u s t i f i e d t h a t a p p r e h e n s i o n .
You w i l l rem e m b er t h a t i p o u r p r e l i m i n a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f my
a p p o in tm e n t as S e c r e t a r y , you em p h asized t h a t v i t a l im p o rta n c e o f
th e s u c c e s s f u l im p le m e n ta tio n o f th e U n i f i c a t i o n Aot o f 1947, as
e n a c t e d by C o n g r e s s ,
I t h e n ' a b v i s e d you o f my u n q u a l i f i e d a p p r o v a l
o f . . t h e p o l i c y o f u n i f i c a t i o n a s e m b o d ie d i n t h a t A c t a n d i n t h e
p r o p o s e d am end m en ts t o t h e la v r w h i c h y o u h a d s u b m i t t e d to. C o n g r e s s ,
F u r t h e r m o r e , I p l e d g e d my b e s t e f f o r t s a s S e c r e t a r y t o a s s i s t t h e
N av y t o f u n c t i o n i n t h e u t m o s t g o o d f a i t h a s a f u l l m em ber i n t h e
U n i f i e d D e f e n s e Team,
You c a r e f u l l y p o i n t e d o u t how e s s e n t i a l i t w o u l d be t o h a v e
■the p r o p e r m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l i n k e y p o s i t i o n s , u p t o a n d i n c l u d i n g
C h i e f o f N a v a l O p e r a t i o n s , i n o r d e r t o a t t a i n t h a t much d e s i r e d
re s u lt.
You a l s o s t a t e d t h a t y o u w o u ld c o o p e r a t e t h a t , a s S e c r e t a r y ,
I m i g h t be s u p p o r t e d a t a l l t i m e s by i n d i v i d u a l s o f my own s e l e c t i o n
in p o s itio n s o f ev ery im p o rta n t s u b o rd in a te c a p a c ity .
V e ry s o o n a f t e r I a s s u m e d o f f i c e , i t becam e e v i d e n t t o me
t h a t t h e r e 'was d e f i n i t e r e s i s t a n c e on t h e p a r t o f som e n a v a l o f 
f i c e r s t o a c c e p t i n g u n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e Armed S e r v i c e s , n o t w i t h s t a n d 
i n g t h e f a c t t h a t i t w as e s t a b l i s h e d b y l a v ; .
T h a t p q n d i t i o n w as
r e f l e c t e d by p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e s t a t e m e n t s f r o m v a r i o u s s o u r c e s
a n d by o t h e r m e t h o d s . Some o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d i n t h o s e
p r o c e d u r e s h e l d v e r y i m p o r t a n t a s s i g n m e n t s i n t h e .Navy*
F o r r e a s o n s 'w hich I f e e l a d e q u a t e , I r e f r a i n e d f r o m p r o m p t l y
b r i n g i n g t h a t s i t u a t i o n t o y o u r o f f i c i a l a t t e n t i o n a s Commander
in C h ie f,
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• - -One o f , the. f i r s t ' 'dutie s-;:.%oj^qon.fijopt - m e - 'a ^ ^ S .e c r .e t a r y .y t h e .y /•
s e l e c t i o n o f an a p p o i n te e * t o s u c c e e d A d m ira l/D e n fe ld a s C h ie f o f
N a v a l O p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e t e r m b e g i n n i n g on ; t h e f i f t e e n t h o f n e x t
D ecem ber. My f i n a l d e c i s i o n , a f t e r c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r i n g v a r i o u s
p h a s e s o f t h e p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d , was t o reco m m en d A d m i r a l D e n f e l d
f o r r e a p p o in tm e n t, a n d s u c h a reco m m en d atio n w en t f o r w a r d t o you
t h r o u g h S e c r e t a r y o f D e f e n s e J o h n s o n on A u g u s t s e c o n d , 19 49*
One
o f t h e m o s t p e r s u a s i v e o f t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h l e d me t o make
t h i s r e c o m m e n d a t io n w as t h e v a l u b t o t h e N av y , a n d t o t h e D e p a r t 
m ent o f D e f e n s e , w h i c h I e x p e c t e d t o f l o w f r o m c o n t i n u i t y o f s e r v i c e
bp A d m ir a l D e n f e l d .
At t h a t t i m e , 'w o r k i n g w i t h A d m ir a l D e n f e l d whom I h i g h l y
e s t e e m , I h a d e v e r y r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t we w e r e i n c o m p l e t e
a g r e e m e n t on a l l i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a f f e c t i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
o f t h e D e p a r tm e n t o f t h e N a v y .
I f e l t s u r e t h a t su ch a h arm o n io u s
r e l a t i o n s h i p . w o u l d c o n t i n u e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t s o o n becam e c l e a r
t h a t my e x p e c t a t i o n w o u l d n o t b e r e a l i z e d .
On T u e s d a y , t h e f o u r t h , o f t h i s m o n th , e v e n t s h a d t a k e n s u c h
s c o u r s e t h a t , in. a c o n f e r e n c e ;, h a d w i t h A d m i r a l D e n f e l d e a r l y t h a t ,
d a y , I f r a n k l y s t a t e d t o him t h a t I f e a r e d h i s u s e f u l n e s s a s
C h i e f o f N a v a l O p e r a t i o n s had" t e r m i n a t e d .
You may r e c a l l " t h a t ' I
m en tio n ed t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f A d m iral D e n f e ld ’ s r e p la c e m e n t in t h e
.. c o u rs e , o f o.ur. d i s c u s s i o n i n y o u r o f f i c e when I was t h e r e - i n . ..com.--- ...
pan ;/ w i t h S e c r e t a r y J o h n s o n on O c t o b e r f i f t h .
My r e l a t i o n s a s o e c r e t a r y o f t h e N a v y w i t h A d m i r a l D e n f e ld
a s C h i e f o f N a v a l O p e r a t i o n s h a v e f i n a l l y becom e s u c h t h a t I f i n d ■
i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o w o rk w i t h h im i n t h e h a r m o n i o u s r e 
l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h s h o u l d p r e v a i l bet/ween t h e o c c u p a n t s o f t h o s e tw o
o ffic ia l p o sitio n s.
A m i l i t a r y e s t a b l is h m e n t i s n o t a p o l i t i c a l dem ocracy.
I n t e g r i t y o f command i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e a t a l l t i m e s .
T h e r e can be
no t w i l i g h t z o n e i n t h e m e a s u r e o f l o y a l t y t o s u p e r i o r s a n d r e s p e c t
f o r a u t h o r i t y e x i s t i n g b etw een v a r i o u s o f f i c i a l r a n k s .
In a b ility
t o c o n f o r m t o s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r m i l i t a r y s t a b i l i t y w o u ld d i s 
q u a l i f y a n y o f u s f o r p o s i t i o n s s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e Commander i n
C h ie f.
The e x i s t e n c e o f t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n p r e v a i l i n g b e t w e e n t h e
h i g h e s t c i v i l i a n a n d t h e h i g h e s t m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r o f t h e N av y m akes
i t u t t e r l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r -me, a s S e c r e t a r y o f t h e N a v y , t o a d m i n i s t e r
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t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e N a v y i n t h e m a n n er I b e l i e v e v i t a l t o n a t i o n a l
s e c u rity *
B e l i e v i n g a s I do i n t h e v i t a l i m p o r t a n c e o f m a i n t a i n i n g
c i v i l i a n c o n tro l o v er th e m ilita r y - e s ta b lis h m e n t, a c o n tin u a n c e of
s u c h a c o n d i t i o n w o u l d b e i n t o l e r a b l e t o me a s S e c r e t a r y o f t h e N a v y ,
R e lu c ta n tly , t h e r e f o r e , * b u t in a c c o rd a n c e w ith w hat I b e l i e v e
to be f o r t h e go®d o f t h e c o u n t r y , I r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t y o u a s
P r e s i d e n t a n d Commander i n C h i e f t o a u t h o r i z e t h e t r a n s f e r o f
A d m ir a l D e n f e l d t o e t h e r i m p o r t a n t d u t i e s , a n d t h e s e l e c t i o n o f
h is s u c c e s s o r a s C h ie f o f N aval O p e ra tio n s a t t h e e a r l i e s t c o n v e n ie n t
d a te .
i

wt/avs
atrs

R e s p e c tfu lly su b m itte d ,

/s/ Francis p. Matthews

The P r e s i d e n t ,
The W h i t e M o u s e ,'
W a s h i n g t o n , D. C«

THE WHITE HOUSE
W a s h in g to n

O c t o b e r 2 7 , 19 4 9

MEMORANHIM FDR:

S e c r e t a r y o f t h e N av y

From;

T he P r e s i d e n t

O ver & lo n g p e rio d o f tim e I h av e d e v o te d
c o n s i d e r a b l e t h o u g h t t o v a r i o u s a s p e c t s o f t h e p r o b l e m w h ic h
y ou d i s c u s s i n y o u r l e t t e r o f t o d a y 1s d a t e .
T h e a c t i o n w h ic h y o u recom m end m e e t s
■with my a p p r o v a l .

A c c o r d i n g l y , I h e r e b y a u t h o r i z e you t o

a r r a n g e f o r a n d c a r r y o u t t h e t r a n s f e r w h i c h y o u re c o m m e n d ,

'£

/ s / H a r r y Truman

F leet A d m ir a l E r n e st J . K in g

F le e t A d m ir a l C h ester N in iitz

F le e t A d m ir a l W illia m F . H g lse y

A d m ir a l L o u is E . D e n f e ld

C a p ta in J o h n C r o m m e lin

A d m ir a l R ic h a r d L . C o n o lly

A d m ir a l T h o m a s C. K in k a id

A d m ir a l A r t h u r W . R a d f o r d

:p8
A ll

SW®

Admiral W illia m II. P . B la n d y

A t K ey W est, 1948: from left, A d m ir a ls R adford and D e n f e ld , G e n e ra l
G ruenther, F leet A d m ir a l Leahy, A ssis ta n t S ecreta ry o f D e f e n s e M c N e i l ,
S e c r e a ta r y o f D e f e n s e Forrestal, G e n e ra ls S p a atz, N o r s t a d t, Bradley, and
W edem eyer. Courtesy o f Mrs. A rthur W. Radford

■ ifw
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DENFELD CH RO NO LO G Y

1947
15 December

14 September

President Truman signed Denfeld's
commission for second term as
CNO

20 September

VADM Bogan wrote Secretary
Matthews regarding Navy morale

ADM Denfeld assumed duties as
CNO

1948
1 1 - 1 4 March

Key West Conference

20 - 22 Aug

Newport Conference

1949
28 March

23 September

28 September
Louis Johnson sworn in as
SECDEF

7 April

Observance of "Service Days"
cancelled

18 April

USS United States keel laying

23 April

Carrier cancellation

25 April

Secretary Sullivan resigned

25 May

Francis Matthews appointed
SECNAV

9 June

House ordered investigation into
the B-36 and defense unification

3 October

3 October

25 June

2 August

RADM Gallery Saturday Evening
Post article, "An Admiral Talks
Back to the Airmen" published

Truman press conference
announcing Russian atomic
explosion
ADM Denfeld endorsed Bogan
letter
Chairman Vinson met with
Navy leaders on postponing
second phase of hearings
Crommelin leaked Bogan letter
and endorsements

4 October

Denfeld told by Matthews that his
usefullness as CNO may have been
terminated by Bogan matter

5 October

Secretary Matthews mentioned the
possibility of removing ADM
Denfeld to the President

5 Oct - 22 Oct

House hearings on unification and
strategy

13 October

Denfeld testimony

15 October

Matthews met with FADM Nimitz
in New York

19 October

Gen Bradley testimony, labeled
admirals "Fancy Dans"

27 October

Denfeld fired by President

Matthews recommended Denfeld
for second term

9 Aug - 25 Aug House hearings on the B-36
10 August

National Security Act of 1949
passed

28 October
11 August

President Truman forwarded
Denfeld's renomination to the
Senate for confirmation

Denfeld and Matthews met,
discuss future assignment

2 November

ADM Forrest Sherman sworn in as
CNO under a recess nomination

Senate confirmed Denfeld's
renomination

10 December

Denfeld informed Matthews he
will not accept the European
command

15 August

10 September

CAPT Crommelin made first
press statements

14 December

15 December

ADM Denfeld issued formal letter
stating his intention not to accept
European command

1952

ADM Denfeld's first term as CNO
officially expired

1972

18 October

29 March
1950
5 January

President Truman forwarded ADM
Sherman's nomination for a lour
year CNO term to the Senate for
confirmation

12 January

Secretary Matthews testified before
the Senate Armed Services
Committee that ADM Denfeld's
commission for a second term had
not been issued to him

18 January

Senator McCarthy accusations
against Secretary Matthews ("lying
or just incompetent")

18 January

ADM Denfeld announced his
application for retirement effective
1 March

23 January

Harmon Report and WSEG
Evaluation of strategic bombing
briefed to President Truman

1 March

House report on Unification and
strategy hearings issued

25 April

New carrier, USS Forrestal,
authorized

25 June

North Korean attack on South
Korea

19 September

SECDEF Johnson fired by
President Truman

1951
July

ADM Sherman died in office

30 July

F. P. Matthews removed as
SECNAV. Selected as
Ambassador to Ireland

Ambassador Matthews died

ADM Denfeld died
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